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Abstract 
 
The study examines the influence of global, country and firm-level governance on social 
and environmental reporting (SER) in developing countries from the institutional 
perspective. Using the Bloomberg ESG disclosure, worldwide governance indicators, and 
other databases for 45 developing countries from 2007–2016, the study examines the 
influence of global, country and firm-level governance on SER. Results show that all three 
levels of governance have significant positive influences on SER, with global governance 
having the strongest influence on SER in developing countries. 
By interviewing 26 corporate and 23 non-corporate interviewees, the study explores 
‘why and how’ the global, country and firm-level governance influence SER in Bangladesh, 
as a case of developing countries. The findings show that SER in Bangladesh is mainly 
driven by the coercive pressures from the global market, followed by the normative pressures 
from the firm-level, and the cultural-cognitive pressures from the country-level. Specifically, 
SER is primarily aimed at mitigating the coercive pressures from the powerful economic 
stakeholders, namely international buyers and lenders followed by the normative pressures 
at the firm-level to be endorsed for SER, thereby branding and expanding the business both 
at home and abroad. The country governance in Bangladesh is not conducive for SER due 
to the absence of coercive pressures (there is coercion for political donations, not for SER), 
normative pressures (lack of national guidelines for SER or CSR), and cultural cognitive 
pressures (lack of awareness of and interest in SER). The firm-level governance in 
Bangladesh is mainly superficial, and the inclusion of the so-called independent directors 
and female directors does not necessarily promote SER. The ‘board independence’ and 
‘board gender-diversity’ are ‘in appearance’ rather than ‘in fact’, because of the lack of 
independent mindset, knowledge and expertise, benefit dependency (co-option), family 
control, patriarchy, male dominance, and honour culture. 
Findings indicate that SER is largely symbolic and used as an expedient response to the 
coercive as well as normative pressures exerted by the international powerful economic 
stakeholders followed by the normative pressures and expertise of SER at the firm-level for 
promoting the financial wellbeing of the reporting entities, rather than ensuring 
accountability, transparency and social justice in developing countries. 
 
 
 
vii 
 
 
 
List of abbreviations 
ADB Asian Development Bank 
BB  Bangladesh Bank 
BRICS Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa 
BSEC Bangladesh Securities and Exchange Commission 
CEDAW Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women  
CEO Chief executive officer 
CSOs Civil society organisations  
CSR Corporate social responsibility  
DMNC Developing country multinational corporation  
DSE Dhaka Stock Exchange 
ECA Environmental Conservation Act  
ECR Environmental Conservation Rules  
ESG Environmental, social and governance  
ETP Effluent treatment plant  
FD Female director 
GDP Gross domestic product 
GRI Global reporting initiative 
ICAB The Institute of Chartered Accountants of Bangladesh  
ICMAB Institute of Cost and Management Accountants of Bangladesh 
ID Independent director  
IFC International Finance Corporation  
ILO International Labour Organisation 
IMF International Monetary Fund 
ISO International Organisation for Standardisation 
JICA Japan International Cooperation Agency 
MDGs Millennium development goals  
MNC Multinational corporation 
MTB Market value to the book value of a stock 
NBR National Board of revenue 
NGOs Non-governmental organisations 
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
OLS Ordinary least square  
RJSC Registrar of Joint Stock Companies and Firms  
RMGs Readymade garments  
SDGs Sustainable development goals 
SEA Social and environmental accounting  
SEC Securities and Exchange Commission 
SED Social and environmental disclosure  
SER Social and environmental reporting  
UNGC United Nations Global Compact 
 
 
 
  
viii 
 
 
 
List of figures and tables  
Figures  
Figure 2.1: Country governance in Bangladesh……………………………. 
 
 
28 
Tables  
Table 3.1: Relative influence of different institutional elements on SER at different 
levels 
38 
Table 5.1: Sample summary statistics……………………………………… 81 
Table: 5.2 Distribution of interviewees …………………………………… 91 
Table 6.1: Descriptive statistics…………………………………………… 97 
Table 6.2: Correlation matrix……………………………………………… 99 
Table 6.3: Multiple regression results using SEDS as the dependent variable: main 
analysis………………………………………………………… 
 
101 
Table 6.4: Multiple regression results using SDS and EDS as dependent variables: 
additional analysis………………………………………………… 
 
106 
Table 6.5 Multiple regression results using SEDS as the dependent variable: 
additional analysis……………………………………………………… 
 
107 
Table 6.6: Multiple regression results (excluding China): robustness test 111 
Table 6.7: Multiple regression results (with firm-fixed effect model): robustness test 112 
Table 6.8: Multiple regression results using SDS and EDS as dependent variable 
excluding China: robustness test……………………………………………. 
 
113 
 
 
1 
 
 Chapter 1 
Introduction  
 
1.1 Background 
In recent years, public awareness of social, environmental, and ethical responsibilities (Reverte, 
2009) has grown. Climate change, environmental degradation, violation of human rights, 
corporate scandals have “increased society’s expectations in relation to companies’ 
environmental, social and ethical responsibilities” (Money and Schepers, 2007, p. 2), and 
companies face pressures for social and environmental disclosure (SED) (Kamal & Deegan, 
2013; Ioannou & Serafeim, 2012; Tagesson et al., 2009; Palazzo & Scherer, 2006). The pressure 
may come from private/market (Moneva & Cuellar, 2009; Gupta & Goldar, 2005; Berthelot, 
Cormier, & Magnan, 2003), public/government (Talbot & Boiral, 2015; Chan, Watson, & 
Woodliff, 2014), and global levels as Ioannou and Serafeim (undated)1 note “a growing number 
of regulators around the world are reviewing the governance arrangements of corporations to 
ensure that companies maintain a healthy long-term focused organizational culture” (p. 3). 
Developing countries 2  are characterised by defective institutional mechanisms, such as 
inefficient democratic institutions, weak enforcement of laws, inadequate pressure from the 
civil society (e.g. Uddin and Choudhury, 2008; Robertson, 2009; Khanna and Palepu, 2010). 
These countries are also suffering from socio-economic problems including poverty, hunger, 
deadly diseases, illiteracy, unemployment, violation of human rights, corruption, environmental 
pollution, inequalities, and vulnerabilities to calamities (Khavul & Bruton, 2013; Idemudia, 
2009; Newell & George Frynas, 2007; Ite, 2005). Besides the government, businesses, as an 
engine of economic growth and contributor to the social and environmental burdens, have a 
responsibility to resolve these problems (Martinez et al., 2017; Belal, 2008; Pachauri, 2006), 
and social and environmental reporting (SER) can play an important role in addressing social 
and environmental problems in developing countries.  
 
1 Ioannou and Serafeim (undated), The consequences of mandatory corporate sustainability reporting, 
https://mba.americaeconomia.com/sites/mba.americaeconomia.com/files/consequences_sustainabilityreporting.p
df accessed on 12 Decmber 2019 
2 The term ‘developing countries’ is used in this paper for both developing and emerging countries (economies). 
The country classification employed belongs to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which considers all 
countries except advanced economies as developing countries (economies) (IMF, 2016), following previous 
studies (e.g. Siddiqui, 2010; Cuervo-Cazurra, 2012; Amos, 2018). 
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There has been a rising interest in the relationship between corporate social responsibility 
(CSR)3, SER and governance. Governance is a complex idea, with varied structures ranging 
from the formal rule‐based decision‐making and surveillance (OECD, 2012) to informal 
arrangements, and from the global to the local levels (Wieland, 2001). Governance includes 
rules, regulations, standards, guidelines, policies, norms, cultures and practices. Thus,  
governance is “multilevel and multidimensional” (Karam, Metcalfe, & Afiouni, 2018, p. 1). 
Good governance promotes CSR and SER (Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004; Weiss, 2000). 
Therefore, it is critical to understand the relationship between various levels and dimensions of 
governance and SER to catalyse transparency, accountability and social justice in developing 
countries.   
 
1.2 Motivation, objectives, and research questions 
The study is motivated by the motto of ensuring transparency, accountability, and social justice 
in developing countries by promoting SER. The overarching objective of the study is to 
examine the influence of global, country and firm-level governance on SER in developing 
countries, and the underlying reasons for such influence. Consistent with the main objective, 
the study aims at answering the following research questions: 
 
RQ1: What is the relationship between the global, country and firm-level governance and social 
and environmental reporting in developing countries? 
RQ2: How do the global, country and firm-level governance influence social and 
environmental reporting in Bangladesh, and why? 
 
1.3 The rationale of the study 
This study is important for several reasons. The sustainable development goals (SDGs4) are set 
to ensuring sustainability and equality for all across the globe as a continuity of the target set 
by the millennium development goals of a world free from extreme poverty, hunger, deadly 
diseases, inequality, to name a few. Among the 17 SDGs, 11 goals  - namely ‘no poverty’ (Goal 
1), ‘zero hunger’ (Goal 2), ‘good health and well-being’ (Goal 3), ‘quality education’ (Goal 4), 
 
3 CSR is also known as corporate social and environmental responsibility.  
4 http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/sustainable-development-goals.html (accessed on January 12, 
2018) 
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‘gender equality’ (Goal 5), ‘clean water and sanitation’ (Goal 6), ‘affordable and clean energy’ 
(Goal 7), ‘decent work and economic growth’ (Goal 8), ‘reduced inequalities’ (Goal 10), 
‘climate action’ (Goal 13), ‘peace, justice and strong institutions’ (Goal 16)  - are inextricably 
linked with and will help improve the well-being of 85% of the world population5 (by 2030) 
living in developing countries if implemented properly. Businesses, having resources and 
expertise, can contribute to achieving these goals. Despite having numerous socioeconomic 
challenges, with sixty per cent of the world economies by 20306, developing countries represent 
the most rapidly expanding markets and growth potential for business (IMF, 2006), which are 
expected to significantly affect the social and natural environment both positively and 
negatively (Fares et al., 2006). Businesses can play a vital role in attaining the SDGs through 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) and be benefitted from emerging markets. Therefore, 
developing countries offer an important research setting where governance and SER can 
mitigate various problems and improve the wellbeing of the majority of the global population 
living in these countries. 
 
Akin to many other developing countries, Bangladesh is a paternalistic state (Holm, 1987) 
characterised by a high level of corruption and impunity, ineffective democratic institutions and 
judiciary, where the desire of the government (in fact, the desire of the family-led ruling party) 
appears to be the law of the country (Amaeshi, Adegbite, & Rajwani, 2016). Bangladesh has 
been chosen as the field of qualitative study because of the following reasons. First, Bangladesh 
is one of the 45 developing countries included in the quantitative analysis; Second, previous 
governance studies suspect the effectiveness of the Western corporate governance mechanism 
in Bangladesh (Siddiqui, 2010; Uddin & Choudhury, 2008). Third, Muttakin, Khan and 
Subramaniam (2015) document significant negative relationships of CSR reporting with female 
directors of the listed companies in Bangladesh. They have called for further qualitative studies 
to explore the underlying reasons for such negative relationship in Bangladesh. Ullah, Muttakin 
and Khan (2019) find an insignificant positive relationship between female directors and CSR 
reporting in listed family insurance companies in Bangladesh. Fourth, access to the appropriate 
interviewees is critically important to attain the research objective. The author’s prima facie 
 
5 http://www.un.org/ga/Istanbul+5/bg10.htm (accessed on Janauary12, 2018) 
6http://www.oecd.org/dev/pgd/economydevelopingcountriessettoaccountfornearly60ofworldgdpby2030accordin
gtonewestimates.htm (accessed on January 12, 2018) 
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understanding of the research setting, prior research experience and network in Bangladesh, his 
birthplace, has helped in accessing the desired interviewees. 
 
1.4 Theoretical framework 
Considering the levels of analysis, sources of pressures and reality of both the pluralistic 
structure and dominance of powerful groups, the study employs institutional perspective to 
analyse and interpret the relationship between three levels of governance (global, country and 
firm) and SER. Regarding the level of analysis, the legitimacy theory is very broad and general; 
the stakeholder theory is narrow focusing on some specific stakeholders while the institutional 
theory lies in between the legitimacy and stakeholder theories, making a balance between them 
(Chen and Roberts, 2010, p. 653). Second, the three levels of governance involve coercive, 
normative and cultural cognitive characteristics that are consistent with the three pillars of the 
institutional theory. Finally, the institutional theory is capable of explaining the social, political 
and economic phenomena from both the classical and bourgeois perspectives of the political 
economy theory (Deegan, 2014, p. 343), recognising the coexistence of and encompassing both 
the pluralistic view, and control and dominance by a small group of people over the majority, 
which is useful in explaining social imbalance, inequality, and unrest, as well as the role of SER 
in addressing them. In fine, by integrating the insights from Scott (2002) and Whelan and 
Muthuri (2017), along with the contextual dynamics in developing countries in general and in 
Bangladesh, in particular, the has developed a multi-level institutional analytical framework to 
understand the relationship between the three levels of governance and SER. It is noted that the 
theoretical framework of the study is subject to some limitations. While the findings of the qualitative 
analysis (Chapter 7) can be explained from the three levels of governance (global, country and firm), 
and three forms of pressures (coercive, normative and cultural cognitive); the results of the quantitative 
analysis (Chapter 6) can only be explained from the three levels of governance. Also, in the quantitative 
analysis, agents such as independent directors, female directors are used as surrogates for firm-level 
governance due to the lack of data.  
 
1.5 Research methods 
The study employs multiple methods to operationalise the research objectives. The quantitative 
method (ordinary least squares regression technique) has been used to examine what is the 
relationship between the global, country and firm-level governance and SER in 45 developing 
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countries, using the Bloomberg environmental, social and governance (ESG) disclosure 
database, the worldwide governance indicators of the World Bank, and other databases from 
2007 - 2016. The mean value of the Bloomberg environmental disclosure score and social 
disclosure score has been used as a proxy for the corporate social and environmental disclosure 
(SED), and the global governance score 7 , country-level governance score 8  and firm-level 
governance score9 have been developed. Besides, the robustness of the findings has been tested 
using the firm-fixed effect model, lagging the firm-level governance variables by one year to 
mitigate the potential problems of endogeneity, excluding firms from China that constitute 
about 49% of the total firm-year observations, analysing the relationship of three levels of 
governance with social disclosure and environmental disclosure separately. By conducting a 
total of 49 semi-structured interviews (with 26 corporate and 23 non-corporate interviewees), 
the study also explores how and why the global, country and firm-level governance influence 
SER in Bangladesh. The corporate interviewees include CEOs, board chairs, members of SER 
teams, independent directors, female directors, business leaders, other corporate officials. The 
noncorporate interviewees have also been interviewed to understand their perceptions of the 
dynamics and relationships of governance and SER in Bangladesh, since “perceptions matter 
because agents base their actions on their perceptions, impression, and views” (Kaufmann, 
Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2010, p. 18). Noncorporate interviewees include CSR experts, accountants, 
regulators, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), civil society organisations (CSOs) and 
academicians. Views of eleven female interviewees (22%) have also been covered, though, the 
proportion of female directors of listed companies in Bangladesh is only 17%. Moreover, the 
samples include seven interviewees who are working (or worked) in the multinational 
corporations (MNCs). 
 
1.6 Summary of the findings 
The regression results show that there is a significant positive influence of all three levels of 
governance (global, country and firm) on SER in developing countries, where the global 
governance has the strongest influence followed by the country-level governance and firm-level 
 
7 Based on the Bloomberg data whether the reporting firm is a signatory of UNGC and GRI. 
8 Based on the six country-level governance indicators of the World Bank: voice and accountability, political 
stability and absence of violence, regulatory quality, government effectiveness, rule of law, ad control of 
corruption. 
9 Based on the Bloomberg ESG data about board independence, female directors on board, board size and 
number of board meetings. 
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governance supporting the notion that “CSR developments are mainly driven by global 
developments but shaped by context-specific factors” (Weyzig, 2006, p. 69). Specifically, the 
adoption of the United Nations Global Compact (UNGC) and Global Reporting Initiatives 
(GRI) has a significant positive impact on the extent of SER in developing countries. Between 
the two global governance variables, GRI has a greater influence on SER in developing 
countries than UNGC. This difference can be explained as the mismatch between ‘what is told’ 
(the disclosure) and ‘what is done’ (the reality) regarding CSR in developing countries, as 
documented by previous studies (Duarte & Imbun, 2016; Momin, 2013; Slack, 2012) and 
supported by the findings from the fieldwork.  
 
With regards to the country-level governance, the study finds that voice and accountability’, 
‘political stability and absence of violence’, and ‘regulatory quality’ have a significant positive 
relationship with SER in developing countries. However, ‘governance effectiveness’ and ‘the 
rule of law’ have a significant but negative relationship, while ‘control of corruption’ has an 
insignificant negative relationship with SER. Findings suggest that voice and accountability, 
political stability, absence of violence, regulatory quality, and policy support for the private 
sector promote SER in developing countries. The negative relationship between governance 
effectiveness and SER supports the notion that the less effective the government services, the 
more businesses supplement government responsibility, fills the institutional voids, and 
disclose more of that (CSR) information (Doh et al., 2017; Ghoul, Guedhami, & Kim, 2017; 
Healy & Serafeim, 2016; Matten & Crane, 2005). The significant negative relationship between 
the rule of law and SER can be explained as the unwillingness of firms to disclose any unwanted 
additional information, especially if it is negative, for fear of bad publicity, poor performance, 
and risk of legal action (Matuszak & Różańska, 2017; Naeem & Welford, 2009; Belal & Owen, 
2007). Regarding firm-level governance, the study finds that SER has a significant positive 
relationship with ‘female directors on board’, ‘board size’ and ‘the number of board meetings’, 
and an insignificant negative relationship with ‘board independence’. Findings suggest that 
firm-level governance encourages firms to do SER to legitimise organisational activities. 
 
The findings of the qualitative analysis show that companies in Bangladesh do SER primarily 
as an expedient response to appease the pressures from the powerful international economic 
stakeholders. SER, particularly the issuance of a stand-alone CSR report, is considered 
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instrumental to satisfy and attract foreign lenders and buyers, be endorsed by national and 
international organisations, exceed the expectations of the regulators, and thereby establish and 
expand businesses both at home and abroad. Also, the smart companies proactively adopt SER 
as a ‘conversation starter’ to communicate and convince powerful international economic 
stakeholders as opposed to the uncertainty posed by weak country governance and unimpressive 
image. However, the evidence in this study suggests that SER in Bangladesh is mainly symbolic, 
due to the lack of coercive and cultural cognitive pressures from within the country. 
 
The overall country governance environment in Bangladesh is not supportive for voice and 
accountability, transparency, and SER because of the guided democracy; politicisation and 
control over the media, civil society organisations, and trade unions; a fragile regulatory and 
judiciary system; the business-politics-government nexus; corruption and impunity; and the 
lack of understanding of and interest in SER on the part of both corporate and noncorporate 
stakeholders. The underdevelopment of institutions adversely affects the development of SER 
in Bangladesh, as an interviewee said: “We cannot expect an oasis of good governance and 
good CSR in an ocean of bad governance” (NGO/CSO4). The conflict of interests and power 
imbalance created by the unscrupulous nexus between business, politics and government 
adversely affects the demand for reforms and development of SER. This also hinders the 
development of civil society organisations (CSOs) and trade unions, which could put pressure 
for CSR and SER in Bangladesh. The weak enforcement of laws is one of the key reasons for 
weak governance and the low level of SER in Bangladesh (Siddiqui, 2010; Uddin & Choudhury, 
2008). The law-enforcing agencies of the country cannot perform their duties independently 
due to the undue influence and unwillingness of the government. Unfortunately, some of the 
law-enforcing agencies and their members have become corrupt and dependent on some 
companies by receiving undue benefits (including the undesirable use of the CSR fund). 
Corruption is engulfing all the good initiatives, including SER. Almost all the interviewees 
opined that corruption is everywhere in Bangladesh, particularly in the government offices, 
which incentivise unfair and immoral practices. Corruption and impunity create an environment 
where evading laws is easier than complying with them. 
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Despite the squeezing space for voice, accountability and freedom of expression (through the 
Digital Security Act 10 ), some print and electronic media have been showing courage in 
unveiling the truth and promoting SER in Bangladesh by publishing good social and 
environmental practices and pointing to the social and environmental wrongdoings. In a 
developing country like Bangladesh, the role of print and electronic media is more important 
than regulations in overseeing governance and social and environmental issues. Because once 
any problems, such as environmental pollutions, grabbing river-land, violations of human rights, 
are highlighted by the media, these come to the attention of the people, the government and the 
regulators. As a result, both the government and businesses feel pressure to act. The press is 
more effective than the regulatory bodies as the latter is too corrupt to take any actions unless 
there is any civic actions or media reports. Companies consider media reports as urgency and 
readily respond to them, especially to negative news (Aerts & Cormier, 2009). However, the 
print and electronic media have also been politicised and captured by various business groups 
recently. 
 
SER is not a priority in Bangladesh. There are political pressures for donations, not for SER. 
Even the CSR Award Committee considers tax payment as one of the criteria, not the SER to 
be selected for the award. The National Board of Revenue (NBR) offers a tax credit for 
allowable CSR expenditures but there are no incentives for SER. The apex body of professional 
accountants in the country does not consider SER as part of their jurisdiction and education. 
There is a lack of transparency and accountability in the national governmental system that 
severely affects SER as well. The cultural and contextual factors are not conducive for SER in 
Bangladesh, where about 90% of the people are Muslims, and offering donations (Zakat) in 
silence is an integral part of the religious belief. There is also an absence of normative pressures 
for SER. For example, there is no national guideline to promote CSR or SER in Bangladesh. 
 
The fieldwork finds mixed relationships between board independence and SER. Findings show 
that independent directors can play a decisive role in promoting SER only when they are 
independent both ‘in appearance and fact’ and are aware of SER. Unfortunately, findings 
suggest that board independence in Bangladesh is mostly superficial, and the inclusion of the 
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so-called independent directors does not necessarily mean an increased SER. Consistent with 
the insignificant negative relationship between board independence and SER documented by 
the quantitative analysis, the fieldwork showed that the independent directors have either little 
or no role in promoting SER in Bangladesh, as they are independent in appearance, but not in 
fact due to the lack of an independent mindset, knowledge, expertise and awareness of SER, 
along with the benefit-dependency (co-option), family control and patriarchy.  
 
In contrast to the orthodoxy that board gender diversity promotes governance and SER, the 
fieldwork finds mixed results. Consistent with the results of quantitative analysis, findings of 
the fieldwork showed that woman directors are more sensitive to taking immediate action to 
humanitarian causes, charitable giving to the community, arts, and cultural activities (Nielsen 
& Huse, 2010; Ayuso & Argandoña, 2007; Williams, 2003; Wang & Coffey, 1992); persuading 
the board to invest more in the woman entrepreneurship; ensuring employee welfare, especially 
the woman employee-related issues (Kirsch, 2018), and conserving the natural environment. 
Although there is some evidence of the role of woman directors in promoting CSR, their role 
in promoting SER/CSR reporting is rather indirect and limited. Findings show that women 
having financial literacy, knowledge of business, work experience in the formal sectors, 
knowledge and expertise of sustainability and accounting contribute to SER more than others. 
But in most of the cases, women are brought to the business to keep family control, comply 
with the regulatory requirements and meet the expectations of the international buyers as 
evidenced by the concentration of 92% woman directors in only three sectors - 54% are in the 
financial industry followed by garments and textiles (24%), and pharmaceuticals and chemicals 
(13.9%).  
 
In contrast to the findings of the quantitative analysis, the fieldwork finds that the female 
director has very little or no role in catalysing SER in Bangladesh. The findings suggest that 
the inclusion of woman directors does not necessarily mean an increased SER although there is 
some limited evidence of their role in addressing the concerns related to female-workers, 
humanitarian and environmental problems that may have an indirect effect on SER in some 
cases. The empirical results indicate that in most of the cases, woman directors cannot play an 
independent role because of cultural cognitive barriers, such as a male-dominated patriarchal 
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society, honour culture, family business, lack of necessary expertise and experience of women 
in business.  
 
In addition to formal corporate governance, the internal firm-level factors significantly affect 
the SER of companies in Bangladesh. The corporate leadership and mindset of the top 
management, enlightened self-interest, giving back to the society, legacy and corporate culture, 
learning from MNCs, personal branding and the group to which a company belongs to play a 
critical role in promoting SER. Despite the enormous pressure from the global level, the SER 
in Bangladesh has yet to be institutionalised in the absence of adequate coercive, normative and 
cultural cognitive pressures from both the country and firm-levels.  
 
1.7 Contribution of the study 
This study makes several impeccable methodological, practical, and theoretical contributions. 
From the methodological point of view,  while most of the prior quantitative studies are limited 
to examining the relationship between corporate governance and SER, it has extended the scope 
of the study to three levels of governance - global, country and firm-levels, segregating CSR 
disclosure into social disclosure and environmental disclosure, bringing in more complexity 
and comprehensiveness. By using an extensive dataset of 45 developing countries from 2007-
2016, developing an overall score for each level of governance, examining their influence on 
SER,  and exploring the underlying reasons beneath the numbers, the study offers surprising 
perspectives (de Bakker et al., 2018) and responds to the calls of Roberts and Wallace (2015) 
and Richardson (2015) for advancing non-mainstream quantitative social and environmental 
accounting research by providing convincing, alternative explanations for (non-) disclosure. 
The study has documented that despite the significant positive influence of all three levels of 
governance on SER in developing countries, global governance has the strongest influence 
followed by the country-level governance and firm-level governance. The study offers evidence 
that firms in developing countries adopt SER in response to the coercive pressures from the 
global market, such as buyers and lenders. Moreover, it confirms the mismatch between ‘what 
is reported’ (SER) and ‘what is actually done’ (decoupling) in developing countries. It supports 
the institutional theory by providing evidence that corporates try to fill the institutional voids 
by undertaking various CSR initiatives in developing countries where the governance services 
are poor/ineffective. It offers evidence that in developing countries, firms avoid disclosing 
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unwanted additional information for fear of poor performance and government intervention 
(Kirsch, 2018). The findings from the fieldwork contribute to both governance and SER 
literature by offering evidence from the ground that only a handful of companies are publishing 
stand-alone sustainability reports mainly because of ‘business case’ and pressures exerted by 
the global governance, and there are many instances of decoupling in contrast to the traditional 
conformance. The study offers evidence of how the coercive, normative, and cultural cognitive 
pressures emanated from the global, country and firm levels affect SER practices of companies 
in a developing country, Bangladesh. More specifically, it documents that the country’s cultural 
cognitive factors, namely the ‘honour culture’, ‘patriarchal society’, ‘masculinity’, ‘uncertainty 
avoidance’, collectivism’, ‘family firm’, ‘nexus between business, politics, and government’, 
‘corruption and impunity’ adversely affect SER. The study explains how the absence of 
transparency and accountability in the government affects transparency and accountability at 
the firm-level, thus affecting SER in Bangladesh. The findings suggest that the inclusion of the 
independent directors and female directors does not necessarily mean an increased SER due to 
the lack of their independence, cognitive cultural barriers, such as male-dominance, or honour 
culture, to name a few. The study has responded to the calls of previous studies for further 
research by offering evidence and unveiling the underlying reasons for a significant negative 
relationship between board gender diversity and SER in Bangladesh (Muttakin, Khan, & 
Subramaniam, 2015); in Latin America (Husted & de Sousa-Filho, 2019) and insignificant 
positive relationship in the family firm in Bangladesh (Ullah, Muttakin, & Khan, 2019). Our 
findings are consistent with the governance literature that caution about the effectiveness of the 
Western governance models in traditional settings like Bangladesh (Siddiqui, 2010; Uddin & 
Choudhury, 2008). 
 
1.8 Structure of the dissertation 
The dissertation has been structured in eight chapters. After the introduction in Chapter 1, 
Chapter 2 discusses the research context, Chapter 3 develops the theoretical framework, 
Chapter 4 reviews the extant literature and develops hypotheses of the quantitative study, 
Chapter 5 discusses the research design, Chapter 6 addresses the research question one and 
presents the results of the quantitative analysis, Chapter 7 addresses the research question two 
and presents the findings, and finally,  Chapter 8 concludes the thesis. 
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Chapter 2 
Research Context  
 
2.1 Introduction  
The context and historical background is the cornerstone of research because “the ideas and 
insights of the predecessors provide the context for current efforts and the platform on which 
we necessarily craft our own contributions” (Scott, 2001, p. 55). Studies underscore the 
importance of context in shaping CSR and SER (Mathews, 1993; Tsang, 1998; Doh and Guay, 
2006; Tregidga and Milne, 2006; Weyzig, 2006; Mehra, 2006; Matten and Moon, 2008; Halme, 
Roome & Dobers, 2009; Milne, Tregidga and Walton, 2009; Preuss and Barkemeyer, 2011; 
Momin and Parker, 2013; Komori, 2015; Rathert, 2016; Tilt, 2016; Wirth et al., 2016; Hopper, 
Lassou and Soobaroyen, 2017). For example,  Matten and Moon (2008, p. 407) argue that 
‘‘CSR is located in wider responsibility systems in which business, governmental, legal, and 
social actors operate”. Halme, Roome and Dobers (2009, p. 2) document that CSR is determined 
by “the institutional, legal and cultural setting within which business is practiced”. The rest of 
the chapter outlines the political, social, cultural, religious, geographical, regulatory, 
institutional and economic contexts of developing countries in general and Bangladesh in 
particular with an expectation that the understanding of the research context will help interpret 
and understand the empirical findings in Chapters 6 and 7. 
  
2.2 Context of developing countries 
Developing countries have a unique institutional context in terms of socioeconomic and 
political environment (such as different political systems, socioeconomic structures, religious 
influences, cultural values, historical conflicts and problems) in contrast to developed countries 
(e.g. Khavul and Bruton, 2013; Belal and Owen, 2015; Nakpodia and Adegbite, 2018). These 
countries are characterised by inefficient market, weak democratic institutions and enforcement 
of laws, the low level of governance11 and high level of corruption12, inadequate pressure from 
the civil society, family-led politics and business (Rodríguez, Montiel, & Ozuna, 2014; Abdalla, 
Siti-Nabiha, & Shahbudin, 2013; Khanna & Palepu, 2010; Robertson, 2009; Uddin & 
 
11 http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/#doc 
12 Corruption perceptions Index 2016. The most corrupted countries are the developing countries. 
https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2016 
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Choudhury, 2008). Countries with weak governance, family-led politics, and poverty 
(Tsamenyi & Uddin, 2008) create an inevitable condition forming strong relationships between 
politicians and businesses (Dieleman & Boddewyn, 2012) and CSR initiatives are designed in 
line with the personal projects (of political leaders) and programs of the ruling party (Uddin, 
Siddiqui, & Islam, 2018). It will not be an overstatement to say that the desire of the ruling 
party is deemed to be the law in developing countries, creating an institutional void (Amaeshi, 
Adegbite, & Rajwani, 2016). In contrast to the notion that the institutional structure and 
governance mechanisms control the behaviour of the elites, the elites and super-rich take 
advantage of institutional voids. Instead of being controlled, they weaken the effectiveness of 
the governance mechanism further to safeguard their interest.  
 
The priorities of developing countries are often different from the developed countries (for 
example, relying more on export-oriented development strategies, incapacity and inertia to 
develop capital markets, governance and regulatory mechanisms) as they are generally lagging 
in terms of economic development. Also, these countries are suffering from socio-economic 
problems including poverty, hunger, deadly diseases, illiteracy, unemployment, violation of 
human rights, corruption, environmental pollution, inequalities, and vulnerabilities to the 
natural disaster (e.g. Ite, 2005; Newell and George Frynas, 2007; Idemudia, 2009; Khavul and 
Bruton, 2013). The problem of vulnerability is more severe than the problem of low income 
and poverty in developing countries (Belal, Cooper, & Roberts, 2013) although there is a long-
term link between them (Blaikie et al., 1994). The relationship between poverty and 
vulnerability is like a vicious cycle as poverty causes vulnerability, which in turn causes, as 
Montalbano (2011) argued, expected poverty and represents a threat of future poverty. 
Developing countries are more vulnerable to natural disasters as a result of the lack of financial 
and technological resources (Bowen, Cochrane, & Fankhauser, 2012). Instead of being a 
blessing, the natural resources in some of these countries have become a curse (Sarr & Wick, 
2010) for them due to the fierce competition for capital investment (Ukpere & Slabbert, 2009) 
and weak legal and regulatory systems, which leads MNCs to select countries with relatively 
weaker regulations as their location - ‘regulatory arbitrage’ (Jenkins, 2005). Developing 
countries are afraid of raising labourers’ wages because of the threat of losing foreign direct 
investment (divestment). All these drawbacks thwart social justice in these countries. 
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Despite having numerous socioeconomic challenges, developing countries represent the most 
rapidly expanding markets and growth potential for business (IMF, 2006) with 60% of the 
world economy by 203013 . These growing economies are expected to significantly affect the 
social and natural environment, both positively and negatively (Fares et al., 2006). Businesses 
having resources and expertise can play a vital role in attaining the SDGs through CSR, and at 
the same time can reap the benefits of the emerging markets. All these factors play a significant 
role in influencing social and environmental accounting (SEA) in these countries, as SEA 
development is inextricably related to the socio-political and economic contexts. Therefore, 
developing countries offer an important research setting, where governance and SER can 
mitigate various problems and improve the wellbeing of the vast majority of the world 
population living there. 
 
Similar to the diverse nature of developing countries, there exist wide variations in governance 
and SER, and as such, exploring the dynamics and influences of the global, country and firm-
level governance on SER will provide us with plausible explanations to understand why such 
variations exist (Campbell, 2007), which is critically important to ensure equality and social 
justice (Rawls, 1971) in developing countries. The following section presents the context of 
Bangladesh as a case of a developing country.  
 
2.3 Context of Bangladesh  
Akin to many other developing countries, Bangladesh is a paternalistic state (Holm, 1987) 
characterised by a high level of corruption, impunity, ineffective democratic institutions and 
judiciary, where the desire of the government (in fact the desire of the family-led ruling party) 
appears to be the law of the country (Amaeshi, Adegbite, & Rajwani, 2016). The following 
sections outline the historical, political, social, cultural, religious, economic, regulatory, and 
institutional contexts of Bangladesh, with an expectation that their understanding will help 
interpret the empirical findings in Chapter 7. 
 
 
 
 
13http://www.oecd.org/dev/pgd/economydevelopingcountriessettoaccountfornearly60ofworldgdpby2030accordin
gtonewestimates.htm (accessed on January 12, 2018) 
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2.3.1 The historical and political context  
Bangladesh is an independent country which was part of India until 1947 and then a part of 
Pakistan until 1971. In 1947, the Indian sub-continent was freed from the 190-year colonial rule 
of the British and two newly independent states - India and Pakistan were created based on the 
‘Two Nation Theory’ (following two religions - Islam and Hinduism) of Muhammad Ali Jinnah, 
the founding father of Pakistan. The current territory of Bangladesh was a part of Pakistan 
(known as East Pakistan). It was a peculiar idea to form a religion-based state named Pakistan 
consisting of two distant lands separated geographically by the existence of India in the middle. 
Unfortunately, the solidarity and trust based on which Pakistan evolved did not persist because 
of the oppression and discriminatory policy by the Pakistani rulers. The hegemony of the 
government was so severe that the people of East Pakistan had to fight for their mother tongue 
against the state-declaration that Urdu would be the only state language of Pakistan although 
56% of the country population was Bengali-speaking and living in East Pakistan. Many 
protesters were killed on 21 February 1952 in the language movement. Confronted with 
tremendous pressure from the masses, ultimately the Pakistani rulers had to accept Bengali as 
the state language, but they continued with discrimination and oppression that reached the 
extreme when they committed genocide in Bangladesh on 25 March 1971, by disregarding the 
result of the public election and refused to hand over the power to Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the 
elected Prime Minister of the then Pakistan and the leader of East Pakistan. In the face of 
totalitarianism, the people of East Pakistan had an outburst and declared the independence of 
Bangladesh on 26 March 1971. On 16 December 1971, Bangladesh emerged as an independent 
sovereign republic at the cost of about three million lives and unrepairable loss after the nine-
month-long heroic liberation war. Therefore, three national days: ‘Independence Day (26 
March)’, ‘Victory Day (16 December)’ and ‘International Mother Language Day (21 February)’ 
are observed in Bangladesh every year. There are also some monuments and museums that 
preserve the history of the liberation war and uphold the commemoration of the heroes. These 
national days and initiatives bear significant ceremonial and emotional importance to the people 
of Bangladesh. Beside the national-level programmes, various events across the country are 
organised, sponsored by the companies in this study to show their solidarity and support 
towards the nation as a part of their CSR activities. 
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The ups and downs in the political system of Bangladesh continued after independence. On 15 
August 1975, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the greatest leader of Bangladesh, was brutally killed 
in a military coup, and since then until 1990, the country was, by and large, ruled by the military 
in the absence of an effective democracy. In 1991, the country started the democratic journey 
after the fall of the autocrat General Ershad through a large scale revolution of the masses. This 
was followed by the fairest election in the history of Bangladesh under the all-party supported 
non-political coalition government, known as the ‘caretaker government’ (Baldersheim, Jamil, 
& Aminuzzaman, 2001), and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) came into power. Then, 
Bangladesh Awami League and BNP, the two family-led major political parties were elected, 
through free and fair national elections held under similar non-political coalition governments 
in 1996 and 2001, respectively.  
 
Unfortunately, the two-times democratically elected political party, BNP helped in bringing the 
chaotic political disorder back by changing the eligibility criteria for the Chief of the coalition 
government. Challenging those changes, the opposition parties led by Bangladesh Awami 
League demonstrated huge protests and some people were killed during the ‘bloody anarchy’ 
in 2006. As a repercussion, the country experienced an interregnum when an unelected 
government backed by the military came to power and ruled the country between  October 2006 
and January 2009. In 2009, the oldest political party in Bangladesh, the Bangladesh Awami 
League, came to power again through an acceptable election held in December 2008. However, 
Bangladesh Awami League was reelected in 2014 through a non-participative coercive unfair 
election (Freedom in the World 2018; Bangladesh Profile, 2018), when 153 candidates were 
elected uncontestedly and the leader of the opposition, Khaleda Zia, was confined illegally and 
unethically to her house so that she could not conduct any political campaigns. Unfortunately, 
in December 2018, the oldest democratic political party, Bangladesh Awami League came to 
power for the third consecutive term through an unacceptable election (votes cast at night before 
the day of the election unlawfully). Since then, the country has become a one-party state 
characterised by a guided democracy, control over the freedom of expression and media, NGOs, 
CSOs and judiciary. 
 
With the introduction of the democratic process in the 1990s, there was some hope among the 
people who were benefited in terms of voice and accountability, political stability, privatisation, 
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internationalisation, foreign investments, regulatory and institutional reforms, and development 
of the capital market. Studies show that during the democratic period, the country experienced 
a rise in corporate social reporting (Belal & Roberts, 2010; Belal, 2000; Imam, 1999). By 
contrast, with the abandonment of the democratic norms and values by the historically 
democratic political party, authoritarian national governance emerged, which in turn affected 
the companies operating in Bangladesh. Therefore, CSR and SER in Bangladesh are expected 
to have fluctuated with the ups and downs in the political environment. 
 
Since independence, Bangladesh has been ruled mainly by two family-led political parties:  
Bangladesh Awami League, led by the Sheikh Mujib family and BNP, led the Zia family. Both 
the ladies - Sheikh Hasina, the President of Bangladesh Awami League and Khaleda Zia, the 
Chairperson of BNP inherited their positions in the party from their father and husband, 
respectively, after their death. Following the tradition, the eldest sons of both leaders were 
inducted to politics and empowered so that they can take over the parties in the absence of their 
mothers (Mannan, 2011). These two major parties are predominantly controlled by the kins and 
relatives of the two families, and neither of them is known for democratic practices, even within 
the party (Mannan, 2006; Sobhan & Ahmed, 1980). This heredity in politics determines 
leadership, institutions and economy, both at the national and local levels. Even CSR and SER 
practices of companies in Bangladesh are guided by the family-dominated political regime 
(Uddin, Siddiqui, & Islam, 2018). 
 
2.3.2 Socio-cultural-religious context  
Historically, imbalanced power structure and inequality in social life were a common 
phenomenon in the greater Indian subcontinent because of the social stratification and caste 
system, which was reinforced by the British colonial rule as they formalised the traditional 
influentials by choosing them as their agents, called ‘zamindars’ or landlords (McLane, 2002). 
The local agents acted as intermediaries and local headmen between the rulers and the 
commoners in collecting rents and forcing them, especially the farmers to grow raw materials 
for British industries during the industrial revolution (McLane, 2002). 
 
Following the socio-political background, the Bangladeshi society is still defined by high power 
distance (score = 80; unequal power and inequality is culturally expected and accepted), high 
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uncertainty avoidance (score = 60; a culture where the members have created beliefs and 
institutions to avoid uncertainty), high masculinity ( score = 55; a high score indicates a society 
driven by competition, achievement and success), high collectivism (individualism score = 20; 
low individualism indicates a culture of strong trust and loyalty within groups), and low 
indulgence ( score = 20; the extent to which people try to control their desires and impulses, 
based on the way they were raised; a low score indicates a culture where behaviour is rigidly 
restrained by social norms)14(Hofstede, 1984, 2001).  
 
Consistent with high power distance, high collectivism, high uncertainty avoidance and low 
indulgence, Bangladesh also belongs to an ‘honour culture’ (Aslani et al., 2013, 2016). An 
‘honour’ is an individual’s socially claimed and recognised estimated worth (Pitt-Rivers, 1968). 
In an honour culture, people try to protect them and their family aggressively and avoid being 
treated unfairly (being taken advantage of by others) (Cohen & Nisbett, 1997), and they are 
highly sensitive to insults, responding emotionally, aggressively and defensively on their own  
(Bourdieu, 1977). However, the positive aspect of honour culture is that people want to be 
trustworthy and maintain their commitment, hospitality and strong family ties (Rodriguez 
Mosquera et al., 2008), and do altruistic activities to exceed expectations of the people in their 
circles (Aslani et al., 2013, p. 255). People in an honour culture try to share less information 
and act tough, and people having more power and social status gain better outcomes (Aslani et 
al., 2013). As the informal dispute resolution systems and getting access to public services 
commonly involve bribes and favours, the wealthier and elites enjoy privileges (Mair, Marti, & 
Ventresca, 2012). In an honour culture, the behaviour of women is restricted because of the fear 
of losing honour (Aslani et al., 2013). 
 
Gender  
Women constitute nearly half of the population of Bangladesh. The Constitution of Bangladesh 
promotes the principle of gender equality. Bangladesh ratified the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) on 6 November 1984 
and subsequently ratified the Optional Protocol on CEDAW in 2000. It is also a signatory to 
the Beijing Declaration and endorsed its Platform for Action. Besides, there are numerous 
 
14 https://www.hofstede-insights.com/country/bangladesh/ (accessed on November 13, 2019.) 
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national mechanisms and legal frameworks to safeguard women. Women’s participation in the 
workplace has improved in recent decades because of their increased literacy. Also, the rapid 
growth of the readymade garments (RMGs) industry in the 1980s had created employment 
opportunities for women who now constitute nearly 80% of the workforce in this industry. 
While this is the largest export earner of the country and most of the value-added in this sector 
comes from the labour force (i. e. women's labour), their status remained noticeably poor. They 
work for long hours under harsh conditions but paid poorly. They are deprived of decent wages, 
the right to collective bargaining and a healthy and safe working environment. Despite 
improvements in education for girls and the creation of economic opportunities for women and 
women’s political participation, Bangladesh continues to score poorly on gender indices. 
Bangladesh is ranked 97 in literacy rate out of 144 countries, and the ratio of literacy between 
female and male is 0.92. With regards to the labour force participation, Bangladesh is ranked 
124 out of 144 countries. The ratio of wage equality for similar work between female and male 
is 0.54 in 2017 (WEF, 2017). It can be explained as a social and cultural context in Bangladesh 
which is still a male-dominated society and where women traditionally work as homemakers.  
 
Honour culture and gender discrimination  
Historically, like other South Asian countries, sons are preferred to daughters in Bangladesh, 
which hurts gender balance and society as a whole as such unethical preference deprives girls 
from their due rights, and results in malnutrition, sickness, and high mortality rates, or even 
killing them before their birth through sex-selective abortions (Sen, 1990). In Bangladesh, 
women’s behaviour is controlled not only by men but also by other women, such as mothers 
and mothers-in-law, who reinforce the prescribed restrictions, and also “update the norms of 
acceptable and unacceptable behaviour towards women” (Faizal and Rajagopalan, 2005, p. 44). 
Many expectations are imposed on young married women, and they are likely to face 
difficulties and disapproval if they express independent desires, goals, or choices (Kabeer, 
2000; Camfield, Rashid and Sultan, 2017). Traditionally women in Bangladesh act as caretakers 
of children and their household and play the roles of daughters, wives and mothers. These roles 
are unpaid as a World Bank study titled ‘Voices to Choices’ documents that more than one-
third of women of the labour force in Bangladesh are unpaid family helpers (Solotaroff et al., 
2019, p. xix). These roles help to keep them stay at home, control and discipline their behaviour. 
Women and girls in Bangladesh are required to adhere to certain modesty norms (Camfield, 
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Rashid, & Sultan, 2017) as the immodesty of a woman family member is considered a shame 
for the whole family (Aslani et al., 2013). 
 
Ownership of assets 
Parallel to the deprivation from the childhood, women are deprived of the inheritance of land 
ownership and are often unable to hold or enforce property rights because of social norms and 
barriers to access justice (Mair, Marti, & Ventresca, 2012). A recent study shows that despite 
increased literacy and campaigns for women empowerment, husbands, who are the heads of 
families in Bangladesh still solely own 96% of household-land in rural areas (Quisumbing, 
Kumar, & Behrman, 2018). The underlying reasons for such extreme gender gap in land 
ownership are male-biased practices in inheritance, the main means to acquire land. The World 
Bank study shows that “it is far more common for daughters not to receive and claim their share, 
due to prevalent customary norms around men’s role as breadwinners and household wealth 
owners” (Solotaroff et al., 2019, p. 186). Even when women inherit the land, they face more 
difficulties than men in registering and legally owning their inheritance (including high fees for 
which they have to depend on their husbands and limited mobility to travel to government 
offices). Moreover, “natal families also worry about losing land if given to daughters who could 
register the land in names of husbands or children, which reflects the strength of clan-based, 
patrilineal customary practices as opposed to the religious law that supports women’s 
inheritance and ownership” (Solotaroff et al., 2019, p. xix).  
 
Women in business 
Because of the initiatives of the government and Bangladesh Bank, the proportion of women’s 
ownership (taking both formal and informal firms together) has increased from 7% in 2013 to 
10% in 2017. However, in the formal enterprises, Bangladesh still has the world’s smallest 
shares of female-majority ownership which is only 1.7% compared to regional and global 
averages of 9.6% and 14.5%15. One of the main reasons for the low number of women in formal 
business compared to the informal ones is the opaque, lengthy and corrupt registration system 
that requires collecting different documents from different offices. In 2015, Bangladesh ranked 
75 out of 77 countries that encourage the development and growth of women-owned enterprises 
 
15  https://www.enterprisesurveys.org/en/data/exploreeconomies/2013/bangladesh#gender (accessed on 14 
November 2019) 
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(Terjesen and Lloyd, 2015, p. 11). Akin to other South Asian countries, Bangladesh has a 
patriarchal society where women are prohibited from getting into the business on their own 
because of the fear of losing honour and threat of risk in addition to the formal structural 
problems. The first resistance comes from the core social unit, the family, because of the 
superiority of male family members - the heads of the households are the husbands, who in 
most of the cases do not want women to start and own a business although there has been an 
improvement in the women participation in the household decision-making process. (Solotaroff 
& Pande, 2014; Kabeer, 2000; Amin & Pebley, 1994). 
 
Religion 
Islam is the major religion in Bangladesh, followed by more than 90.4% of the population, 
while the Hindu population is 8.50% (BBS, 2015, p. 28). Islam plays a significant role in the 
socio-economic and cultural life of people in Bangladesh. As a result, a good number of banking, 
finance and insurance companies have come forward to serve the need of the people according 
to the principle of Islamic Shariah. Even some of the foreign conventional banks such as HSBC, 
Standard Chartered have opened Islamic banking branches in response to the demand of the 
Muslim dominated population in the country. Giving donations is an integral part of 
Bangladeshi culture which is deeply rooted in ‘Zakat’, one of the five pillars of Islam. One of 
the possible reasons for the low level of SER in Bangladesh is religion. Because in Islam, 
donating in silence is preferred to donating in public (disclosing it). In Islam, it is said that 
donations should be made in such a way so that when you give donations with the right hand, 
do not let the left hand know, meaning ‘donate in silence’. In contrast to the general perception 
that women are deprived of their rights because of religion, adherence to the inheritance 
principles of Islam help women asset ownership: “(t)he more devoutly religious a family is - 
among the vast majority of households, which are Muslims - the more likely it is to allow 
daughters to inherit their share of natal family assets, as dictated by the Quran or religious 
prescription, or inheritance as per respective religious laws” (Solotaroff et al., 2019, p. xix). 
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People, literacy, poverty, employment and corruption 
With about 170 million people, Bangladesh is the most densely populated country among the 
91 countries/territories that have a population of over 10 million 16 . The population of 
Bangladesh is equivalent to 2.18% of the world population, and it is ranked on the 8th position 
in the world. The population density in Bangladesh is 1278 per km2. The proportion of people 
living in urban areas has increased from 23.70% in 2006 to 36.50%  in 201817. However, the 
difference between the poor and the rich is vast. Based on the international poverty line of $1.90 
per person per day, poverty in Bangladesh has declined from 44.2% in 1991 to 13.8% in 
2016/17 18 . Likewise, life expectancy, literacy rates and per capita food production have 
increased significantly. However, the challenge19 for Bangladesh is that it still has about 22 
million people under the poverty line, and it has to create job opportunities for about 2 million 
youths coming into the job market every year, in addition to the current extensive 
unemployment. The adult literacy rate is 72.3% (in 2016)20, whereas the literacy rate among 
the female youths (80.40%) is more than the male youths (77.10%) according to the UNICEF 
data21. The highest number of people are employed in agriculture, followed by the service and 
industrial sectors. In 2017, the proportions of employment in agriculture, service and industrial 
sectors were 39.07%, 39.85% and 21.09%, respectively compared to 48.46%, 36.48% and 
15.06% in 200722. Although the employment in the industrial and service sectors has been rising, 
the working conditions have not been improved, and the common rights of the labourers are not 
ensured due to the lack of collective bargaining agents and lack of enforcement of laws. 
Although there are some trade unions in different industrial sectors, they generally maintain a 
strong liaison with the major political parties and attempt to uphold their personal and political 
interests.  
 
Bangladesh is one of the top corrupt countries in the world23, where even the provision of public 
goods (such as health, education, public administration) involves pervasive corruption 
 
16 https://population.un.org/wpp/Download/Standard/Population/ 
17 http://www.worldometers.info/world-population/bangladesh-population/ 
18 https://www.worldbank.org/en/results/2018/11/15/bangladesh-reducing-poverty-and-sharing-prosperity 
19 https://www.worldbank.org/en/results/2018/11/15/bangladesh-reducing-poverty-and-sharing-prosperity 
20 https://www.thedailystar.net/editorial/adult-literacy-rate-rises-1425580 
21 https://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/bangladesh_bangladesh_statistics.html 
22 https://www.statista.com/statistics/438360/employment-by-economic-sector-in-bangladesh/ 
23  ‘Corruption perceptions Index 2016’. The most corrupted countries are the developing countries. 
https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2016 
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(Asadullah & Chakravorty, 2019; Knox, 2009). The bribery incidence (% of firms experiencing 
at least one bribe payment request) in Bangladesh is 47.7% compared to 24.8% and 17.4% of 
the South Asian and global averages, respectively24.  
 
2.3.3 Economic context   
Bangladesh is the 39th largest economy in the world in terms of the nominal GDP and one of 
the next 11 emerging countries in the world. Despite numerous problems, Bangladesh has high 
potential reinforced by the private sector and demographic dividend. The country holds the first 
position in the global garments market and has achieved the highest growth in GDP among the 
45 Asia-Pacific countries (ADB, 2019). The country had a GDP growth rate of over 6.00% 
during the last decade with an all-time high of 7.90% in 2018 (compared to 4.30% in Central 
Asia, 6.0% in East Asia, 6.6% in South Asia, 5.1% in Southeast Asia, 0.4% in the Pacific and 
4.3% in all the emerging markets and developing economies) and it is expected to be 8.10% in 
2019 (compared to 4.4% in Central Asia, 5.5% in East Asia, 6.2% in South Asia, 4.5% in 
Southeast Asia, 4.2% in the Pacific and 4.0% in all the emerging markets and developing 
economies) and 8.0% in 2020 (ADB, 2019; World Bank, 2019). The rate of inflation was 5.8% 
in 2018 and is expected to be 5.5% in 2019 and 2020 (ADB, 2019). Although Bangladesh was 
an agrarian economy where 24.60% of GDP came from agriculture in 2000, the contribution of 
agriculture to GDP has reduced to 14.23% in the 2017-18 fiscal year because of the rising 
growth of service and industrial sectors due to demographic dividend and open trade policy. 
During the fiscal year 2017-18, the contribution of the service sector was 52.1% (51.00% in 
2000) and of industrial sectors 33.66% (in contrast to 24.40% in 2000) (World Bank, 2002; 
GOB, 2018). 
 
The economy of Bangladesh is dominated by the crony capitalism and family business, which 
is closely related to the emergence of two family-lead political parties and their partisan 
beneficiaries though the process started before the independence when the Pakistan government 
encouraged rich families through various incentives to promote industrialisation. However, 
because of the discriminatory economic policy of the Pakistani government, industrialisation 
and ownership of the industrial assets mostly belonged to some West Pakistani family 
 
24 https://www.enterprisesurveys.org/en/data/exploreeconomies/2013/bangladesh#corruption 
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(Humphrey, 1987). During the liberation war, the industrialists of Pakistan left Bangladesh, and 
the new government nationalised about 92% of the industrialised assets in pursuance of the 
newly adopted socialistic economic system (Taher, 1994). As a result, a vacuum was created 
with an underdeveloped capital market and paucity of private capital after independence.  
 
However, confronted with rising pressures from the international donors (such as the World 
Bank, IMF and their allies) supported by the local employers and their associations, along with 
corruption, political unrest, bureaucracy, inefficient management, recurring loss and weak 
economic conditions, the government adopted the denationalisation and privatisation policy in 
1984, which got further momentum in 1991 with the revised privatisation policy (Taher, 1994, 
p. 4). Through the privatisation, the family-led political government favoured their clan and 
party-men, and a new group of family businesses were created, resulting in crony capitalism 
(Uddin & Choudhury, 2008). Poor governance and lack of accountability are rooted in the post-
independence family-led political parties in Bangladesh (Uddin & Choudhury, 2008) that have 
recently become more egotistical, violent and oppressive. 
 
The antagonistic politics between the two main family-led political parties has created a culture 
where everything, including non-political affairs, has also been politicised. There is a 
longstanding nexus between politics and business as many politicians get involved with the 
business to make money using their political power, and many business people believe that 
political affiliation and support is a necessary condition for licensing some businesses (such as 
banking, media, large public-private partnership projects), their survival, and expansion 
(Zaman, 2011; Uddin, Siddiqui and Islam, 2018, p. 417).  
 
Besides privatisation, the government adopted a free-market economic policy and emphasised 
on export-oriented industries such as readymade garments, leather and leather goods, and the 
Agro-processing industries in the 1990s. Consistent with the vision of the market economy, the 
government undertook several initiatives to develop the private sectors. Some of the remarkable 
initiatives were revitalising the Dhaka Stock Exchange (DSE), establishing the Chittagong 
Stock Exchange, establishing the Bangladesh Securities and Exchange Commission (BSEC) to 
regulate the capital market and protect the interests of the investors, establishing special 
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industrial zones, and offering incentives to attract private sector investments both from home 
and abroad. 
 
Despite political instability and many other challenges, Bangladesh has achieved a stable credit 
rating by Moody’s (Ba3) and S&P (BB-) for the 9th consecutive time. The private sector plays 
a remarkable role in the economic development of Bangladesh through production, investment, 
export and employment. In FY2017-18, the total investment increased to 31.23% of the GDP 
from 19.20% in 2008, and 74.48% of the investments came from the private sectors - local and 
foreign (GOB, 2018). These growing economic activities explicitly affect the social and natural 
environment of Bangladesh both positively and negatively (Fares et al., 2006). As such, SER 
can help promote transparency and accountability of social and environmental performance of 
companies in Bangladesh. 
  
2.3.4 Regulatory and institutional context 
The current rules and regulations that determine the corporate disclosures in Bangladesh include 
the Companies Act, 1994; the Securities and Exchange Ordinance, 1969; the Securities and 
Exchange Rules, 1987; the Corporate Governance Code 2018; the listing rules of stock 
exchanges and the various statutes creating the public enterprises, the Insurance Act, 1938; the 
Banking Companies Act, 1991; and the Income Tax Ordinance, 1984. The Companies Act is 
the main act for the publicly listed limited companies, which mainly requires financial 
disclosures along with some social disclosures (such as spending for energy, number of 
employees, salaries, remuneration paid to the directors, contribution to the national exchequer). 
The Securities and Exchange Ordinance and Rules, and the Listing Rules of stock exchanges 
require the listed companies to disclose additional information and comply with international 
accounting standards. The national institutions which are expected to play important roles in 
implementing these rules and regulations include the Securities and Exchange Commission,  
Registrar of Joint Stock Companies, Dhaka Stock Exchange Limited, Chittagong Stock 
Exchange Limited, Bangladesh Bank, Insurance Development and Regulatory Authority, NBR, 
Institute of Chartered Accountants of Bangladesh (Belal, 1999). 
 
Despite numerous laws, regulations and policy initiatives for conserving the natural 
environment, the environmental performance of companies in Bangladesh is poor. Ullah (2014) 
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documents that there are 21 environmental laws and related documents in Bangladesh. Some 
of the notable laws are Bangladesh Environmental Conservation Act, 1995; Environmental 
Conservation Rules (ECR), 1997; Renewable Energy Policy, 2008; Bangladesh Climate 
Change Strategy and Action Plan, 2009; Environment Court (Amendment) Act, 2010; Climate 
Change Trust Act, 2010; Bangladesh Climate Change Resilience Fund, 2010. The Bangladesh 
Environmental Conservation Act (ECA) 1995 is the umbrella Act. ECA 1995 and ECR 1997 
together provide the framework of environmental regulations relevant to the industries of the 
country. According to the requirements of ECR 1997, a clearance certificate must be obtained 
from the Department of Environment for establishing any industrial units. To refine the 
industrial wastage, a zero per cent tariff facility has been proposed in the FY 2012-13 budget 
against the existing 1% for imports of ETP. Over the last three decades, the government 
invested about USD10.0 billion to strengthen resilience capacity. Moreover, the government 
allocated BDT 21.0 billion during 2010-12 under the Bangladesh Climate Change Trust Fund 
for increasing resilience to climate change and proposed another BDT 4.0 billion for the FY 
2012-13. To address the climate risks, Bangladesh Climate Change Resilience Fund was 
established by the government, with financial help from the development partners including the 
World Bank, the UK, EU, Denmark, Sweden and Australia that contributed around US $200 
million to it (Ullah, 2014). 
 
The government of Bangladesh encourages corporate social responsibility (CSR) by offering 
10% tax exemption on the allowable actual CSR expenditure, which is lower than 20% of the 
gross income, or BDT 80 million by issuing a statutory regulatory order and subsequently 
amending it in 2012 and 2014. To claim a tax exemption, companies have to comply with 
certain conditions which, in turn, will further enhance compliance of some important laws 
related to the social and environmental responsibility. Some of the areas of CSR applicable for 
the tax exemption include aid through any government bodies for reducing mass crisis in case 
of natural disasters; aid to organisations establishing and pursuing welfare activities such as 
operating old homes; taking care of mentally and physically challenged persons, women 
empowerment and anti-dowry campaigns, subsistence, rehabilitation and education of orphan 
and rootless children; housing projects for slum dwellers; independence war-related research; 
healthy sanitation activities; free medical treatment to cleft lip, cataract and cancer; acid victims, 
liver and kidney diseases, thalassemia, ophthalmology, cardiology; sports training, museums 
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for preserving the memory of the independence war and memory of the father of the nation; 
various funds of the Prime Minister. All these government initiatives encourage companies to 
spend on CSR. However, there is no direct encouragement for CSR reporting though companies 
are supposed to disclose these activities in their reports and on the websites.  
 
In conformity with the government initiatives, Bangladesh Bank (BB), the central bank of the 
country, has also undertaken certain initiatives for promoting inclusive growth, sustainability, 
CSR and CSR reporting. Notable BB initiatives include ensuring the availability of measures 
against environmental pollution before financing in 1997 25 , issuance of a comprehensive 
guideline on CSR in 2008 26 , the Agricultural Credit Policy in 2010 27 , Guidelines on 
Environmental Risk Management28, and Policy Guidelines for Green Banking, both in 201129. 
However, none of these laws, rules, guidelines, nor the organisations call for any mandatory 
SER for the publicly listed companies, and these laws are also not functioning effectively. 
Figure 2.1 depicts the governance environment in Bangladesh. It shows that the overall country 
governance in Bangladesh is very poor as indicated by an all-time negative value ranging from 
-0.80 to -1.0 from 2004 to 2018 where +2.5 and -2.5 represent the strongest and weakest country 
governance, respectively. The country lacks political stability (PVE), which, in turn, affects 
voice and accountability, and corruption. The low level of state accountability affects the 
accountability and transparency of the companies operating in the country. Other country 
governance indicators namely the rule of law (RLE), government effectiveness (GEE), 
regulatory quality (RQE) and control of corruption (CCE) are also negative indicating poor 
governance in the country.    
 
Besides the absence of effective regulatory pressures, companies in Bangladesh do not face any 
strong pressures for SER from society at large. Therefore, they try to merely comply with the 
mandatory requirements. As a result, the country governance environment has a minimal role 
 
25 BB BRPD Circular No. 12 dated August 10, 1997. 
26 DOS Circular No. 01 ‘Mainstreaming Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) in banks and financial 
institutions in Bangladesh’ dated 1 June 2008. 
27 ACD Circular No. 14 ‘Agricultural / Rural Credit Policy and Programme for the fiscal Year 2010-11’ dated 
July 21, 2010. 
28 BRPD Circular No.01 ‘Guidelines on Environmental Risk Management (ERM)’ dated January 30, 2011. 
29 BB BRPD Circular No. 2, February 27, 2011. 
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in promoting SER, and the level of the SED of Bangladeshi companies is low along with 
rhetoric, descriptive and positive disclosures (Belal & Cooper, 2011; Sobhani, Amran, & 
Zainuddin, 2009; Imam, 2000). Moreover, the performance of companies in sensitive social 
and environmental aspects (such as child labour, poverty alleviation, corruption, pollution) is 
deficient because of weak enforcement of laws. Thus, in the absence of any mandatory 
disclosure requirements, companies are not interested in disclosing their poor performance 
(Belal & Cooper, 2011). 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Country governance in Bangladesh  
Source: Based on the Worldwide Governance Indicators of the World Bank 
The unethical social and environmental practices of Bangladeshi companies are evidenced by 
the several recent accidents in different industrial bases. Examples are the Rana Plaza collapse 
that killed about 1134 workers in 2013, the Nimtoli chemical factory explosion, which killed 
117 people in 2010, fire at Tazreen Fashions garment factory (112 workers died in 2012), F. R. 
Tower fire, which killed at least 25 people, visible hazards and inevitable adverse impact on the 
lives of the people living around Hazaribagh by the tanneries (Siddiqui & Uddin, 2016; Azom 
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et al., 2012; Bajaj, 2012). The severity of the non-compliance can be understood from some of 
the statistics related to the effluent treatment plant (ETP). By reviewing the dailies, Haque 
(2017) documents that there were 89 instances of no clearance from the department of 
environment and no ETPs, 73 firms had faulty ETPs, 42 firms had no ETPs, and 19 ETPs were 
found turned off. The amount of fines imposed is not enough to refrain the violators from 
repeating the violation as Haque (2017, p.6) notes that “(o)ut of the 290 of offenders, one factory 
has been fined thrice over the five years. Additional 25 factories were fined at least twice over 
the years.”. Unfortunately, the miscreants can get away with these misdeeds because of their 
nexus, influence and the corrupt and ineffective legal system (Uddin & Choudhury, 2008). On 
many occasions, the government interfered, reduced or cancelled the fine, sometimes for 
political causes.30 A newspaper reported that “(m)any of the fines have been forgiven, reduced 
and even returned following the appeals process regardless of the violation, further encouraging 
the culture of impunity. … during 2010–2014, 1788 industrial units were fined a total of 
1,516,100,000 Taka, out of which MoEF31 collected 1,027,900,000 Taka which is 68% of the 
levied fine”32. While a mandatory requirement for SER could ensure corporate accountability, 
it is yet to be done due to the lack of political will and probable cost of arbitrage including 
increased corruption (Belal, Cooper, & Khan, 2015). However, the companies that have linkage 
with and are dependent on the international donors, lenders and buyers tend to provide SED to 
offer an avenue to know about the companies’ social and environmental activities and to 
appease the pressures for such concerns (Belal and Owen, 2007, 2015; Islam and Deegan, 2008) 
 
2.4 Summary  
This chapter has briefly discussed the contexts of developing countries in general and  
Bangladesh, in particular, to provide an overview of the research settings so that the theoretical 
framework can be developed in line with the ground realities in Chapter 3 and the empirical 
findings in Chapters 6 and 7 can be interpreted and related to the context. It shows that 
developing countries are characterised by the undeveloped markets, poor governance, family-
led politics and business, high level of corruption, inefficient democratic institutions, weak 
 
30 I. Mahmud, Environmental fines are publicity stunts Prothom Alo, 1, 14 February 2014 as cited in Haque 
(2017, p.7) . 
31 MoEF stands for Ministry of Environment and Forest. 
32 A. Hossain, 80 lakh taka fine forgiven with one appeal. Daily Samakal. Retrieved from: 
〈http://archive.samakal.net/2014/05/21/60832〉, 21 May, 2014 as cited in Haque (2017, p.7) . 
30 
 
enforcement of laws, political instability, guided democracy, and limited voice and 
accountability, and Bangladesh, as a developing country, possesses many of these 
commonalities. The context of Bangladesh has been described in terms of historical, political, 
social, cultural, religious, economic, regulatory, and institutional contexts. Based on the 
understandings of the research settings, the next chapter will develop and present the theoretical 
framework of the dissertation.  
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Chapter 3 
Theoretical Framework 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to develop a theoretical framework for conducting the study, and 
analysing and interpreting the empirical findings in Chapters 6 and 7. The following provides 
an overview of theories used in the social and environmental accounting research, develops a 
theoretical framework and explains why this study employs the institutional perspective based 
on the multi-level institutional analysis model of Scott (2002) and the three-level analytical 
framework of Whelan and Muthuri (2017) to examine the relationship between the global, 
country and firm-level governance and SER in developing countries in general, and explore the 
underlying reasons for such relationships in Bangladesh, as a developing country, in particular. 
 
Businesses are an inseparable part of the broader social system, which both affect and are 
affected by the society in which they operate (Deegan, 2014). The sociocultural, legal, 
economic, and political institutions play a vital role in explaining the forms and focus of 
CSR across the nations (Powell & DiMaggio, 1991; Halme, Roome & Dobers, 2009; 
Barrena Martínez, López Fernández and Romero Fernández, 2016), and companies disclose 
voluntary information as a tool to influence their relationships with other parties (Deegan, 2014; 
Suchman, 1995). The SEA researchers most commonly use legitimacy theory, stakeholder 
theory and institutional theory to explain why an organisation does social and environmental 
reporting. Referring to the institutional theory, Suchman (1995, p. 571) notes that “many 
dynamics in the organizational environment stem … from cultural norms, symbols, beliefs and 
rituals”. Likewise, Gray, Owen and Adams, (1996, p. 45) argue that a system-oriented view of 
organisation and society “permits us to focus on the role of information and disclosure in the 
relationship(s) between organisations, the state, individuals and groups”. These theories are 
derived from a single broader theory - the political economy theory (PET) (Gray, Owen, & 
Adams, 2009). 
 
According to Gray, Owen and Adams (1996, p. 47), the political economy is “the social, 
political and economic framework within which human life takes place”. With a broader 
societal perspective, the PET helps a researcher to widen his level of analysis by considering 
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the political, social, and institutional frameworks where a business operates, how a business 
operates and what information it chooses to disclose. As a society, politics, and economics are 
inseparable, economic issues cannot be investigated without such considerations (Deegan, 
2014, p. 341). From the political economy perspective, accounting reports are considered social, 
political and economic documents that serve as a tool for constructing, sustaining, and 
legitimising economic and political arrangements, institutions, and ideological themes, which 
contribute to the corporate private interests. Accounting reports can transmit social, political, 
and economic meanings for a pluralistic group of stakeholders (Guthrie, Parker and Parker, 
1990, p.166).  
 
The PET can be seen from the ‘classical’ and ‘bourgeois’ perspectives (Gray, Owen and Adams, 
2009, p. 20). The classical political economy focuses on structural conflicts within the society 
and considers the accounting reports as a tool to facilitate the wealthy and powerful section of 
the society that controls the scarce capital whereas to undermine the weak section of the society 
without the capital (Deegan, 2014, p.342). The bourgeois branch of PET ignores struggles and 
inequalities within the society and considers the interactions between various groups in an 
essentially pluralistic world, for example, the negotiation between a corporation and an 
environmental NGO or a local authority (Gray, Owen and Adams, 2009, p. 20). In contrast to 
the power and privilege of the elites, the bourgeois PET assumes that various groups of 
stakeholders have the power to influence the corporate decisions and activities. The legitimacy 
theory and stakeholder theory, which do not question social structure or conflicts, are derived 
from the bourgeois branch of PET. While the legitimacy theory explains how an organisation 
attempts to legitimate its ‘license to operate’ in society through voluntary CSR disclosure 
(Deegan, 2014), by changing the level of resolution, the stakeholder theory focuses on the 
subgroups within society and their relationship with the corporation (Chen & Roberts, 2010). 
More precisely, the legitimacy theory looks at the society as a whole, whereas the 
stakeholder theory recommends that some groups within the society are more powerful 
than others (Jain, Aguilera, & Jamali, 2017; Mitchell, Agle, & Wood, 1997), and 
companies behave responsibly in response to the concerns and expectations of powerful 
stakeholders (e.g. Ullmann, 1985; Phillips, 2003; Fassin, De Colle and Freeman, 2017). 
However, the limitation of the pluralistic view is that it ignores much evidence indicating that 
the majority of the people in a society are controlled and oppressed by a small group of elites 
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(Cooper & Sherer, 1984). The power of the institutional theory is that it “can be applied within 
either a classical or a bourgeois conception of political economy” (Deegan, 2014, p. 343). 
Hence, we employ the institutional theory as the theoretical framework of the dissertation. The 
next section delineates the institutional theory. 
 
Given the importance of institutional and contextual study in the contemporary SEA research 
(e.g. Mathews, 1993; Tsang, 1998; Doh and Guay, 2006; Tregidga and Milne, 2006; Weyzig, 
2006; Flanagan and Whiteman, 2007; Komori, 2007, 2015; Matten and Moon, 2008; Milne, 
Tregidga and Walton, 2009; Halme, Roome, & Dobers, 2009; Ertuna and Tukel, 2010; Preuss 
and Barkemeyer, 2011; Abreu et al., 2012; Momin and Parker, 2013; Gruber and 
Schlegelmilch, 2015; Rathert, 2016; Tilt, 2016; Wirth et al., 2016; Yin and Jamali, 2016; 
Hopper, Lassou and Soobaroyen, 2017), the following section aims at developing a theoretical 
framework (based on the institutional perspective, governance, research context and SER in 
developing countries) that will be used to analyse and interpret the empirical findings in 
Chapters 6 and 7. The final section summarises and concludes the chapter. 
 
3.2 Institutional Theory  
According to the institutional theory, companies internalise the norms, beliefs, values, and 
principles accepted by society and behave in line with the contexts that are vital for their 
survival (Fuenfschilling & Truffer, 2014; Dacin, 1997). The core of the institutional theory is 
the ‘institutions’ that are inhabited and maintained by human interactions (behaviour) and 
resources. Scott (2001, p. 48) defined institutions as follows: 
 
Institutions are social structures that have attained a high degree of resilience. Institutions are 
composed of cultural-cognitive, normative, and regulative elements that, together with associated 
activities and resources, provide stability and meaning to social life. 
 
Similarly, defined by other scholars, institutions are enduring features of social life (Giddens, 
1984), a set of collective rules accepted by society to establish institutional belief (Searle, 2005), 
and highly resistant to change (Zucker, 1987). Human interactions and activities are critical to 
the institutional process because institutions are inhabited, preserved and modified by human 
behaviour (Scott, 2001). Institutions are ‘dead’ “unless they are ongoingly brought to life in 
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actual human conduct” (Berger and Luckmann, 1991, p. 93). Likewise, both human and 
material resources are critical to any conception of social structure to understand the 
asymmetries of power. To sustain and be effective, any rules and norms must be backed by the 
sanctioning power and cultural beliefs, or schemas that are often embodied in resources (Sewell, 
1992). 
 
Although institutions provide order, stability and shared meaning, they are subject to change, 
both incremental and discontinuous (Scott, 2001, p. 48). Institutions are a state of an existing 
social order as well as processes of institutionalisation and deinstitutionalisation (Tolbert & 
Zucker, 1996; Oliver, 1992). Adopting the knowledge from cognitive psychology and cultural 
anthropology, neo-institutional theorists focus on the cultural cognitive factors (such as shared 
beliefs and conceptual frameworks) together with the earlier coercive and normative control 
and the processes through which structural conformity (isomorphism) among the organisations 
in the same organisational fields take place (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 
1977). In general, institutions induce firms to adopt similar strategies in response to the 
coercive, normative and cognitive pressures (Scott, 2008a) and the organisational conformity 
to such pressures is conceived as a means to survive and grow in an institutional environment. 
 
The “central building blocks of the institutional structure” are the regulative (coercive), 
normative and cultural-cognitive institutions (Scott, 2008b, p. 49) that consist of rules, norms, 
beliefs, values, and principles accepted by the society and influence organisational strategies 
to be aligned with the social, political and economic needs of a particular context where a 
company operates (Ball & Craig, 2010; Lounsbury, 2008; Scott, 1987, 2002, 2008b; Meyer & 
Rowan, 1977). Among these three, the coercive pressure is the most powerful (Islam and 
Deegan, 2008). The coercive processes and structures involve rule-settings, monitoring, and 
sanctioning activities - rewards or punishments. According to DiMaggio and Powell (1983, p. 
150), “Coercive isomorphism results from both formal and informal pressures exerted on 
organizations upon which they are dependent and by cultural expectations in the society within 
which organizations function”. The regulative institutions are the coercive mechanisms and are 
primarily enforced by the government or the powerful stakeholders upon which the 
organisations are dependent. Because of the pressure (fear) for nonconformance from the legal 
rules and coercive impositions from other sources, organisational conformance is expedient and 
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instrumental, irrespective of their choice (Lounsbury, 2008; Scott, 2001, 2002; DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1983). The effectiveness of this institutional pillar depends not only on the rules and 
laws but also on the agents’ capacity to establish and implement the laws, inspect and impose 
sanctions. Normative institutions are based on social obligations and binding expectations that 
lead to organisational obedience stemming from the internalised moral obligations to act in a 
socially appropriate manner (Scott, 2001; Dacin, Goodstein and Scott, 2002). Certifications, 
accreditations, professional experience, endorsements, and formal education help create and 
maintain normative institutions. Cultural-cognitive institutions are based on orthodoxy where 
conformity comes from the taken-for-granted and shared beliefs, culture and norms within a 
given society (Contrafatto, 2014; Scott, 2008b). More specifically, conformity to the norms, 
beliefs, values and principles accepted by society is vital for the success and survival of the 
organisations, and thus determines their behaviour so that doing otherwise becomes unthinkable 
(Fuenfschilling & Truffer, 2014; Dacin, 1997). This pillar is difficult to detect, but it exists in 
the inherent cognitive characteristics of the actors, and is maintained by mimicry, whereby 
organisations facing uncertainty tend to imitate the relatively more successful ones (peers in the 
same field or related fields). 
 
The three institutional pillars are interrelated and co-exist, and thereby form a continuum 
moving “from the conscious to the unconscious, from the legally enforced to the taken for 
granted”, although one or two of them may play a dominant role at a particular point in time 
(Hoffman, 2001, p. 36). Such integrated structures create overdetermined systems, as argued 
by d’Andrade (1982) in his book chapter, ‘The Cultural Meaning Systems’ that “(i)n general, 
the directive functions of most cultural meaning systems are highly overdetermined: 
overdetermined in the sense that social sanctions, plus the pressure for conformity, plus intrinsic 
direct reward, plus values, are all likely to act together to give a particular meaning system its 
directive force” (d’Andrade, 1982, p. 209). The three forces, together, constitute a powerful 
social framework through their interactions and mutual reinforcement. Such a structure 
constrains and empowers social behaviour through the coercive, normative and cognitive-
cultural mechanisms. 
 
Institutional elements are transmitted by various carriers (Scott, 2002; Jepperson, Ronald, 
1991), and these elements and their carriers operate at multiple levels, each of which influences 
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the operations of business today (Scott, 2001, 2002) to varying degrees, depending on their 
scope of operations and dependence on the institutions, at various levels (See Table 3.1). Scott 
(2002) developed a multi-level institutional analytical framework to analyse the changing 
institutions in Chinese enterprises, based on his previous study (Scott, 2001), which concluded 
that institutions work at different levels, ranging from the world system to interpersonal 
interactions: the world system level; societal level; organisational field level (i.e. organisations 
operating in a specified social arena); organisational population level (i.e. similar organisations 
exhibiting same structural forms); the individual organisation level; and the organisational 
subsystem level (i.e. a department of an organisation). Scott (2002) argues that the level of 
analysis depends on the nature of the research phenomena. However, “it is often useful to 
examine the influence of forces working at various levels” (Scott, 2002, p. 62). Emphasising 
the pervasive influence of the three institutional elements at multiple levels, Scott (2001) notes 
that “it is important to recognise that even if an investigation focuses on a particular level, 
institutional forces operating at other levels – both ‘above’ and ‘beneath’ the level elected – 
will be at work” (p. 56). Likewise, Whelan and Muthuri (2017) developed a three-level 
analytical framework for analysing human rights in China. In today’s globalised system, the 
adoption of an accounting technology such as SER can be driven by shared institutional 
dynamics operative at the global, country and firm levels. Therefore, the study examines the 
influences of institutions (governance) stemming from the global, country, and firm levels on 
SER in developing countries in general and in Bangladesh, in particular. 
 
Akin to the three institutional elements that emerge from multiple-levels, governance as an 
institution also emerges from and operates at the global, country, and firm levels. Governance 
refers to rule‐based decision‐making and monitoring (OECD, 2012), and as such, it is multilevel 
and multidimensional. Governance is a complex concept and has structures spanning both 
formal and informal arrangements at the global, country, and firm levels (Wieland, 2001). The 
development of global governance is closely associated with globalisation. The multiplicity of 
regulations and cultural-cognitive variations across the countries, along with the expanded 
operations of corporations and the concurrent problems (such as climate change, loss of 
biodiversity) throughout the world, have resulted in global concerns in contrast to the earlier 
state-based conceptions. New policies have emerged to address these problems by encouraging 
companies to voluntarily improve their activities and, at the same time, corporations have also 
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been trying to have some universal standards to be followed globally (in contrast to varied 
regulations in various countries) to legitimate their presence of operations and avoid any strict 
regulations (Williams, 1999). Thus, global governance standards (Brown, Clark, & Buono, 
2018; Merry, 2011; Chen & Bouvain, 2009; Weiss, 2000; Rosenau, 1995), commonly known 
as self-regulation, have emerged (Scherer & Smid, 2000) to fill the gap in the legal regulation, 
eschew strict regulations and evade varied national governance system. Unlike country 
governance, global governance is called governance without a government. Global governance 
is a global public good, which is developed and implemented with the help of multi-stakeholder 
engagement, including governments, intergovernmental organisations, businesses, civil society 
groups, NGOs, and others (Detomasi, 2007). Some of the remarkable initiatives at the 
beginning of the 2000s include the United Nations Global Compact (UNGC), the Global 
Reporting Initiatives (GRI) ‘Sustainability Reporting Guidelines’ (currently the ‘Sustainability 
Reporting Standard’) and, the ISO 26000 ‘Guidance on Social Responsibility’. The normative 
standards for global governance are generally voluntary. However, they become bindings for 
companies when they are mandatorily required by some statutes or dominant stakeholders, such 
as securities and exchange commission, international buyers or lenders. It is noteworthy that 
despite numerous instances of noncompliance with laws, export-dependent firms in developing 
countries take utmost care to meet the requirements of their buyers based in the advanced 
economies.  
 
Country governance is mainly shaped by a wide range of macroeconomic and cultural-cognitive 
factors such as history, heritage, culture, and beliefs of a country. Consistent with the coercive 
pillar of the institutional theory, improved regulations and effective enforcement (formal 
governance) can play a pivotal role in developing, maintaining, and embedding deeper firm-
society relationships (Islam, Deegan, & Gray, 2018; Rahim, 2013). Consistent with the 
normative pillar of the institutional theory, good governance, ethical codes of conduct, and 
professionalism are expected to limit corruption (Islam, Haque, & Gilchrist, 2017) and promote 
good practices, such as SER. 
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Table 3.1: Relative influence of different institutional elements on SER at different levels 
Pressures\levels Global Country-level Firm-level 
Coercive Strong Moderate Weak 
Normative Moderate Weak Strong 
Cultural cognitive Weak Strong Moderate 
Based on Scott (2001; 2002) and the author’s understanding of the research context 
 
The study considers governance (that may be seen from the global, country and firm-level 
perspectives) as institutions that have varying degrees of influence on SER, depending on the 
level of expediency, moral obligations, orthodoxy and the sources of pressures for conformity. 
The three levels of governance and three forms of pressures are interdependent.  Table 3.1 has 
been developed based on Scott (2001; 2002) and the author’s understanding and research 
experience to portray the relative influence of the global, country and firm levels in the forms 
of coercive, normative and cultural-cognitive pressures to analyse and interpret the findings of 
the developing countries in general and Bangladesh in particular. It is important to note that the 
ranking of the coercive, normative and cultural cognitive as strong, moderate, and weak at the 
global, country and firm-levels are based on their relative influence at each level. More 
specifically, each of the three levels of governance has three ranks (strong, moderate, and weak) 
for three forms of pressures in terms of their relative influence on SER. Table 3.1 depicts that 
although all the three forms of pressures for voluntary SER come from the three levels, coercive 
pressures are mainly emanated from the global level (strong) followed by the country-level 
(moderate) and firm-level (weak); normative pressures come from the firm-level (strong) 
followed by the global-level (moderate) and country-level (weak); cultural-cognitive pressures 
predominantly come from the country-level (strong) followed by the firm-level (moderate) and 
global-level (weak). There are interactions and interdependence between (a) coercive, 
normative, and cultural-cognitive governance; (b) governance at the global, country, and firm 
levels; and (c) between (a) and (b). Through these interactions, the coercive, normative, and 
cultural-cognitive governance factors create an overall governance environment for SER in 
developing countries. More importantly, the interactions between the coercive, normative, and 
cultural-cognitive elements are mediated by the capacity and role of the agents. For example, 
the effectiveness of the regulative governance largely depends on the process and the agents 
involved with rule-setting, enforcement, monitoring, and sanctioning. Likewise, the 
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interdependence between the governance at the three levels is mediated by the degree of a firm’s 
linkage with the rest of the world. 
 
The cultural-cognitive factors are deeply rooted in a particular context, thus having a substantial 
impact on the perception of corporate managers and others regarding the regulative and 
normative elements in the Bangladeshi institutional context (Hofstede, Hofstede, & Minkov, 
2005). Also, the other two pillars of the institutional theory must be backed by a sanctioning 
power, and cultural beliefs or schemas to be effective. Contrary to the individualism in most 
Western societies, the traditional system suggests collectivism as the core for societal harmony 
(Hofstede, 1984, 2001). In a traditional setting, people “from birth onwards are integrated into 
strong, cohesive in-groups, which throughout people’s lifetime continue to protect them in 
exchange for unquestioning loyalty” (Hofstede, Hofstede and Minkov, 2005, p. 515). Thus, the 
cultural-cognitive framework seems relevant to understand the corporate behaviours in the 
context of Bangladesh, due to its unique socio-economic, political, and cultural characteristics. 
Bangladesh is a mixed economy characterised by honour culture (Aslani et al., 2013, 2016), 
high power dominance, masculinity, collectivistic society (Hofstede, 1984, 2001), the guided 
democracy predominantly led by two families, political instability and anarchy, unholy nexus 
between business, politics and bureaucrats, corruption and impunity (Uddin & Choudhury, 
2008), along with the most commonly pronounced problems of developing countries, such as 
poverty, hunger, or illiteracy (Rodríguez, Montiel, & Ozuna, 2014; Khavul & Bruton, 2013; 
Abdalla, Siti-Nabiha, & Shahbudin, 2013; Robertson, 2009). 
 
In many developing countries, laws are for the weak section of the population and the powerful 
people most often can act according to their desires and can getaway. Instead of being regulated, 
the super-rich in developing countries regulate the regulators; and the rules in such contexts are 
“nothing more than the commands of those who exercise political authority”  (Carver, 2018, p. 
18). Traditional settings (such as Bangladesh) are characterised by patriarchy, where the display 
of public loyalty, the master-servant relationship, and obedience to the person are prioritised 
over the formal authority (Dyball, Fong Chua, & Poullaos, 2006; Weber, 1978). In a patriarchal 
society, interpersonal relationships supersede the formal regulations and have “a rich subculture 
of instrumental-personal ties through which individuals circumvent formal regulations to obtain 
official approvals” (Walder, 1986, pp. 6-7 as cited in Li and Belal, 2018, p. 201). The 
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enforcement of laws depends on the whims of the ruling party and the state headman since they 
develop the legal and enforcement structure, aligned with their self-interest. 
 
In developing countries, including Bangladesh, the ruling party and the state affect 
socioeconomic developments according to their wish rather than acting as a neutral referee for 
promoting the freedom and wellbeing of all the citizens of the country (Lee & Zhang, 2013). 
The opportunity of agency, getting a licence to do certain business, access to government 
contracts, the prosperity and survival of a business, as well as the bureaucrats predominantly 
depend on the wish and intent of the superpower of the family-led political-leader, which 
spreads across the hierarchy in organisations and national political systems (Scott, 2001; Uddin 
and Hopper, 2003). The context is such that the desires of the top leaders and their clienteles 
are the law of the country, subverting the formal institutional and legal structure. Thus, in 
Bangladesh, the distinctive cultural-cognitive characteristics stemming from the wider societal 
systems, organisational fields, and individual firms along with the political hegemony, have 
collectively set the bases for firm structure and culture. Like many other developing countries, 
including China, Bangladesh has become an authoritarian state through token democracy, 
where mistrust, unrest and political conflicts are so rampant that the primary function of the 
government is to misuse the state apparatus, including the judiciary and law enforcing agencies, 
in suppressing the disagreement and political opposition (Lee & Zhang, 2013; Mannan, 2011; 
Uddin & Choudhury, 2008). Instead of utilising the state power for the betterment of the 
citizens, the government in such a country tries to capture it, to develop, maintain and brutally 
control different views (opposite and unwelcoming) forcing them to endure their power 
unchallenged rather than accommodating political differences and pacify the political conflicts, 
resulting in disorganisation and deinstitutionalisation (Mannan, 1992 as cited in Uddin, 
Siddiqui and Islam, 2018). 
 
Through the process of privatisation, liberalisation and linkage with the global market, many 
developing countries, including Bangladesh, adopted the Western corporate governance 
mechanisms (Siddiqui, 2010). However, most of the listed companies in Bangladesh are family 
businesses, and the top five shareholders own more than fifty per cent of the stocks (Farooque 
et al., 2007). In family-controlled firms, the effectiveness of corporate governance is 
questioned, and the independent directors required by the BSEC cannot perform an independent 
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role. Moreover, because of the honour culture, the female directors may not perform their due 
role in promoting SER in developing countries, in general, and in Bangladesh, in particular. 
The international stakeholders, such as buyers, lenders and donors, require transparent and 
responsible operations. Also, the national initiatives of the NBR for promoting CSR, 
Bangladesh Bank CSR guidelines for the financial sector, learning and professional experience 
from the MNCs, pressure from the media and CSOs should have some impact on the CSR and 
SER in Bangladesh. 
 
It is worth mentioning that this study employs the institutional perspective subject to some 
limitations. While the findings of the qualitative analysis (Chapter 7) can be explained from the 
three levels of governance (global, country and firm), and three forms of pressures (coercive, 
normative and cultural-cognitive); the findings of the quantitative analysis (Chapter 6) can only 
be explained from the three levels of governance. Also, in the quantitative analysis, agents such 
as independent directors and female directors are used as surrogates for the firm-level 
governance due to the lack of data.  
 
3.3 Summary 
This chapter briefly discusses various theoretical explanations that are most commonly used to 
understand why do companies do SER. Starting with a framework for the relationship between 
the social, political and economic activities provided by the broader political economy theory, 
the chapter points to the organisational theories such as the legitimacy theory, stakeholder 
theory and institutional theory. While the legitimacy theory looks at the society as a whole, 
the stakeholder theory recommends that some groups within the society are more powerful 
than others (Jain, Aguilera, & Jamali, 2017; Mitchell, Agle, & Wood, 1997) and companies 
respond to the concerns and expectations of the powerful stakeholders (e.g. Ullmann, 1985; 
Phillips, 2003; Fassin, De Colle and Freeman, 2017). The institutional theory posits that 
companies internalise the norms, beliefs, values, and principles accepted by society and 
behave in conformity with the contexts in which they operate (Fuenfschilling & Truffer, 
2014; Dacin, 1997). 
 
The institutional theory appears to be the most appropriate theory for this study considering the 
level of analysis, forms and sources of pressures, and the reality of both the pluralistic structure 
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and dominance of powerful stakeholder groups. More specifically, the study analyses the 
relationship between three levels of governance (global, country and firm) and SER, which is 
possible using the institutional perspective because of the following reasons. Regarding the 
level of analysis, the legitimacy theory is very broad and unspecified; the stakeholder theory is 
very narrow and focuses on some specific stakeholders, while the institutional theory lies in 
between the legitimacy theory and the stakeholder theory, creating a balance between them 
(Chen and Roberts, 2010, p. 653). Furthermore, the three levels of governance also involve 
coercive, normative and cultural-cognitive characteristics that are consistent with the three 
pillars of the institutional theory. Finally, the institutional theory is capable of explaining the 
social, political and economic phenomena from both the classical and bourgeois perspectives 
of the political economy theory (Deegan, 2014, p. 343), recognising the coexistence of and 
encompassing both the pluralistic view, control and dominance by a small group of people over 
the majority, which is useful in explaining the social imbalance, inequality and unrest, as well 
as the role of SER in addressing them. To sum up, by integrating the insights from Scott (2002) 
and Whelan and Muthuri (2017) along with the contextual dynamics in developing countries, 
in general, and in Bangladesh in particular, the chapter has developed a multi-level institutional 
analytical framework to understand the relationship between the three levels of governance and 
SER. 
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Chapter 4 
Literature Review and Development of Hypotheses 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter aims at reviewing the corporate social and environmental reporting (SER) and 
governance literature to identify research gaps and locate the contributions of the study within 
the extant literature. The following sections briefly present SER in developing countries, SER 
in Bangladesh, barriers to SER, governance and SER, and the development of hypotheses. 
Finally, review findings are summarised, gaps are identified, and potential contributions are 
indicated. 
 
4.2 SER in developing countries 
Despite the rising trend in the research on SER practices in developing countries in recent times, 
such endeavour is still limited (Teoh and Thong, 1984; Hegde, Bloom and Fuglister, 1997; 
Tsang, 1998; Belal, 2000, 2008; Belal, 2001; de Villiers and Staden, 2006; Belal and Owen, 
2007; Islam and Mathews, 2009; Sobhani, Amran and Zainuddin, 2009; Naeem and Welford, 
2009; Gao, 2011; Nyahunzvi, 2013; Momin and Parker, 2013; Muttakin and Subramaniam, 
2015). The CSR awareness, performance and disclosure are low in developing countries (e.g. 
Naeem and Welford, 2009; Sobhani, Amran and Zainuddin, 2009; Gao, 2011; Momin and 
Parker, 2013; Nyahunzvi, 2013; Muttakin and Subramaniam, 2015). Naeem and Welford 
(2009) document that the level of corporate social awareness and corporate social performance 
in Bangladesh and Pakistan is very low. Similarly, corporate social disclosure is also very low 
in China (Gao, 2011), Bangladesh (Momin & Parker, 2013; Sobhani, Amran, & Zainuddin, 
2009), India (Muttakin & Subramaniam, 2015) and Zimbabwe (Nyahunzvi, 2013). Besides, the 
quality of disclosure is also poor in developing countries (Nyahunzvi, 2013; Kolk & Lenfant, 
2010). 
 
Prior studies document that SER in developing countries is inadequate, cosmetic and rhetoric 
in nature because of the lack of corporate genuine social involvement (Belal & Roberts, 2010; 
Teoh & Thong, 1984). Corporates focus more on the narrow insensitive areas and try to 
overlook sensitive but socially important issues. Studies reveal that the corporate priority 
disclosures are the employees and human resources in Bangladesh (Momin & Parker, 2013; 
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Sobhani, Amran, & Zainuddin, 2009), Zimbabwe (Nyahunzvi, 2013), Malaysia (Teoh & Thong, 
1984); shareholders in Zimbabwe (Nyahunzvi, 2013); economic and social aspects in Angola, 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Republic of the Congo (Kolk & Lenfant, 2010); 
education and health in Bangladesh (Hossain, Hecimovic, & Lema, 2015); customers in 
Zimbabwe (Nyahunzvi, 2013); products in Malaysia (Teoh & Thong, 1984), and Pakistan 
(Khan, Lew, & Park, 2015). Corporates seem to be avoiding sensitive social issues, such as 
human rights (Kolk & Lenfant, 2010), and environmental burden and remedial measures in 
Bangladesh (Sobhani, Amran, & Zainuddin, 2009) and Zimbabwe (Nyahunzvi, 2013). 
 
Studies also suggest that firms in developing countries try to adopt reporting styles and formats 
developed in the advanced western economies that, in turn, results in cosmetic responses, given 
the different socio-economic and political conditions of the developing context (Hossain & 
Alam, 2016; Belal & Roberts, 2010). Based on the data from interviews, surveys, and focus 
group discussions, studies also document greenwashing, exaggeration and misrepresentation in 
SER. For example, corporate responsibility lacks substantial involvement and inclusiveness in 
India (Amaladoss & Manohar, 2013) and Malaysia (Teoh & Thong, 1984). There are concerns 
and scepticism about the SER practices in developing countries, as evidenced by the qualitative 
studies based on interviews and surveys with non-corporate stakeholders. Studies discover that 
there is an extensive discrepancy between the stated social and environmental commitments, 
social and environmental disclosure, and actual performance in, for example, Papua New 
Guinea (Duarte & Imbun, 2016), Bangladesh (Hossain & Alam, 2016; Momin, 2013) and 
Guatemala (Slack, 2012). In related work, Momin (2013) documents that there is a huge 
mismatch between the reality and the reported activities, as opined by the interviewee in his 
study – “CSD33 [reporting] is full of nice words … for example, you will often find corporations 
address issues like labour or employee-training issues rather than labour rights … issues such 
as freedom of association and collective bargaining are never addressed by the companies” 
(Momin, 2013, p. 150). Momin (2013) reveals that corporate social disclosure in developing 
countries is “no more than a public relations exercise” (p. 151). Based on a series of interviews 
with eighteen managers across ten subsidiaries in Sri Lanka during 2008-2009, Beddewela and 
Herzig (2013) find that MNC subsidiaries in developing countries are preoccupied with seeking 
 
33 CSD stands for corporate social disclosure. 
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internal legitimacy to comply with the head office requirements and control while 
compromising the priorities of the vulnerable local stakeholders. Hence, the SER made by firms 
in developing countries lacks transparency, trust (Duarte & Imbun, 2016) and credibility 
(Momin, 2013). 
 
By contrast, some studies show that developing country multinationals (DMNCs) are ahead in 
discharging their responsibilities. Using 219 DMNCs as samples (out of 412 firms from 
Thomson Reuters ASSET4 database) that had at least one foreign subsidiary (from five 
developing countries for the period 2009–2012), Zyglidopoulos, Williamson and Symeou 
(2016) document that the DMNCs have higher levels of corporate social performance than their 
purely domestic counterparts caused by the fact that internationalisation creates reputation and 
legitimacy deficits. A few studies document good SER practices in developing countries 
(Bhattacharyya, 2015; Muller & Kolk, 2009; Dawkins & Ngunjiri, 2008). Dawkins and 
Ngunjiri (2008) find that the level of corporate social and environmental disclosure (SED) in 
South African firms is significantly higher than that of the Fortune Global 100. Similarly, 
Muller and Kolk (2015) document that the nature, type and extent of SER practices of local 
Mexican auto firms are comparable to those in the western settings. Likewise, Bhattacharyya 
(2015) notes that managers possess a positive attitude towards SER in India. 
 
The level of SED in the developing countries is low (Muttakin & Subramaniam, 2015; Momin 
& Parker, 2013; Nyahunzvi, 2013; Gao, 2011; Naeem & Welford, 2009; Sobhani, Amran, & 
Zainuddin, 2009). The reasons behind non-disclosure or a low level of SED in these countries, 
as identified by the extant literature, include limitations of the accounting system itself (Hopper, 
Lassou, & Soobaroyen, 2017; Morales & Sponem, 2017), cultural attitudes in a country (Adams, 
2004), lack of regulations and enforcement, absence of pressures, profit imperativeness, lack of 
human and material resources, fear of bad publicity (Soobaroyen & Ntim, 2013; Belal & Cooper, 
2011; Gao, Heravi, & Xiao, 2005; Kuasirikun & Sherer, 2004; Teoh & Thong, 1984), short-
termism and avoidance of uncertainty (Slawinski et al., 2017), poor governance and nexus 
between business and politics (Momin, 2013; Uddin & Choudhury, 2008). 
 
Hopper, Lassou and Soobaroyen (2017) criticise accounting as being a barrier to solving the 
problems of developing countries. They argue that accounting know-hows are imported from 
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the developed countries, and they do not sufficiently recognise the context, needs and 
involvement of developing countries, thus, creating implementation problems. They also argue 
that accounting technologies are oriented towards the financial, rather than the development 
goals. Similarly, in their review work of ‘You too can have a critical perspective! 25 years of 
Critical Perspectives on Accounting’, Morales and Sponem (2017) show that accounting helps 
sustain capitalist accumulation by producing rhetoric of efficiency and rationality that masks its 
impacts on social relations. Annisette, Cooper and Gendron (2017) criticise accounting, arguing 
that within institutions, accountability has been “turned on its head such that, rather than 
institutions being held accountable to their stakeholders, employees are accountable to their 
institutions; consequently, they have been subjected to hierarchical management control 
systems which cast a spotlight on certain areas of their work through accounting technologies 
such as key performance metrics, balanced scorecards and the like. These metrics frequently 
make employees’ lives miserable and stressful” (p. 2). 
 
Belal and Cooper (2011) investigate the reasons for non-disclosure on three eco-justice issues: 
child labour, equal opportunities and poverty alleviation, through 23 semi-structured interviews 
with senior corporate managers in Bangladesh. They identify that the main reasons for non-
disclosure include the lack of resources, profit imperative, lack of legal requirements, lack of 
knowledge/awareness, poor performance and the fear of bad publicity. Teoh and Thong (1984) 
identify two reasons for non-disclosure: the desire of keeping the size of the annual report brief 
and maintaining secrecy about the firm’s activities. Studies also document that SER is 
dominated by the disclosure of good news (Deegan & Rankin, 1996); therefore, the lesser the 
number of good news, the lower will be the SER. Other factors include cultural attitudes within 
a country (Adams, 2004), little or no pressures from community pressure groups, and the 
government’s failure to enforce existing social and environmental legislation (in Hong Kong 
and Thailand) (Gao, Heravi, & Xiao, 2005; Kuasirikun & Sherer, 2004), and an absence of 
mandatory social and environmental disclosures (Kuasirikun & Sherer, 2004; Adams, Coutts, 
& Harte, 1995). 
 
Likewise, Soobaroyen and Ntim (2013) reveal that the corporate legitimisation agenda leads to 
symbolic disclosures with some limited substantive disclosures. They argue that the attainment 
of the vision of SER in South Africa is unlikely by the global voluntary initiatives alone. Momin 
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(2013) considers some vulnerability issues, such as high levels of poverty, lack of governance, 
dependence on foreign aid and investments and a nexus of political and business elites leading 
to corruptions. He argues that such a vulnerable condition creates even further opportunities for 
corporate exploitation of vulnerable stakeholders, such as women workers of export-oriented 
garments factories in Bangladesh. Finally, Slawinski et al. (2017) attribute short-termism and 
uncertainty avoidance as the reasons for organisational inaction on climate change disclosure. 
 
4.3  Governance and SER in developing countries 
Governance refers to rule‐based decision‐making and surveillance (OECD, 2012), which is 
“multilevel and multidimensional” (Karam, Metcalfe, & Afiouni, 2018, p. 1). Governance is a 
complex idea, having varied structures with both formal and informal arrangements and global 
and local levels (Wieland, 2001). Thus, governance includes rules, regulations, standards, 
guidelines, policies, norms, culture and practice. The effectiveness of global governance 
depends on the effectiveness of country institutional and governmental arrangements (Chen & 
Bouvain, 2009). Improved regulations and effective enforcement can play a pivotal role in 
creating, developing, and embedding deeper organisation-society relationships (Islam, Deegan, 
& Gray, 2018; Rahim, 2013; Patten, 2005; Holloway, 1997). Good governance and ethical 
codes of conduct are expected to limit corruption (Islam, Haque, & Gilchrist, 2017). The 
differences in SER can be explained by the differences in governance (Aguilera & Cuervo-
Cazurra, 2004; Weiss, 2000). Extant literature suggests that firms undertake social and 
environmental activities and disclose the same to maintain organisational legitimacy (Chen, 
Patten, & Roberts, 2008; Rahaman, Lawrence, & Roper, 2004; Deegan, Rankin, & Tobin, 2002). 
Institutional theory recommends that corporate governance mechanisms are sometimes adopted 
to gain legitimacy (Biggart, 1991; Hamilton & Biggart, 1988). Literature also argues that CSR 
choice and performance are to be positively associated with corporate governance mechanisms 
(Jo & Harjoto, 2011; Haniffa & Cooke, 2005; Johnson & Greening, 1999; Gibbins, Richardson, 
& Waterhouse, 1990) and strong corporate governance mechanisms may encourage firms to 
voluntarily disclose information about their activities (Eng and Mak, 2003; Gul and Leung, 
2004; e.g. Chen, Patten and Roberts, 2008; Kelton and Yang, 2008; van Duuren, Plantinga and 
Scholtens, 2016). Mehra (2006) argues that to mainstream CSR, it must be embedded 
institutionally and culturally, and it must have consistency between words and actions. 
Govindan, Kannan and Shankar (2014) identify that the codes of conduct of companies, as a 
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driver for social and environmental practices in India, suggest that a firm can uphold its 
reputation and manage risk efficiently by institutionalising SER activities. Based on the SER 
and governance literature, a positive relationship between good governance (Weiss, 2000) and 
SER in developing countries can be expected. 
 
The social and environmental reporting is influenced by the coercive, normative, and cultural-
cognitive pressures (governance) from the global, country and firm levels. The following 
subsections review the relationship between SER and the three levels of governance that exerts 
three forms of pressure for (non-) disclosing social and environmental information. 
 
4.3.1 Global governance and SER  
Global governance means both the formal and informal, regulatory and voluntary initiatives 
devised by the intergovernmental and multilateral agencies, such as the United Nations, World 
Bank, Asian Development Bank (ADB), Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development, to bring harmony and uniformity for various constituencies. The term ‘global 
governance’ has been used to indicate the regulations, systems, and norms of interdependent 
relations between actors across the globe, in the absence of an overarching political authority 
(Rosenau, 1999). That is why global governance is sometimes termed as ‘governance without 
a government’. In the age of globalisation, governance is global, and the more global it is, the 
better it is, though it needs to be customised to fit with the local context.  
 
The development of SER is closely related to the globalisation of business. In the global 
marketplace, a firm comes across different legal and regulatory requirements, varied contextual 
factors and diverse stakeholders. Because of the multiplicity of regulations and cultural-
cognitive variations across the countries, the MNCs found it difficult to meet the varied 
requirements and expectations, on the one hand, and on the other hand, it has become nearly 
impossible for many governments to ensure social and environmental responsibility of the 
powerful MNCs. In the case of developing countries, the MNCs contribute towards economic 
development by creating employment, paying taxes, and bringing technologies developed in 
the advanced economies. Therefore, there has been a prolonged conflict between the public 
interest and economic development since the beginning of the modern corporations based on 
the assumption that maximising private interests (profit) will eventually promote public 
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interests, known as ‘trickle-down effect’. Because of such conflicts, the corporations were 
required to be regulated through laws and regulations by the state government to protect the 
public interest. However, with the globalisation and rising expansion of capitalism throughout 
the world, the operations of corporations and the concurrent problems (such as climate change, 
loss of biodiversity) created by the businesses have emerged as a global concern, in contrast to 
the earlier state-based conceptions. The national states and intergovernmental organisations 
lack adequate power to control the rules of the economic system (Scherer & Smid, 2000). As a 
result, government regulations have been gradually losing their effectiveness in controlling the 
social and environmental behaviour of corporations. Hence, they have been explicitly required 
to fulfil their responsibility toward the society that started in the EU, with the Lisbon strategy, 
in 2000. Over time, the EU members adopted CSR policies, and separate Ministries were 
established in the UK and France to oversee the social and environmental issues. In these 
circumstances, new policies have emerged aiming to solve the problems by encouraging 
companies to voluntarily improve their activities rather than directly regulating their social and 
environmental behaviour. Such policy changes and deregulations benefitted the corporations. 
More importantly, corporations have also been striving to devise some harmonisation tools to 
be followed globally (in contrast to varied regulations in various countries) to legitimate their 
operations and avoid any strict regulations (Williams, 1999). Thus, SER has been used as a tool 
for managing the relationship between the corporations and their stakeholders in the global 
marketplace. Also, to eschew strict legal regulations and evade varied country governance 
systems, global governance standards (Brown, Clark, & Buono, 2018; Merry, 2011; Chen & 
Bouvain, 2009; Weiss, 2000; Rosenau, 1995), commonly known as self-regulation, have 
emerged (Scherer & Smid, 2000). 
 
Unlike country governance that involves rule-setting and enforcement within the national 
territory, global governance is generally normative and applicable to the global market. Global 
governance (normative) lacks the enforceability of regulations on private actors such as 
businesses. Neither the national governments nor international organisations are capable 
enough to sufficiently regulate the global economy and offer global public goods (Kaul et al., 
2003). Therefore, global governance (global public goods) such as CSR standards, which are 
mainly voluntary, are developed and implemented with the help of the multi-stakeholder 
engagement including governments, intergovernmental organisations, businesses, civil society 
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groups, NGOs, and others (Detomasi, 2007). Yet, they become bindings for companies when 
they are mandatorily required by some institutes or powerful stakeholders, such as international 
buyers or lenders. Some of the remarkable initiatives at the beginning of the 2000s include the 
United Nations Global Compact (UNGC), the Global Reporting Initiatives (GRI) 
‘Sustainability Reporting Guidelines’ (currently the ‘Sustainability Reporting Standard’), the 
ISO 26000 ‘Guidance on Social Responsibility’. The relationship between stakeholders and 
companies is at the centre of the GRI guidelines, ISO 26000 and UNGC principles. Thus, 
instead of government regulations and agents, a system has been developed where stakeholders 
are actively involved to develop and check corporate social and environmental practices. 
 
The United Nations Global Compact (UNGC) is the world’s largest corporate social 
responsibility initiative, with 13,000 corporate participants and other stakeholders over 170 
countries34. UNGC is acknowledged as one of the global governance standards because it 
provides a benchmark for corporate social and environmental practices with its ten principles 
under four categories - human rights, labour rights, environment and anti-corruption (Waddock, 
2008) - and catalyses progressive networking, learning and development, and partnerships 
across the globe (Buono, 2014). CSR programmes have been integrated within the business 
strategies by many organisations, especially the member organisations in line with the UNGC 
principles (Archel et al., 2009; Deegan, 2002). The ISO 26000 is an ISO International 
Organisation for Standardisation (ISO) standard which guides the overall picture of the social 
responsibility of an organisation throughout the world. 
 
Under rising coercive pressures from different stakeholders to be more transparent about their 
environmental, economic and social impacts, companies need some kind of reporting 
framework since the market assesses companies based on the available information (Michelon, 
2011; Sutantoputra, 2009; Mirfazli, 2008; Statman, 2006; Walden & Stagliano, 2003). 
Consistent with the UNGC principles, the Global Reporting Initiatives (GRI) offer the global 
best practices for reporting on the critical sustainability issues, such as climate change, human 
rights, governance, and social well-being (GRI35). The report published according to the GRI 
 
34https://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/publications/UN_Global_Compact_Guide_to_Corporate_Sustainabilit
y.pdf accessed 27 October 2018  
35 https://www.globalreporting.org/Information/about-gri/Pages/default.aspx 
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guidelines (since 2016 GRI Standards) is known as a ‘sustainability report’, ‘corporate social 
responsibility (CSR)’, ‘environmental, social and governance (ESG) report’. The GRI reporting 
framework helps companies identify, gather, and communicate their economic, environmental, 
social and governance information clearly and comparably. The number of companies that have 
been publishing their CSR reports following GRI has sharply increased since its launch in 2000. 
The GRI sustainability reporting framework is now broadly used by companies, governments, 
NGOs and others. In 2017, 63% of the global largest 100 companies, and 75% of the Global 
Fortune 250 published their CSR activities following the GRI reporting framework (KPMG, 
2017). The latest form of GRI reporting framework is the GRI Standards, developed by the 
Global Sustainability Standards Board, which are the first global standards for sustainability 
reporting free to use. It is argued that being developed with multi-stakeholder contributions and 
rooted in the public interest, the GRI sustainability reporting standards promote transparency 
and accountability of firms to the stakeholders and thus, it is considered as a value-creation and 
legitimacy tool (Crisóstomo, Prudêncio, & Forte, 2017). 
 
There have been numerous content analyses in both developed and developing countries, taking 
the GRI reporting framework as a benchmark, to examine the level and variety of corporate 
social and environmental disclosures. de Villiers and Alexander (2014) examine SER structures 
by comparing the annual report and website disclosures of 36 GRI adopting companies in 
Australia and South Africa (18 companies from each country). They compare 30 disclosure 
patterns and find that there is no difference in 29 items. Despite this high level of isomorphic 
disclosure patterns in two diverse settings, there exist differences in SER contents at the detailed 
level, such as the reference to the applicable national rule and regulations, and specific local 
communities. Their findings indicate that SER is institutionalised through professionalisation 
and global governance, such as GRI. They argue that SER characteristics and patterns should 
be interpreted “as a reflection of global CSRR36 templates. Management intent or company-
specific characteristics, such as social and environmental performance, do not necessarily drive 
CSRR patterns” (de Villiers and Alexander, 2014, p. 198). However, Adams (2002) 
underscores on future research on how the internal organisational factors - management, boards, 
various committees - influence social and ethical reporting. 
 
36 CSRR stands for corporate social responsibility reporting. 
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Despite the increased level and convergence of SER globally, it has been far from attaining its 
goals, as Gray (2010) argues “[i]t is increasingly well-established in the literature that most 
business reporting on sustainability and much business representative activity around 
sustainability actually have little if anything to do with sustainability” (p. 48). The statement of 
Gray has been supported by de Villiers and Alexander (2014), who document that “… 
management of GRI standing, therefore, potentially shifts the focus from socially responsible 
action and reporting on these actions, to increase the company’s GRI reporting level, i.e. 
increasing the number of CSRR boxes that can be ticked” (p. 209). The fundamental objective 
of SER to promote transparency and accountability is being compromised (defeated) due to the 
‘business case’ motive of SER and an unwillingness to reform corporate governance structures 
(Owen, Swift, & Hunt, 2001). 
 
However, there has been a limited effort in unveiling why (or why not) companies adopt GRI 
as a reporting framework and become the members of the UNGC, and how the GRI and UNGC 
affect SER. Belal and Owen (2015) examine the basic drivers for the development and 
subsequent cessation of stand-alone SER in an MNC subsidiary in Bangladesh, using a case 
study method. They document that the company published its first stand-alone social report in 
2002 as a legitimacy tool, but had to discontinue such reporting in 2009, in the face of 
significant opposition exerted by the national tobacco control regulations and protests posed by 
the stakeholders. They offer unique evidence that SER fails to meet the stakeholders’ 
expectations and attain its objectives of ensuring social justice and equity.  
 
As such, the global CSR standards and governance have largely been led by the private sector 
rather than the governments. It is important to note that the governments (that are largely 
economically and morally weak and politically unstable) in developing countries are not 
capable enough to meet the very basic needs (such as education, health, nutrition - commonly 
known as public goods) of their citizens. As a result, the companies, especially the large MNCs, 
having extensive money and power, come forward to fill the gap and take advantage of 
increasing their power further. They engage in the production and distribution of public health, 
education, social security services and addressing other human rights, which were traditionally 
the responsibilities of the governments in developing countries (Margolis & Walsh, 2003). 
Through such engagements in public affairs, the businesses get involved with and influence the 
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global business regulation and development of global public goods (Vogel, 2008) and, through 
these increased roles, some businesses play a state-like role (Matten & Crane, 2005). Matten 
and Crane (2005) argue that corporates come forward to perform these activities when the state 
system fails to discharge its responsibilities and consequently businesses have become 
important political actors in the global society (Detomasi, 2007; Scherer, Palazzo, & Baumann, 
2006; Matten & Crane, 2005). Drawing on the political economy of accounting and power, 
Belal, Cooper and Roberts, (2013) argue that structural inequalities and the uneven power 
relations in modern society are the main reasons for non-disclosure. Referring to the concerns 
raised by Hanlon (2008) and Llewellyn (2007) that CSR itself could further increase the rights 
and powers of business, they highlight the tremendous power of business. Based on their work, 
Belal, Cooper and Roberts (2013) call for further research to uncover the silencing of injustice. 
 
The effectiveness of regulations and governance mechanisms is often weakened by the elites 
(Nakpodia & Adegbite, 2018), and such discourse and governance often reinforce the market 
domination in policy setting (Andrew & Cortese, 2013). Besides the superpower of the MNCs 
mostly based in developed countries, which enable them to address some of the basic social 
problems of developing countries and influence the democratic and regulation-setting process, 
such influence is enhanced and reinforced through the collaboration of the MNCs with the local 
super-rich business (-cum politicians) in the host countries. The unholy nexus between the 
MNCs, politicians, local businesses, regulators and governmental agencies destabilises the 
public institutions and worsens the fragile political and government environment in the 
developing countries. For example, Nakpodia and Adegbite (2018) document that institutional 
voids drive the emergence of elites and facilitate systemic corporate corruption. They argue that 
elites challenge institutional resilience, deinstitutionalise the institutions and control the 
controlling mechanisms in their favour (Oliver, 1992). Their findings challenge the institutional 
permanence argument of Dacin and Dacin (2008), North (1990) and Scott (2014) that says that 
the institutions constrain the behaviour of elites. In the same line, based on their review work, 
Scherer and Palazzo (2011) show how the businesses influence the political system, democratic 
regulations and control of market regulations through ‘political CSR’. They also highlight the 
limitations of theorising CSR and SER research from the instrumentalist perspectives and call 
for further research to examine and theorise CSR from the political perspective. 
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Globalisation and MNCs play a pivotal role in catalysing SER in developing countries (Rathert, 
2016; Li, Lin, & Yang, 2016; Miska, Witt, & Stahl, 2016; Preuss, Barkemeyer, & Glavas, 2016; 
Azizi & Jamali, 2016; Zyglidopoulos, Williamson, & Symeou, 2016; Khan, Lew, & Park, 2015; 
Mzembe & Meaton, 2014; Muthuri & Gilbert, 2011; Perez-Batres, Miller, & Pisani, 2010; 
Beckman, Colwell, & Cunningham, 2009; Flanagan & Whiteman, 2007; Weyzig, 2006). Li, 
Lin and Yang (2016) document that globalisation and multinationalism have a significant 
positive impact on the market responsibility, social responsibility and overall CSR practices in 
China. Muthuri and Gilbert (2011) find that internationalisation and global institutional forces 
explain the focus and form of social and environmental practices in Kenya. Similarly, Weyzig 
(2006) suggests that international CSR standards, such as the OECD guidelines for MNCs, act 
as normative guidance. Miska, Witt and Stahl (2016) argue that global CSR associations affect 
global CSR integration, whereas the presence in the Western and international markets lead to 
local CSR responsiveness. Perez-Batres, Miller and Pisani (2010) identify that global 
institutional pressures, such as international trade and listing with international stock exchange, 
encourage SER. Flanagan and Whiteman (2007) highlight the importance of international 
organisations, pressuring companies to be socially responsible. 
 
Mzembe and Meaton (2014) document that the influence of global private and public 
regulations, coercive pressures from international financial institutions, and listing with 
international stock exchanges of the companies in Australia, Western Europe and North 
America have substantial positive impacts on CSR implementation. Beckman, Colwell and 
Cunningham (2009) identify that MNCs are key actors in Chile and that “MNCs imported their 
CSR beliefs, skills, and processes into Chile … once large domestic firms felt pressured by their 
MNC rivals, they also adopted CSR initiatives” (p. 191). Zyglidopoulos, Williamson and 
Symeou (2016) argue that the developing country multinational corporations (DMNCs) have 
higher levels of social performance than their purely domestic counterparts. Similarly, Preuss, 
Barkemeyer and Glavas (2016) document that DMNCs from poorer countries and countries 
with lower governance effectiveness tend to express more comprehensive commitments to CSR. 
Azizi and Jamali (2016) argue that coercive forces at the global level are influential, as MNC 
subsidiaries are forced to act according to their headquarters’ policy. Khan, Lew and Park 
(2015) find that MNCs follow headquarters’ global CSR marketing strategies and adapt their 
CSR programs to the host country’s norms, focusing on their product brand value-related CSR 
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marketing. Based on the firm-level data37 of 540 Western European MNCs, Rathert (2016) 
documents that the type of CSR adopted by MNCs is driven by the institutional features of the 
headquarters, and that MNCs adopt two distinct types of CSR policies: standards-based and 
rights-based CSR. 
 
However, there is criticism against the MNCs. Most of the MNCs follow the centralised CSR 
strategies, which do not match with the needs of developing countries. Studies contend about 
the role of MNCs’ CSR and SER in developing countries. (Ozdora-Aksak & Atakan-Duman, 
2016; Momin & Parker, 2013; Beddewela & Herzig, 2013). Ozdora-Aksak and Atakan-Duman 
(2016) assert that the MNCs in developing countries execute their CSR initiatives taking the 
global needs into account rather than the local ones. Momin and Parker (2013) argue that MNCs 
in Bangladesh face conflicts between their headquarters policy and host country environment 
and prioritise home country policies for internal legitimacy. Beddewela and Herzig (2013) find 
that MNC subsidiaries in developing countries face dual institutional challenges: internal 
legitimacy to conform to the headquarters’ regulations and policies based in the developed 
Western context, and external legitimacy to operate in developing countries. They suggest that 
subsidiaries are more preoccupied with seeking internal legitimacy to comply with the head 
office requirements and control, and priorities of the vulnerable local stakeholders are 
compromised (Beddewela & Herzig, 2013). 
 
The pressures for SER in developing countries stemming from the global level are primarily 
coercive exerted by the international buyers and lenders to comply with the global best practices, 
CSR standards and guidelines. Businesses that are dependent on international buyers, lenders 
and other stakeholders face coercive pressures for SER from the global market. A good number 
of studies document that SER of export-oriented companies in developing countries is in 
response to the expectations and coercive pressures posed by the international buyers, lenders, 
MNCs and governments (Rahaman, Lawrence and Roper, 2004; Islam and Deegan, 2008; Belal 
and Roberts, 2010; Khan et al., 2013; Muttakin and Khan, 2014; Muttakin, Khan and Azim, 
2015; Zou, 2015; Li, Lin and Yang, 2016; Ozdora-Aksak and Atakan-Duman, 2016). Belal and 
Roberts (2010) argues that motivation and CSR practice in Bangladesh are growing in response 
 
37 from Bureau van Dijk’s AMADEUS database, ASSET4 ESG database, and Thomson Reuters DataStream. 
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to pressures from international markets. Similarly, Muttakin, Khan and Azim (2015), Muttakin 
and Khan (2014) and Khan et al. (2013) find that CSR practices have a significant positive 
relationship with export-dependent industries in Bangladesh because of the bargaining power 
of international buyers. Ozdora-Aksak and Atakan-Duman (2016) document that the business 
to business firms focus on core business-related CSR activities, whereas the business to 
consumers companies focused on discretionary, diverse and philanthropic CSR initiatives in 
Turkey. Zou (2015) also finds that MNCs create pressure on the focal firms for product quality 
and a wider range of social issues, whereas the state-owned enterprises create it for employee 
welfare and a broader range of social issues, in China. The international buyers from developed 
countries exert significant influence, as opposed to the local consumers on the export-dependent 
firms in developing countries, to adopt the Western explicit CSR guidelines. The pressure in 
this case possibly comes from the ethical concerns of the educated consumers in advanced 
economies and the compliance with the listing requirements and those of a sustainable supply 
chain management of the foreign buyers. 
 
Besides the global governance and international players, the governance, and cultural cognitive 
factors of the country where a firm operates also influence and shape its SER. 
 
4.3.2 Country governance and SER  
The definition of ‘governance’ given by the World Bank is very much related to country-level 
governance. The World Bank defines governance as “the traditions and institutions by which 
authority in a country is exercised. This includes (a) the process by which governments are 
selected, monitored and replaced; (b) the capacity of the government to effectively formulate 
and implement sound policies; and (c) the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions 
that govern economic and social interactions among them” (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 
2010, p. 4). The World Bank again constructs two measures of governance related to each of 
the three areas, resulting in a total of six indicators38 of governance: voice and accountability, 
 
38 (a) The process by which governments are selected, monitored, and replaced: 1. Voice and accountability capture 
the perceptions of the extent to which a country’s citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as 
well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media. 2. Political stability and absence of 
violence/terrorism captures the perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or 
overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including politically motivated violence and terrorism. (b) The 
capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies: 3. Government effectiveness 
(GE) - capturing perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its 
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political stability and absence of violence/terrorism, government effectiveness, regulatory 
quality, rule of law and control of corruption. In addition to these six indicators, the informal 
factors, such as culture, also constitute country governance. The following part reviews the 
country governance in terms of coercive, normative, and cultural cognitive pressures that shape 
SER in developing countries. 
 
Prior studies show that the quality of country-level governance influences the economic and 
social development (e.g. Busse and Gröning, 2009; Kraay and Tawara, 2010; Çule and Fulton, 
2012). Also, country characteristics, such as cultural and legal environments, determine 
companies’ level of disclosure (e.g. Jaggi and Low, 2000; Hope, 2003) and sustainability 
performance (Ortas et al., 2015; Ioannou & Serafeim, 2012). Studies examine the link of SER 
with state regulations, governance and political conditions in developing countries (e.g. Li et 
al., 2010; Momin, 2013; Govindan, Kannan and Shankar, 2014; Mzembe and Meaton, 2014; 
Wu, 2014; Barakat, Pérez and Rodríguez Ariza, 2015). Govindan, Kannan and Shankar (2014) 
identify that government regulations are the most powerful driver for social and environmental 
practices in India. Barakat,  Pérez and Rodríguez Ariza (2015) reveal that CSR disclosure is 
positively associated with the legal system of the country. Mzembe and Meaton (2014) find that 
state policy affects the CSR agenda in Malawi. Li et al. (2010) identify that “a country’s 
governance environment is the most important driving force behind CSR communications 
intensity” (p.635) in BRIC countries. They also argue that the bigger manufacturing firms in 
more rule-based societies disclose more CSR information. Similarly, Momin (2013) also 
identifies the weak governmental structure as a barrier to SER in a developing country (taking 
Bangladesh as a case) based on interviews with nine social and environmental NGOs. 
 
The economic activities in a traditional setting are primarily directed at satisfying the desire of 
the master (who is at the centre of the state power) (Weber, 1978). Also, the expected role of 
 
independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility 
of the government’s commitment to such policies. 4. Regulatory quality (RQ) - captures the perceptions of the 
ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote 
private sector development. (c) The respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and 
social interactions among them. 5. The Rule of law (RL) - capturing perceptions of the extent to which agents have 
confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, 
and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. 6. Control of Corruption (CC) capturing perceptions 
of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, 
as well as ‘capture’ of the state by elites and private interests (Kaufmann et al., 2011, p. 222). 
58 
 
regulations in creating and maintaining harmony between organisations and society is, by and 
large, missing in developing countries. As a result, although the concept of ‘political CSR’ was 
originated through the process of globalisation, the ‘political use of CSR and CSR reporting’ 
has now become a common phenomenon at the country level and it is now being practised by 
the local firms as well. For instance, drawing upon the neo-pluralistic argument that political 
connection could enable businesses to shun stakeholder pressure and by using 936 firm-year 
observations collected from annual reports of companies listed on the Dhaka Stock Exchange 
in Bangladesh from 2005 to 2013, Muttakin, Mihret and Khan (2018), find that corporate 
political connection is associated with reduced CSR disclosures. By analysing the annual 
reports of 23 banking companies in Bangladesh from 2009–2012, Uddin, Siddiqui and Islam 
(2018) conclude that the corporate philanthropic activities that are disclosed in the CSR reports 
are inseparably linked to personal projects of the influential leaders and the ruling party’s 
agendas. 
 
The role of contextual, cultural cognitive factors is well established in SER literature 
(Matten & Moon, 2008). Matten and Moon (2008) argue that “CSR is located in wider 
responsibility systems in which business, governmental, legal, and social actors operate” (p. 
407). Likewise, Halme, Roome, & Dobers (2009) document that CSR is determined by “the 
institutional, legal and cultural setting within which business is practiced” (p. 2). Despite the 
global pressure for convergence, the socio-political, legal, and cultural backgrounds of a 
nation influence its CSR practice to a great extent (Preuss & Barkemeyer, 2011). 
Developing countries possess unique socio-cultural, historical, and political conditions 
dominated by the state and ruling party (see Chapter 3). Thus, we expect that despite the 
global institutional pressure for convergence, CSR practices in those countries will be 
largely shaped by the socio-economic reality of the local settings and be profoundly 
affected by the perversion of the state and governmental intervention.  
 
Although global CSR guidelines and MNCs operating in the developing countries encourage 
convergence, MNCs need to make significant adaptations in their global CSR agendas to fit 
with the local cultural cognitive factors (Gruber & Schlegelmilch, 2015; Flanagan & Whiteman, 
2007). A good number of studies investigate the relationship between cultural cognitive and 
contextual factors and CSR in developing countries (Rathert, 2016; Wirth et al., 2016; Yin & 
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Jamali, 2016; Gruber & Schlegelmilch, 2015; Hossain, Hecimovic, & Lema, 2015; Momin & 
Parker, 2013; de Abreu et al., 2012; Ertuna & Tukel, 2010; Flanagan & Whiteman, 2007; Mehra, 
2006; Weyzig, 2006). Weyzig (2006) reveals that the priorities and operational aspects of CSR 
are strongly influenced by the local context and argues that “CSR developments are mainly 
driven by global developments but shaped by context-specific factors” (p. 69). Rathert (2016) 
also suggests that “specific types of CSR adoption are driven by the institutional features of 
MNE [multinational enterprises] host countries, rather than home countries” (p. 875). Wirth et 
al. (2016) identify that the context of the host countries largely determines the CSR policies 
and practices. Ertuna and Tukel (2010) document that despite the interaction between the 
domestic and international influences, traditional contextual practices have a stronger impact 
on SER practices compared to global forces, and that SER practice in Turkey is mostly context-
dependent. Yin and Jamali (2016) argue that MNCs in China need to cope with the local context 
to secure benefits from social and economic value creation. Abreu et al. (2012) document that 
the characteristics of the host country where a firm is located strongly influence the CSR 
adoption. Hossain, Hecimovic and Lema (2015) identify a culturally specific context, 
Bangladesh, where telecommunication companies focus more on the community disclosure 
than the environmental disclosure. Momin and Parker (2013) argue that because of the hostile 
external host country environment, the SER in Bangladeshi MNC subsidiaries is limited. 
 
Corruption adversely affects SER in developing countries (Agyei-Mensah, 2017; Lopatta et al., 
2017; Wu, 2014; Ioannou & Serafeim, 2012; Azmat & Coghill, 2005). Wu (2014) identifies 
that a high level of local government corruption encourages the likelihood of irresponsible 
social and environmental behaviour of companies. In a comparative study between two African 
countries, Botswana and Ghana, with 174 firm-year observations from 2011-2013, Agyei-
Mensah (2017) finds that firms in a less corrupt country disclose more forward-looking 
information. Lopatta et al. (2017) show that CSR performance is negatively associated with the 
risk of corporate corruption. In the same manner,  Ioannou and Serafeim (2012) document a 
positive relationship between the control of corruption and SER. Press and media play a critical 
role in combating corruption and promoting SER. On the other hand, restrictions on the freedom 
of press and expression encourage higher levels of corruption (Camaj, 2013). In the same 
manner, Hu and Scholtens (2014)  document that CSR is positively related to voice and 
accountability. 
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Several studies examine the influence of other stakeholders such as NGOs, consumers, 
community and media (Beddewela & Fairbrass, 2016; Mzembe & Meaton, 2014; Momin, 2013; 
Beckman, Colwell, & Cunningham, 2009; Belal & Owen, 2007). Momin (2013) suggests that 
the corporate social disclosure in a developing country is driven by international consumer 
groups, global social and environmental NGOs, and international fund providers. Beckman, 
Colwell and Cunningham (2009) identify that MNCs and NGOs are key actors in Chile. 
Beddewela and Fairbrass (2016) document that the NGOs influence CSR practices of firms in 
Sri Lanka. Mzembe and Meaton (2014) document that Paladin, an Australian MNC, has to 
respond to the concerns and expectations of the community because of the pressure from listing 
requirements of stock exchanges in Australia, Western Europe and North America, and civil 
society organisations. However, Belal and Owen (2007) argue that the major motivation for 
CSR reporting in Bangladesh is to satisfy key stakeholders. In addition to government, they 
identify media and powerful lobby groups as influential stakeholders. However, less powerful 
stakeholder groups, such as the community and broader society, are either disregarded or 
virtually unheard of (Belal & Owen, 2007). Consumers and community are neglected in the 
absence of such pressures due to the institutional voids, for instance, inefficient democratic 
institutions, lack of prudent regulations, weak enforcement of laws, inadequate pressure from 
civil society (Islam and Deegan, 2008; Robertson, 2009; Khanna and Palepu, 2010; Uddin, 
Siddiqui and Islam, 2018). 
 
It is argued that corporate managers are now controlled by the legal and economic constraints 
in maximising the interest of the owners at the expense of other stakeholders (Freeman, 1997). 
The legal constraints, such as products liability law39, labour law40, environmental law41, and 
the civil and human rights, have imposed constraints on managers in ignoring the interests of 
other stakeholders (Freeman, 1997). However, in an inefficient and vulnerable governance 
environment in developing countries, as discussed in the preceding section, firms might attempt 
 
39Volkswagen recalls five million cars in China over faulty airbags linked to deaths; product liability law has 
largely replaced caveat emptor with caveat venditor and product recalls and customers right to information compel 
managers in caring customers right (https://www.thetrustedinsight.com/investment-news/volkswagen-recalls-
five-million-cars-in-china-over-faulty-airbags-linked-to-deaths-the-independent-20170914871/ 
40 Equal pay act and human rights coerce managers from discrimination in hiring and managing employees. 
41 BP reveals $6.3bn quarterly loss owing to Deepwater Horizon bill; faced an extra charge of $10.8bn taken on by 
UK oil company follows $18.7bn legal settlement to cover US federal, state and local compensation claims. 
(https://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/jul/28/bp-loss-deepwater-horizon-bill)  
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to yield the undue benefits of weak regulations, prioritise the interest of the most powerful 
stakeholders, subverting that of the relatively weaker ones (Belal & Owen, 2007). 
 
Finally, emphasising the significance of the socio-political context for mainstreaming CSR, 
Mehra (2006) suggests “if we expect CSR to truly take off in emerging markets … ongoing 
socio-political reality needs to be borne in mind” (p. 21). Besides, the focus should be on the 
local, as she notes “while the CSR movement has been inspired by global norms and standards, 
… domestic constituencies for CSR in emerging markets is perhaps the single most important 
area where efforts should be exerted for meaningful long-term results” (p. 22). Despite the 
global pressure on MNC subsidiaries and export-dependent firms to adopt the Western 
guidelines, CSR in developing countries is largely shaped by the local contextual factors, 
such as culture, governance, politics. The aforesaid discussion suggests that instead of 
convergence or divergence, a blended form of CSR, often termed as ‘crossvergence’, has 
emerged in developing countries. Taken together, it can be said that the governance and 
cultural cognitive characteristics of a country in which businesses are located can largely 
determine the forms and focus of SER. 
 
4.3.3 Firm-level governance and SER 
Firm-level governance or corporate governance is defined as “the system by which companies 
are directed and controlled” (Cadbury Committee, 1992). Being a subset of governance, 
corporate governance acts as a watchdog in safeguarding the interests of the stakeholders. 
Several studies find that corporate governance promotes SER in developing countries 
(Sundarasen, Je-Yen, & Rajangam, 2016; Barakat, Pérez, & Ariza, 2015; Kiliç, Kuzey, & Uyar, 
2015; Muttakin & Subramaniam, 2015; Muttakin & Khan, 2014; Khan et al., 2013; Rao, Tilt, 
& Lester, 2012; Said, Zainuddin, & Haron, 2009; Jamali, Safieddine, & Rabbath, 2008; Haniffa 
& Cooke, 2005). Corporate governance safeguards the interest of the shareholders and promotes 
corporate accountability and transparency by disclosing the social and environmental practices 
of a company (Hossain & Alam, 2016). Besides the shareholders, corporate governance also 
safeguards the interest of other stakeholders (Freeman et al., 2010). Jamali, Safieddine & 
Rabbath (2008) argue that corporate governance acts as a necessary condition for socially 
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responsible behaviour of firms by documenting that “the majority of managers conceive of 
CG42 as a necessary pillar for sustainable CSR” (p. 443). 
 
The contemporary studies examine the relationship between corporate governance and SER 
(Ibrahim & Hanefah, 2016; Sundarasen, Je-Yen, & Rajangam, 2016; Barakat, Pérez, & Ariza, 
2015; Kiliç, Kuzey, & Uyar, 2015; Deschênes et al., 2015; Muttakin & Subramaniam, 2015; 
Giannarakis, 2014b; Muttakin & Khan, 2014; Khan et al., 2013; Dunn & Sainty, 2009; Jamali, 
Safieddine, & Rabbath, 2008; Rashid & Lodh, 2008; Ghazali, 2007). However, the CSR 
research in the developing countries is still dominated by the nature, contents, extent and 
motivational aspects of SED (Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975; Teoh and Thong, 1984; Guthrie and 
Parker, 1989; Guthrie, Parker and Parker, 1990; Patten, 1992; Roberts, 1992; Clarkson, 1995; 
Donaldson and Preston, 1995; Deegan and Gordon, 1996; Deegan and Rankin, 1997; Adams, 
Hill and Roberts, 1998; Neu, Warsame and Pedwell, 1998; Mcwilliams and Siegel, 2001; 
Newson and Deegan, 2002; Campbell, 2007; van Beurden and Gössling, 2008; Uzma, 2016); 
and by the determinants of SED in general (Alotaibi & Hussainey, 2016; Nurhayati et al., 2016; 
Barakat, Pérez, & Ariza, 2015; Giannarakis, 2014a; Muttakin & Khan, 2014; Rahman, Zain, & 
Al‐Haj, 2011; Naser et al., 2006; Alnajjar, 2000; Hackston & Milne, 1996). 
 
However, prior studies disapproved of the appropriateness of the Anglo-American corporate 
governance models and institutions in developing countries (Singh & Zammit, 2006; Singh, 
1997, 1999) as those models are preconditioned by developed capital markets, independent 
accounting professions and a democratic state (Singh & Zammit, 2006; Morck, Wolfenzon, & 
Yeung, 2005; Chua & Poullaos, 1993, 1998; Sikka & Willmott, 1995; Robson & Cooper, 1990; 
Puxty et al., 1987), which are, however, largely non-existent in developing countries (Dyball, 
Fong Chua, & Poullaos, 2006; Dyball & Valcarcel, 1999). Also, most of the studies are 
conducted in the context of advanced economies. Therefore, there is still the paucity of research 
in both corporate governance and SER literature in the context of developing countries. 
Moreover, some studies suspect the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms there 
(Reed, 2002; Reed, 2002; West, 2006; Judge, Douglas and Kutan, 2008; Uddin and Choudhury, 
 
42 CG stands for corporate governance. 
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2008; Siddiqui, 2010). Therefore, the influence of corporate governance mechanisms on SER 
may be different in developing countries. 
 
In addition to the formal corporate governance structure, the informal firm-level ethical 
leadership and normative values of board, managers and employees can also play an important 
role in catalysing SER. Apart from external pressures, managers have their grounds and 
intrinsic motivation to discharge CSR. Management, as a stakeholder and as an agent, plays a 
special role in safeguarding the interests of other stakeholders. Studies reveal that managers’ 
ethical and normative values have a profound impact on CSR in developing countries (Miska, 
Witt, & Stahl, 2016; Tian, Liu, & Fan, 2015; Muller & Kolk, 2010; Jamali, Zanhour, & 
Keshishian, 2009; Mehra, 2006). Jamali, Zanhour and Keshishian (2009) document that the 
owner-managers’ spiritual commitment to social practices is the most critical driver for doing 
altruistic CSR in Lebanon. Muller and Kolk (2010) document that management commitment to 
ethics is the dominant driver of CSP. Similarly, Tian, Liu and Fan (2015) find that both ethical 
leadership and external stakeholder pressure have significant positive impacts on CSR 
implementation and the positive effect of external stakeholder pressure on CSR weakens where 
the level of ethical leadership is higher and vice versa. Miska, Witt and Stahl (2016) suggest 
that the advent of global CSR is a consequence of the multicultural experience of top 
management teams. Likewise, Mehra (2006) argues that leadership and accountability from top 
management is a must for mainstreaming CSR. Based on interview data from seven large 
MNCs in the UK and Germany, Adams (2002) points to the lack of explanatory power of the 
prevailing CSR theories and offers a more inclusive model of CSR, in addition to the corporate 
characteristics and general contextual factors. The internal contextual factors, as highlighted by 
Adams (2002), include the role of chair and board of directors of the firm, CSR reporting 
committee, corporate structure and governance procedures, degree and nature of stakeholder 
engagement, level of accountants’ involvement, corporate culture corporate views on reporting 
bad news, regulations and verification, and reporting costs and benefits. 
 
Studies also reveal that employees are considered as essential drivers for CSR and CSR 
reporting (Rahman, Haski-Leventhal, & Pournader, 2016; Zou, 2015; Momin & Parker, 2013; 
Rettab, Brik, & Mellahi, 2009). Zou (2015) documents that higher educated employees are the 
leading actors in shaping the CSR activities of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in 
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China, by creating pressures for employee welfare and a wider range of social issues. Rettab, 
Brik and Mellahi (2009) find a positive relationship between employee commitment and CSR 
in Dubai. Momin and Parker (2013) argue that CSR disclosure in Bangladeshi MNC 
subsidiaries is limited, consisting mainly of employee information, possibly because of a desire 
for internal legitimacy. Rahman, Haski-Leventhal and Pournader (2016) also document positive 
relationships between employee CSR attitudes, job satisfaction and organisational commitment. 
 
Previous studies generally used board independence, board gender diversity, the board size, 
board meeting, and CEO duality as surrogates for corporate governance or firm-level 
governance. 
 
Board independence 
Board independence is measured as a percentage of independent directors on the board as 
commonly used in the accounting literature (Majumder, Akter, & Li, 2017; Barakat, Pérez, & 
Ariza, 2015; Muttakin & Subramaniam, 2015; Khan et al., 2013; Jo & Harjoto, 2011). Board 
independence is considered as one of the important apparatus of corporate governance 
mechanisms because an independent board ensures better monitoring (Agrawal and Knoeber, 
1996; Jo and Harjoto, 2011). It is expected that independent directors strengthen board 
performance by monitoring its activities and management and ensure the interest of the 
investors (Petra, 2005; Fama & Jensen, 1983). Because of their position and interest neutrality, 
independent directors are expected to focus more on meeting the social obligations of the 
company (Zahra & Stanton, 1988). Chang et al. (2017) contend that independent directors could 
restrict managers from self-seeking activities that may lead to socially irresponsible decisions. 
Jo & Harjoto (2011) observe that board independence positively influences the level of CSR 
disclosures. Likewise, Abdullah, Mohamad, & Mokhtar (2011) argue that independent directors 
play a decisive role in promoting CSR practices of a company. However, Uddin & Choudhury 
(2008) document that independent directors in Bangladesh are appointed because of personal 
connections, rather than their skills and expertise. Although several previous studies find a 
positive association between board independence and CSR disclosures, independent directors 
in developing countries may not be truly independent (Uddin & Choudhury, 2008). 
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Board gender diversity 
Board gender diversity is measured as a percentage of female directors on the board. The gender 
diversity of the board is expected to result in a higher board efficiency because of quality 
monitoring (Adams & Ferreira, 2009), increased reputation of the company by engaging with 
societal affairs (Bear, Rahman, & Post, 2010), better corporate governance (Bernardi, Bean, & 
Weippert, 2002) and a better decision due to board heterogeneity, active participation and 
discussion on the board meetings (Letendre, 2004). Moreover, female directors help create an 
open and relaxed atmosphere on the board (Huse & Solberg, 2006). The critical mass theory 
(Konrad, Kramer, & Erkut, 2008) indicates that a critical mass of women in boards is necessary 
to change board attitude towards CSR reporting. Therefore, woman leadership is deemed to be 
critical to organisational success. Previous studies suggest that women are more sensitive to the 
society than men (Burgess & Tharenou, 2002) and therefore, the higher share of female 
directors on the board, the higher the corporate charitable giving to the community, arts, and 
cultural activities (Ayuso & Argandoña, 2007; Williams, 2003; Wang & Coffey, 1992). Nielsen 
& Huse (2010) argue that females may be particularly sensitive to certain organisational issues, 
such as CSR and environmental policies. Based on a systematic review of 310 articles published 
in 135 journals from 1981 to 2016, Kirsch (2018) documents that there is a positive impact of 
a female director on the social and ethical behaviour of firms and gender diversity in the 
management (below the board level). However, women are in a disadvantageous position in 
getting access to corporate boards. The inclusion of women on the boards is determined by the 
institutional factors on three levels: formal and informal institutions, actors and their interests 
(micro-level); board, organisational and sectoral characteristics (Meso-level) and appointment 
processes with gender bias and restricted access to outsiders (confined to the family members) 
(micro-level) (Kirsch, 2018, p.357). Considering the literacy rate of women, the male-
dominated patriarchal society (Quisumbing, Kumar, & Behrman, 2018; WEF, 2017; Solotaroff 
& Pande, 2014; Kabeer, 2000; Amin & Pebley, 1994), the honour culture (Aslani et al., 2013, 
2016), the family-dominated business, and the lack of necessary expertise and experience of 
women in business (Uddin & Choudhury, 2008), the presence of women on the board in 
developing countries in general and in Bangladesh, in particular, may be symbolic and may not 
contribute towards promoting SER. 
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Against the expectations of better corporate social and environmental matters, there are 
opposite views as well. Studies about gender contend how business efforts toward gender‐
supportive practices may inadvertently lead to further incapacitating women on the corporate 
value chain (Sinkovics, Hoque and Sinkovics, 2016; e..g. Mccarthy, 2017; Ozkazanc-Pan, 
2018). A good number of studies argue that global level initiatives (such as those of UN and 
World Economic Forum for promoting gender empowerment), national-level initiatives 
(governance mechanisms to regulate and monitor inequalities between men and women) (Chant 
& Sweetman, 2012; Nussbaum, 2003; Council of Europe, 1998) and firm-level governance for 
gender equality (Rao & Kelleher, 2005) could not deliver on their promise, other than 
facilitating market and trade growth (Eisenstein, 2005; Acker, 2004). 
 
Board size 
Board size denotes the total number of directors on the board of a company. Board size is 
considered as an effective monitoring tool of corporate governance (Lee & Chen, 2011) and, as 
such, a larger board tends to disclose more information (Samaha et al., 2012). Akhtaruddin et 
al. ( 2009) argue that a larger board could have diversified expertise because of their collective 
experience. Hence, the volume and quality of disclosures are expected to increase. The extant 
literature provides mixed results regarding the link between the board size and SER. A good 
number of studies find significant positive relationships (Alotaibi & Hussainey, 2016; Javaid 
Lone, Ali, & Khan, 2016; Majeed et al., 2015; Barakat, Pérez, & Ariza, 2015; Supriyono et al., 
2015; Giannarakis, 2014a; Haji, 2013; Siregar & Bachtiar, 2010), and some studies document 
an insignificant positive link between board size and SER (Kiliç, Kuzey, & Uyar, 2015; Ling 
& Sultana, 2015; Razak & Mustapha, 2013). By contrast, a few studies find an insignificant 
negative relationship between board size and SER (e.g. Dunn and Sainty, 2009; Sufian and 
Zahan, 2013). 
 
4.3.4 Development of hypotheses 
The aforesaid literature review shows that governance at the global, country and firm levels 
influence SER. Global governance has two dimensions – normative and coercive. The 
normative global governance, such as GRI standards, UNGC Principles, ISO 26000 and the 
like, motivate companies to be socially and environmentally responsible and report the same. 
The coercive global governance that largely comes from international buyers, lenders and other 
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pressure groups also require firms to do SER. Moreover, some firms in developing countries 
do SER to satisfy the (normative) expectations of the consumers in developed countries. 
Therefore, the first hypothesis is proposed. 
 
 H1: There is a positive relationship between global governance and SER in developing 
countries. 
 
Country governance consists of “the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country 
is exercised. This includes (a) the process by which governments are selected, monitored and 
replaced; (b) the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement sound 
policies; and (c) the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic 
and social interactions among them” (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2010, p. 4). Studies 
document that country government regulations are the most powerful driver for SER (Barakat, 
Pérez, & Ariza, 2015; Govindan, Kannan, & Shankar, 2014; Li et al., 2010), whereas a weak 
governmental structure acts as a barrier to SER (Momin, 2013). Prior studies document that 
democracy, freedom of expression, freedom of association and media cause pressures for 
companies to be accountable (Newell & George Frynas, 2007), socially and environmentally 
responsible, and disclose more CSR information. Democratic governments and systems 
improve the feeling of security and self-confidence among citizens through the enforcement of 
law and judicial system that ensure freedom for all (Simnett, Vanstraelen, & Chua, 2009). Thus, 
democracy and freedom of the press are conducive for SER (de Villiers and Marques, 2016). 
On the other hand, corruption adversely affects SER in developing countries (Agyei-Mensah, 
2017; Lopatta et al., 2017; Wu, 2014; Ioannou & Serafeim, 2012; Azmat & Coghill, 2005). Wu 
(2014) identifies that a high level of local government corruption encourages the likelihood of 
irresponsible social and environmental behaviour of companies. In a comparative study 
between two African countries  - Botswana and Ghana  - with 174 firm-year observations from 
2011-2013, Agyei-Mensah (2017) finds that firms in a less corrupt country disclose more 
forward-looking information. Lopatta et al. (2017) show that CSR performance is negatively 
associated with the risk of corporate corruption. In the same manner, Ioannou and Serafeim 
(2012) document a positive relationship between the control of corruption and SER. The press 
and media play a critical role in combating corruption and promoting SER. On the other hand, 
restrictions on the freedom of the press and expression encourage higher levels of corruption 
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(Camaj, 2013). In the same manner, Hu and Scholtens (2014) conclude have concluded that 
CSR is positively related to voice and accountability. Some studies have documented that in 
developing countries where government services are less effective, businesses supplement 
government responsibility to some extent to fill the institutional voids and disclose it (Doh et 
al., 2017; Ghoul, Guedhami, & Kim, 2017; Amaeshi et al., 2016; Healy & Serafeim, 2016; 
Matten & Crane, 2005). A few studies argue that firms operating in a country having a strict 
rule of law avoid disclosing any unwanted additional information for fear of pressure/bad 
publicity/risk and government intervention (Kirsch, 2018; Belal & Cooper, 2011). Therefore, 
the second hypothesis is proposed. 
 
H2: There is a positive relationship between country-level governance and SER in developing 
countries. 
 
Board independence, board gender diversity, the board size, frequency of board meetings are 
used as the firm-level governance variables. Studies provide mixed results about the 
relationship between board independence and SER. Some studies document that there is a 
significant positive link between the board independence and SER (Ibrahim & Hanefah, 2016; 
Javaid Lone, Ali, & Khan, 2016; Deschênes et al., 2015; Kiliç, Kuzey, & Uyar, 2015; Muttakin 
& Subramaniam, 2015; Supriyono et al., 2015; Khan et al., 2013; Dunn & Sainty, 2009; Rashid 
& Lodh, 2008), and an insignificant positive link between them (Majumder, Akter, & Li, 2017; 
Nurhayati et al., 2016; Lim et al., 2008). However, some studies report an insignificant negative 
relationship between the board independence and SER (Alotaibi & Hussainey, 2016; 
Sundarasen, Je-Yen, & Rajangam, 2016; Barakat, Pérez, & Ariza, 2015; Kiliç, Kuzey, & Uyar, 
2015; Giannarakis, 2014b; Haji, 2013). 
 
Regarding the relationship between the board gender diversity and SER, previous studies 
provide inconclusive results. A good number of quantitative studies (regression analyses) 
document a significant positive relationship between board gender diversity and SER (Ullah, 
Muttakin, & Khan, 2019; Ibrahim & Hanefah, 2016; Javaid Lone, Ali, & Khan, 2016; Setó‐
Pamies, 2015; Boulouta, 2013; Hafsi & Turgut, 2013; Zhang, 2012; Post, Rahman, & Rubow, 
2011; Bear, Rahman, & Post, 2010; Webb, 2004; Williams, 2003). Although Ullah, Muttakin 
and Khan (2019) document a significant positive relationship between the female directors and 
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SER in the insurance industry in Bangladesh, the relationship becomes insignificant in the case 
of family-owned firms. They argued that in the family-dominated insurance companies, gender-
diversified boards do not have any effect on the level of CSR reporting maybe because of the 
male dominance and patriarchy. However, some studies record an insignificant positive link 
between female directors and SER (Majumder, Akter, & Li, 2017; Sundarasen, Je-Yen, & 
Rajangam, 2016; Muttakin, Khan, & Azim, 2015; Giannarakis, 2014a, 2014b; Khan, 2010). 
 
By contrast, some studies document significant negative relationships between SER and female 
directors (Husted & de Sousa-Filho, 2019; Muttakin, Khan, & Subramaniam, 2015) and 
insignificant negative relationships between SER and board gender diversity (Majeed et al., 
2015; Kiliç, Kuzey, & Uyar, 2015). With the dataset of 116 non-financial companies from 
2005-09, Muttakin, Khan and Subramaniam (2015) find that both the female directors and 
family-ownership are significantly negatively linked with SER, and the relationship of female 
directors and SER is found insignificant and negative in the case of family firms in Bangladesh. 
Using the Bloomberg ESG dataset for 176 firms from four Latin American countries (Brazil, 
Mexico, Colombia and Chile), Husted and de Sousa-Filho (2019) find a significant negative 
link between women on boards and SER. The relationship between SER and board gender 
diversity is mediated by family ownership and control in developing countries. Based on data 
collected from the annual reports of 116 non-financial companies from 2005-2009, Muttakin, 
Khan and Subramaniam (2015) find that there is an insignificant positive relationship between 
board gender diversity and CSER in Bangladesh, while the relationship is significantly negative 
for family firms. Although (Ullah, Muttakin, & Khan, 2019) find a significant positive 
relationship between female directors and SER in the insurance industries in Bangladesh, the 
relationship is insignificant for the family-owned companies. 
 
The extant literature provides mixed results regarding the link between the board size and SER. 
A good number of studies find significant positive relationships between them (Alotaibi & 
Hussainey, 2016; Javaid Lone, Ali, & Khan, 2016; Majeed et al., 2015; Barakat, Pérez, & Ariza, 
2015; Supriyono et al., 2015; Giannarakis, 2014a; Haji, 2013; Siregar & Bachtiar, 2010). Some 
studies document an insignificant positive link between the two (Kiliç, Kuzey, & Uyar, 2015; 
Ling & Sultana, 2015; Razak & Mustapha, 2013). By contrast, a few studies find an 
insignificant negative relationship between the board size and SER (e.g. Dunn and Sainty, 2009; 
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Sufian and Zahan, 2013). The number of board meetings can have an impact on firm-level 
decisions and disclosure because frequent board meeting is a proxy for board activity (Khanchel, 
2007). Shivdasani and Zenner (2004) argue that frequent board meetings may act as a 
supervision and control mechanism. It can be expected that the probability of effective 
discussions and decisions regarding the CSR and SER-related issues in addition to the business 
affairs will increase with frequent board meetings (Giannarakis, 2014b). However, studies find 
an insignificant positive relationship between the frequency of board meetings and SER 
(Alotaibi & Hussainey, 2016; Giannarakis, 2014a, 2014b) and an insignificant negative 
relationship (Haji, 2013). 
 
However, some question the appropriateness of the Anglo-American corporate governance 
models and institutions in developing countries (Singh & Zammit, 2006; Singh, 1997, 1999), 
arguing that those models are preconditioned by developed capital markets, independent 
accounting professions and a democratic state (Singh & Zammit, 2006; Morck, Wolfenzon, & 
Yeung, 2005; Chua & Poullaos, 1993, 1998; Sikka & Willmott, 1995; Robson & Cooper, 1990; 
Puxty et al., 1987), which are, however, largely absent in developing countries (Dyball, Fong 
Chua, & Poullaos, 2006; Dyball & Valcarcel, 1999). Therefore, the third hypothesis is proposed. 
 
H3: There is a positive relationship between firm-level governance and SER in developing 
countries. 
 
4.4 Summary 
Based on the review of SER and governance literature above, findings are summarised, and 
gaps are identified. The review shows that the level of corporate social and environmental 
disclosure in developing countries is still low, and the reasons for low or no disclosure include 
the lack of resources, the profit imperative, the lack of legal requirements, lack of awareness, 
poor performance and the fear of bad publicity (Kirsch, 2018; Belal & Cooper, 2011), the desire 
of keeping the size of the annual report brief and maintaining secrecy about the firm’s activities 
(Teoh & Thong, 1984). SER in developing countries is dominated by the disclosure of good 
news (Deegan & Rankin, 1996). As the number of good news is small, the level of SER is also 
low. Other reasons include cultural attitudes within a country (Adams, 2004); little or no 
pressure from community pressure groups and the government’s failure to enforce existing SER 
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legislation (Gao, Heravi, & Xiao, 2005; Kuasirikun & Sherer, 2004); an absence of mandatory 
SER (Kuasirikun & Sherer, 2004; Adams, Coutts, & Harte, 1995). SER in developing countries 
consists mainly of symbolic disclosures with some limited substantive disclosures (Soobaroyen 
& Ntim, 2013); it is inadequate, cosmetic and rhetoric in nature because of the lack of corporate 
genuine social involvement (Belal & Roberts, 2010; Teoh & Thong, 1984); and “no more than 
a public relations exercise” (Momin, 2013, p. 11). An extensive mismatch between reality and 
SER (decoupling) exists. As a result, the fundamental objective of SER to promote transparency 
and accountability is being compromised due to the ‘business case’ motive of SER and an 
unwillingness to reform corporate governance structures (Owen, Swift, & Hunt, 2001). 
 
The development of SER is closely related to the globalisation of business. Firms, which are 
operating across the globe, face different legal and governance systems in different countries. 
In the global marketplace, CSR involves managing relationships between the company and 
diverse stakeholders. With globalisation and expansion of capitalism throughout the world, 
operations of corporations and concurrent problems (such as climate change, loss of 
biodiversity) created by the businesses have emerged as a global concern in contrast to the 
earlier state-based conceptions. The national states and intergovernmental organisations lack 
adequate power to control the rules of the economic system (Scherer & Smid, 2000). As a result, 
government regulations have been gradually losing their effectiveness in controlling the social 
and environmental behaviour of corporations. To address the differences in the national 
governance system and to minimise the aforesaid difficulties, the global governance (Brown, 
Clark, & Buono, 2018; Merry, 2011; Chen & Bouvain, 2009; Weiss, 2000; Rosenau, 1995), 
commonly known as self-regulation, has emerged. 
 
To ensure responsible corporate behaviour by encouraging companies to voluntarily improve 
their activities rather than directly regulating their social and environmental behaviour, global 
governance standards, such as UNGC, GRI, ISO 26000, have been developed. More 
importantly, corporations have also tried to devise some harmonisation tools to be followed 
globally (in contrast to varied regulations in various countries) to legitimate their presence of 
operations and avoid any strict regulations (Williams, 1999). With the institutional voids and 
incapacity of the governments, the large companies having massive amounts of money and 
power come forward to fill the gap and take advantage in increasing their rights and power 
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further (Hanlon, 2008; Llewellyn, 2007). They engage in the production and distribution of 
public health, education, social security services and addressing other human rights, which were 
traditionally the responsibilities of the government in developing countries (Margolis & Walsh, 
2003). Through such engagements in public affairs, the businesses get involved with and 
influence the global business regulation and development of global public goods (Vogel, 2008), 
and through these increased roles, some businesses play a state-like role (Matten & Crane, 
2005). 
 
Previous studies examine the extent of social and environmental disclosure based on the GRI 
as a benchmark. But there is a paucity of SEA research that empirically examine the relationship 
of SER with the UNGC and GRI in developing countries. There has been a limited effort in 
unveiling why (or why not) companies adopt GRI as a reporting framework, why companies 
adopt UNGC, how GRI and UNGC affect SER. For example, Belal and Owen (2015) document 
that the company with an MNC subsidiary in Bangladesh published its first stand-alone social 
report in 2002 as a legitimacy tool and had discontinued such reporting in 2009 in the face of 
significant opposition exerted by the national tobacco control regulations and protests posed by 
the stakeholders. They offer unique evidence that SER fails to meet the stakeholders’ 
expectations and attain its objectives of ensuring social justice and equity. Therefore, there is a 
research gap in explaining how global governance, such as GRI and UNGC, influence SER in 
developing countries and why. 
 
The effectiveness of global governance depends on the effectiveness of the country institutional 
and governance arrangements (Chen & Bouvain, 2009). Developing countries often have an 
entirely different socio-political context (Nakpodia & Adegbite, 2018) and their economic 
development is often at different stages, with different priorities (e.g. relying more on export-
oriented development strategies), having an under-developed capital market and corporate 
governance systems, and relatively weak regulatory mechanisms. All these factors could play 
a significant role in influencing SEA development in these countries, as it is almost impossible 
to isolate SEA development from real social-political and economic contexts. Context plays a 
critical role in shaping the CSR practices and reporting thereof. Specific contexts, such as the 
country governance and cultural cognitive, factors influence firms’ SER and sustainability 
performance (e.g. Ioannou and Serafeim, 2012; Ortas et al., 2015). The economic activities in 
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a traditional setting are primarily directed at satisfying the desire of the master (Weber, 1978). 
Corporate philanthropic activities and social responsibility reports in developing countries are 
inseparably linked to personal projects of the influential leaders and the ruling party’s agendas 
(Uddin, Siddiqui, & Islam, 2018). Studies urge for further research on the process and context 
rather than the report itself (e.g. Tregidga, Milne and Lehman, 2012; Tregidga, Milne and 
Kearins, 2014). In recognising the effect of context on the text and also the reverse effect of 
text on context, researchers can gain insight into organisational messages (Tregidga, Milne and 
Lehman (2012) suggest further study to understand the role of micro-contextual factors at the 
organisational level), macro-contextual factors, regulations, media, and political discourse. 
Also, Qian, Tilt and Belal (undated43) call for a special issue on the topic of context-specific 
research in developing countries considering their peculiarities. Moreover, the study of CSR 
disclosure from the contextual and institutional perspectives is also important to develop 
counter-strategies that challenge the hegemonic forces of global capitalism (Milne & Gray, 
2013). Besides looking for the drivers of CSR reporting, SEA researchers should investigate 
the reasons for non-disclosure as a priority, since prior studies show that corporates try to avoid 
reporting poor/bad social and environmental performance. There are many calls for SEA 
research into the motivations and challenges specifically faced by the developing world (Tilt, 
2016; Belal, Cooper, & Roberts, 2013; Islam & Deegan, 2008). 
 
Although there are only a few studies in the context of developed countries (Baldini et al., 2018; 
Ghoul, Guedhami, & Kim, 2017) that examine the country characteristics (including 
governance), to the best of my knowledge, no study empirically examines the influence of 
various country-level governance variables on SER in developing countries using either large 
data or conducting fieldwork. 
 
Among the firm-level governance variables, the relationships of firm board independence and 
board gender diversity with SER are inconclusive. In contrast to the governance and gender 
literature, few recent quantitative studies document significant negative relationships between 
SER and female directors (Husted & de Sousa-Filho, 2019; Muttakin, Khan, & Subramaniam, 
2015) and insignificant negative relationships between board gender diversity (Majeed et al., 
 
43 http://www.emeraldgrouppublishing.com/products/journals/call_for_papers.htm?id=7822 
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2015; Kiliç, Kuzey, & Uyar, 2015). Muttakin, Khan and Subramaniam (2015) find that there is 
an insignificant positive relationship between board gender diversity and SER in Bangladesh, 
but the relationship is significantly negative for family firms. Using the Bloomberg ESG dataset 
for 176 firms from four Latin American countries (Brazil, Mexico, Colombia and Chile) Husted 
and de Sousa-Filho (2019) find a significant negative link between women on the board and 
SER. The relationship between SER and board gender diversity is mediated by family 
ownership and control in developing countries. Although Ullah, Muttakin and Khan (2019) find 
a significant positive relationship between female directors and SER in the insurance industries 
in Bangladesh, the relationship is insignificant for the family-owned companies. Muttakin, 
Khan and Subramaniam (2015) call for further research to explore why such a negative 
relationship exists. Similarly, some studies document an insignificant positive link between 
SER and board independence (Majumder, Akter, & Li, 2017; Nurhayati et al., 2016; Lim et al., 
2008) as well as an insignificant negative relationship between them (Alotaibi & Hussainey, 
2016; Sundarasen, Je-Yen, & Rajangam, 2016; Barakat, Pérez, & Ariza, 2015; Kiliç, Kuzey, & 
Uyar, 2015; Giannarakis, 2014b; Haji, 2013). 
 
Although firm-level governance and CSR disclosure have separately established themselves as 
well-researched domains, relatively less attention has been paid in setting up a link between 
them, particularly in the context of developing countries, studies criticise the suitability of the 
Western corporate governance models in developing countries (Singh & Zammit, 2006; Singh, 
1997, 1999) because those models are based on developed capital markets, independent 
accounting professions and a democratic state (Singh & Zammit, 2006; Morck, Wolfenzon, & 
Yeung, 2005; Chua & Poullaos, 1993, 1998; Sikka & Willmott, 1995; Robson & Cooper, 1990; 
Puxty et al., 1987), which are largely non-existent in developing countries (Dyball, Fong Chua, 
& Poullaos, 2006; Dyball & Valcarcel, 1999). Furthermore, some studies suspect the 
effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms in the developing countries (A. M. Reed, 
2002; Reed, 2002; West, 2006; Judge, Douglas and Kutan, 2008; Uddin and Choudhury, 2008; 
Siddiqui, 2010), therefore, the influence of corporate governance mechanisms on SER may be 
different. Thus, the influence of corporate governance models on SER in developing countries 
may be different from that in developed ones. In addition to the questioned applicability of the 
Western governance models in developing countries, the majority of the quantitative studies 
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attempt to examine and explain the relationship between corporate governance and SER using, 
again, the organisational theories developed in the West. 
 
In addition to the formal corporate governance structure and corporate characteristics, the 
informal firm-level ethical leadership and normative values of the board, managers and 
employees can also play an important role in catalysing SER. Apart from external pressures, 
managers have their grounds and intrinsic motivation to discharge CSR. Adams (2002)  
contends the lack of explanatory power of the available SER theories and offers a more 
inclusive model of CSR, emphasising internal firm-level factors, including the role of chair and 
board of directors, CSR reporting committee, degree and nature of stakeholder engagement, 
level of accountants’ involvement, corporate culture, regulations and verification, and reporting 
costs and benefits. 
 
Therefore, it is critically important to explore how the firm-level governance - both formal and 
informal, written and actual - explain SER in developing countries and why. 
 
Researchers emphasise on the engagement-based studies with various stakeholders rather than 
the managers only. In the absence of genuine stakeholder engagement, the current CSR 
reporting practice has failed to enhance corporate transparency and accountability (Medawar, 
1976). Tregidga, Milne and Lehman (2012) suggest a broader interpretive and qualitative 
research perspective covering different types of stakeholders to uncover the organisational 
reporting practices and to enable a more explicit theorisation of the politics of communication. 
Deegan (2017) recommends broadening the scope of SEA research to cover other stakeholders 
(besides managers) and to engage more with social movements to explore the conflicts within 
society. (Owen, 2008) calls for “researching social movements and working directly with 
stakeholder groups” (p. 240). Belal, Cooper and Roberts (2013) also emphasised the 
marginalised voices of local stakeholders located within the emerging and less developed 
countries. Analysing the report awarding process and observing the reporting award decision 
meetings, if possible, could add another dimension that is lacking in the accounting literature. 
 
By using the large data of developing countries and by analysing the relationship between the 
three levels of governance and SER from the three institutional pillars (regulative, normative 
76 
 
and cultural cognitive) and the three levels of analysis (global, country and firm), the study 
offers surprising perspectives (de Bakker et al., 2018) and responds to the call for advancing 
non-mainstream quantitative SEA research of Roberts and Wallace (2015) and Richardson 
(2015), by providing convincing, alternative explanations for (non-) disclosure. More 
importantly, as the quantitative analysis depicts the upside of the picture, the fieldwork will 
investigate if the findings of the quantitative study can be generalised or if there are some 
nuances in a context, taking Bangladesh as a case of developing countries. Therefore, the study 
will examine the link between firm-level governance, country-level governance, global 
governance and SER in developing countries, using global datasets, and will attempt to unveil 
the Blackbox of such relationships in a developing country. 
 
This chapter aims at reviewing the governance and SER in developing countries to identify 
gaps and position itself within the SEA research. The study will address these gaps by 
employing multiple research methods and multi-level institutional perspectives. The next 
chapter delineates the research design. 
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Chapter 5 
Research Design 
 
 
5.1 Introduction  
This chapter explains the methodology and methods used in this study. As the preceding 
chapters describe the background, theoretical and contextual framework while the following 
chapters present the empirical findings, this chapter is important to understand the methods 
used in conducting the study, selecting samples, and procedures used in the collection and 
analysis of the empirical data. The following section presents the research methods used for 
quantitative and qualitative analysis, followed by a summary. 
 
5.2 Research methods 
The overarching objective of the study is to understand the influence of the global, country and 
firm-level governance on social and environmental reporting (SER) in developing countries in 
general and the underlying reasons for such influences in Bangladesh, in particular. The study 
has employed multiple methods to attain the research objective. First, the study aims to have an 
overview of the relationship of the social and environmental disclosure (SED) with the global, 
country and firm-level governance in developing countries by adopting a quantitative method 
(regression analysis) using the Bloomberg ESG dataset and the country governance indicators 
of the World Bank, among others. Then, based on the findings of the quantitative analysis, the 
study has explored how SER is influenced by the three levels of governance in Bangladesh and 
why conducting by interviews. Semi-structured interview method has been employed to answer 
the second research question by capturing the perceptions and experience of corporate managers, 
members of the SER team, independent directors, female directors, regulators and 
representatives of other stakeholders in Bangladesh. Consistent with previous studies (e.g. 
Siddiqui, 2010; Cuervo-Cazurra, 2012; Amos, 2018), the study uses the emerging markets and 
developing economies defined by the International Monetary Fund (IMF, 2016, pp. 145-7) as 
developing countries. 
 
 
 
78 
 
5.2.1 Quantitative study 
Outline  
To have an overview of the relationship between the global, country and firm-level governance 
and SER in developing countries, the study employs quantitative methods (regression analysis) 
using the third party provided data of a large international sample of firms for the period from 
2007–2016. The following section presents data sources, samples, measurements, model 
specification, and limitations of the quantitative method. 
 
Data  
The data for the quantitative analysis came from multiple sources, including but not limited to 
the Bloomberg ESG database and the Worldwide Governance Indicators of the World Bank. 
The corporate social and environmental disclosure score (which is the average of the 
Bloomberg environmental disclosure score and social disclosure score), firm-level governance 
score (average of board independence, the board size, female on the board, number of board 
meetings), global governance score (average of GRI compliance, UNGC signatory), firm-
specific control variables such as ROA, firm size, leverage, market-to-book value were 
collected from the Bloomberg ESG database while country-specific governance variables were 
obtained from the Worldwide Governance Indicators of the World Bank and the GDP per capita 
data, which were collected from the publicly available source of the World Bank website44. 
 
Bloomberg environmental, social and governance (ESG) data  
The study uses the average of the environmental disclosure score (EDS) and the social 
disclosure score (SDS) of the Bloomberg ESG disclosure database as a proxy for a company’s 
level of SED since these scores measure the amount of social and environmental data a company 
reports publicly, but they do not measure a company’s social and environmental performance 
on any data point. The variables are winsorised at 1% and 99% levels. The Bloomberg ESG 
database has been extensively used for analysing social and environmental disclosure (Li et al., 
2018; Husted & Sousa-Filho, 2017; Giannarakis, Konteos, & Sariannidis, 2014). Prior CSR 
studies also use ESG performance data (e.g. Asset4 and KLD) rather than the disclosure score 
(Luo et al., 2015; Cheng, Ioannou, & Serafeim, 2014; Ioannou & Serafeim, 2012). The study 
 
44 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD 
https://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/ 
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uses the Bloomberg ESG database, rather than ASSET4 or KLD (to cite the most common), 
because its focus is on the relationship between the three levels of governance and the level of 
SED, not CSR performance or CSR rating (Ioannou and Serafeim, 2015).  
 
The Bloomberg ESG disclosure score measures the transparency of a company, not the 
performance. The more information is disclosed, the higher is the disclosure score. The 
Bloomberg ESG data covers 120 environmental, social and governance indicators, including 
energy and emissions, waste data, climate change, pollution, supply chain, political 
contributions, discrimination, diversity, community relations, human rights, women on the 
board, independent directors, executive compensation, shareholders’ rights. (see Appendix 
Table 1 and 2). Bloomberg evaluates companies on an annual basis, collecting public ESG 
information disclosed by companies through CSR reports (or sustainability reports), annual 
reports and websites. Bloomberg also collects data from other publicly available sources and 
companies by directly contacting them. The collected data are checked and standardised. 
Bloomberg provides company reported ESG data for almost 11,500 companies in 83 countries 
and had a plan to provide ESG data on 13,000 companies by the end of 2018. The number of 
customers using the Bloomberg ESG data has almost tripled from 5,172 in 2012 to nearly 
18,000 in 201845, indicating a large and growing market interest in the level of a firm’s degree 
of transparency (Eccles, Serafeim, & Krzus, 2011). Bloomberg shows that 34% and 25% of 
clients demand and have an interest in sustainable strategies and tracking the long-term 
performance of companies46.   
 
Worldwide Governance Indicators of the World Bank  
The study uses the country governance indicators of the World Bank as the surrogate for the 
country-level governance (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2010) following previous studies 
(e.g. Rachisan, Bota-Avram and Grosanu, 2017; Seifert and Gonenc, 2018). The six-country 
governance indicators developed by the World Bank are voice and accountability, political 
stability and absence of violence/terrorism, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, the 
rule of law, and control of corruption. These indicators are based on the compilation of several 
 
45 https://www.bloomberg.com/impact/products/esg-data/ 
46 https://www.bloomberg.com/professional/solution/esg/?bbgsum=DG-GP-ESG-M20859&mpam=M20859 
&gclid=EAIaIQobChMI6O3D0-7K5QIVD6yWCh1D4AL7EAAYASAAEgKltvD_BwE  
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hundred variables obtained from over 200 countries and 31 different data sources, capturing 
governance perceptions47 as reported by survey participants, non-governmental organisations, 
commercial business information providers, and public sector organisations worldwide since 
1996 and updated every year. The values of these indicators range from - 2.5 (weak) to 2.5 
(strong).  
 
Because of the credibility of the World Bank, it is expected that any discrepancies in these 
indicators would be minimal. Also, these are the only readily available measures for country-
level governance globally (Serebour Agyemang, Fantini, & Frimpong, 2015, p. 21; Kaufmann, 
Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2010) that have offered activists and reformers globally with advocacy 
techniques for policy reforms and monitoring (e.g. MCC48). 
 
Sample  
The sample firms are selected based on the criteria that there are no missing values for the firm-
year observations for each of the variables chosen from the Bloomberg ESG database and the 
worldwide governance indicators of the World Bank. Panel A of Table 5.1 depicts the sample 
selection process. The initial sample consists of 18,920 firm-year observations based on all 
companies in developing countries for which the ESG disclosure scores and worldwide 
governance indicators are available between 2007 and 2016. After eliminating missing data, 
the final sample consists of 10,599 firm-year observations. Panel B and C of Table 5.1 list the 
number of firm-year observations and the percentage by year and country, respectively. Panel 
B shows that there is an upward trend in the number of firm-year observations from 1.90% in 
2007 to 16.18% in 2015. However, the number of observations in 2016 is 930 (8.77%) 
compared to 1,715 (16.18%) in 2015. This may be because of the incompleteness of data in 
2016 although the data of the year 2016 were collected from the Bloomberg terminal in 
 
47 In response to the critic that these indicators are based on perceptions, Kaufmann et al., (2010) argue for the 
value of perception-based data in measuring governance by noting that: “perceptions matter because agents base 
their actions on their perceptions, impression, and views. If citizens believe that the courts are inefficient or the 
police are corrupt, they are unlikely to avail themselves of their services. ….. Second, in many areas of governance, 
there are few alternatives to relying on perceptions data. For instance, this has been particularly the case for 
corruption, which almost by the definition leaves no ‘paper trail’ that can be captured by purely objective measures” 
(Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2010, p. 18).  
48 Progress made to Strengthen the Application of the Control of Corruption Indicator Congressional Report, 
Millenium Challenge Corporation, United States of Aerica (2016), https://www.mcc.gov/resources/doc/progress-
made-to-strengthen-control-of-corruption-indicator-application accessed on 22 October 2018. 
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December 2017, assuming that most of the 2016 data would be available one year after the 
reporting year. Panel C of Table 5.1 shows that the samples are from 45 developing countries 
and most of the observations are from the BRICS countries: China 5,179 (48.86%), India 2,141 
(20.20%), Brazil 568 (5.36%), South Africa 567 (5.35%) and Russia 240 (2.26%). Among the 
non-BRICS countries, the maximum number of observations are from Malaysia 298 (2.81%) 
followed by Mexico 187 (1.76%), Indonesia 175 (1.65%), Thailand 171 (1.61%), Pakistan 152 
(1.43%), Chile 129 (1.22%) and so on. The least number of observations came from Bulgaria, 
Morocco, and Zambia 2 (0.02%).  
 
Table 5.1: Sample summary statistics  
Panel A: Sample size  
Number of firm-years observations  18,920 
Less: Firm- years without necessary information (missing value)  8,321 
Total firm-year observations 10,599 
 
 
Panel B: Year-wise observations  
Year No. of observations Percentage 
2007 201 1.9 
2008 654 6.17 
2009 774 7.3 
2010 693 6.54 
2011 1,146 10.81 
2012 1,374 12.96 
2013 1,507 14.22 
2014 1,605 15.14 
2015 1,715 16.18 
2016 930 8.77 
Total 10,599 100 
 
Panel C: Country-wise observations 
 
Country No. of observations Percentage 
Argentina 39 0.37 
Bangladesh 9 0.08 
Bermuda 21 0.2 
Bosnia and Herzegovina  4 0.04 
Botswana 6 0.06 
Brazil 568 5.36 
Bulgaria 2 0.02 
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Chile 129 1.22 
China 5,179 48.86 
Colombia 83 0.78 
Croatia 20 0.19 
Egypt 6 0.06 
Hungary 24 0.23 
India 2,141 20.2 
Indonesia 175 1.65 
Jordan 9 0.08 
Kazakhstan 6 0.06 
Kenya 6 0.05 
Kuwait 9 0.08 
Malaysia 298 2.81 
Mauritius 9 0.08 
Mexico 187 1.76 
Mongolia 4 0.04 
Morocco 2 0.02 
Nigeria 15 0.14 
Oman 8 0.08 
Pakistan 152 1.43 
Panama 9 0.08 
Peru 38 0.36 
Philippines 112 1.06 
Poland 73 0.69 
Qatar 10 0.09 
Romania 5 0.05 
Russia 240 2.26 
Saudi Arabia 12 0.11 
Serbia 4 0.04 
South Africa 567 5.35 
Sri Lanka 50 0.47 
Thailand 171 1.61 
Turkey 124 1.17 
Ukraine 8 0.08 
United Arab Emirates 45 0.42 
Uruguay 6 0.06 
Vietnam 11 0.1 
Zambia 2 0.02 
Total 10,599 100 
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Measurements  
Measurement of SED score  
The study uses the average of the Bloomberg environmental disclosure score and social 
disclosure score as a proxy for the social and environmental disclosure (SED) score for a 
particular company for a particular year as done by previous studies (Ioannou and Serafeim, 
2012; Luo et al., 2015; e.g. Ghoul, Guedhami and Kim, 2017). The social disclosure score 
ranges from 0.1 for companies that disclose a minimum amount of social data to 100 for those 
that disclose every data point collected by Bloomberg. Each data point is weighted in terms 
of importance, with workforce data-carrying greater weight than other disclosures. The score 
is also tailored to a different industry. In this way, each company is only evaluated in terms 
of the data that is relevant to its industry sector. This score measures the amount of social data 
a company reports publicly and does not measure the company's performance on any data 
point. Likewise, the environmental disclosure score ranges from 0.1 for companies that 
disclose a minimum amount of environmental data to 100 for those that disclose every data 
point collected by Bloomberg. Each data point is weighted in terms of importance, with data 
such as greenhouse gas emissions carrying greater weight than other disclosures. This score 
measures the amount of environmental data a company reports publicly and does not measure 
the company’s performance on any data point. The original environmental disclosure score 
and the social disclosure score lie between 0.1 and 100 and the SED score is normalised by 
dividing it by 100 so that it ranges between 0 and 1. Appendix Table 3 provides details of 
variables descriptions, measurements and data sources. 
 
Measurement of global governance score (GLOBAL_GOV)  
The measure for the global governance score (GLOBAL_GOV) is the average score of two 
global governance variables - UNGC and GRI for a particular company for a particular year. A 
value of 1 has been used if a firm is a signatory of the UNGC or has published its CSR report 
following GRI and 0 otherwise.   
 
Measurement country-level governance score (COUNTRY_GOV)  
The measure for country-level governance score (COUNTRY_GOV) is the average of six 
governance indicators for a particular country for a particular year (provided by the World 
Bank): (1) voice and accountability, (2) political stability and absence of violence, (3) 
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government effectiveness, (4) regulatory quality, (5) the rule of law, and (6) control of 
corruption (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2010), as used by previous studies (e.g. Rachisan, 
Bota-Avram and Grosanu, 2017; Seifert and Gonenc, 2018). 
 
Measurement of firm-level governance score (FIRM_GOV)  
The firm-level governance score (FIRM_GOV) is the average of four firm-level governance 
variables - board independence (BIND), female director on board (FEMD), board size (BSIZE) 
and the number of board meetings (BMTG) for a particular company for a specific year. For 
board independence and female on board, the study uses the proportion of independent directors 
and the proportion of female directors on the board, respectively. The study uses the natural 
logarithm of the number of board members for the board size. Then, the four firm-level 
governance variables are converted into dummy variables by putting a value of 1 if their value 
is more than the median and 0 otherwise following the earlier studies (e.g. Pindado, de Queiroz 
and de la Torre, 2015). Finally, the values of the four dummy variables are added and the sums 
are div divided by four to get the firm-level governance score.  
 
Model specification and variable description 
Ordinary least-squares (OLS) regression is one of the most popular statistical techniques used 
in the social sciences (Hutcheson, 2011). By using OLS, loss of observation and the difference 
between the observed values and predicted values can be minimised. The study uses OLS 
regression technique to test the hypothesised relationships between the global, country and 
firm-level governance and SED, following previous social and environmental accounting 
research (Ullah, Muttakin, & Khan, 2019; Muttakin, Mihret, & Khan, 2018; Muttakin, Khan, 
& Subramaniam, 2015; Khan et al., 2013). The industry and year are included to control the 
effects of variations in industries and time. The variations in countries are controlled by taking 
the natural logarithm of GDP per capita at the current price as surrogates for countries following 
previous studies (Ortiz‐de‐Mandojana, Aguilera‐Caracuel, & Morales‐Raya, 2016; Jalilian, 
Kirkpatrick, & Parker, 2007) in addition to controlling for the ROA, firm-size, market-to-book 
value of stocks, leverage. The assumptions underlying the regression model have been tested 
for multicollinearity, based on the correlation matrix and the variance inflation factor. 
Endogeneity for the firm-level governance variables has also been tested. The regression model 
is as follows:  
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SEDSit = α + β1GLOBAL_GOVit + β 2COUNTRY_GOVjt + FIRM_GOVit + β4 ROAit + β5FSIZEit 
+ β6MTBit + β7 LEVit + β8LNGDPjt + β9INDUSTRYDUMMIES + β10YEARDUM+ εit    
Where, 
SEDSit = Corporate social and environmental disclosure score for a firm i at time t;  
GLOBAL_GOVit   = A measure of global governance for a firm i at time t;  
COUNTRY_GOVjt = A measure of country-level governance for country j at time t;  
FIRM_GOVit =A measure of firm-level governance for a firm i at time t,  
ROAit = Ratio of earnings before interest and taxes and total assets for a firm i at time t;  
FSIZEit = Natural logarithm of total assets for a firm i at time t;  
MTBit = Ratio of the market value to the book value of a stock for a firm i at time t;  
LEVit = Ratio of the book value of total debt and total assets for a firm i at time t;  
LNGDPjt =Natural logarithm of gross domestic product (GDP) per capita at the current price 
for a country j at time t.  
 
Limitations of quantitative methods 
Although the quantitative analysis provides an overall picture of the relationships, it does not 
answer to the questions of how do the global, country and firm-level governance affect SER in 
developing countries and why. Also, the quantitative analysis cannot explain the reasons, 
dynamics and process of the influence of governance on SED beneath the number. Moreover, 
the context of each country and even each company can be different. Knowing the underlying 
reasons for such differences is critically important to promote SER in developing countries, and 
those nuances can only be explored through in-depth and engagement-based qualitative 
investigation. Therefore, the qualitative method has also been employed in addition to the 
aforesaid quantitative method. The next section delineates the method and methodology of the 
fieldwork.  
 
5.2.2 Fieldwork –Interviews  
Outline 
To overcome the limitations of the quantitative analysis and explore the answers to the research 
question two, an interview method and interpretive approach have been used, as the interview 
method offers an opportunity to directly interact with the interviewees, unveil the problem and 
frame the questions based on the ground realities as Burgess (2002, p. 107) states: “(i)nterviews 
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provide the opportunity for the researcher to probe deeply to uncover new clues, open up new 
dimensions of a problem and to secure vivid, inclusive accounts that are based on personal 
experience”. The semi-structured interview method is considered to be the most appropriate 
method for deepening our understanding of the hows and whys of the relationships between the 
global, national and firm-level governance and SER in Bangladesh. The semi-structured 
interview method allows the researcher to have a list of themes and questions in line with the 
research questions and framework that may vary from interview to interview- some questions 
may be ignored, and new questions can be added in real-world settings depending on the 
particular organisation and the interviewees (Saunders, Lewis, & Thornhill, 2000). For example, 
some companies that adopt GRI are very good at SER while others may not be. Similarly, 
interviewees who are CSR experts, members of the CSR teams and familiar with CSR practices 
were expected to be more conversant than others. Semi-structured interviews also offer the 
benefits of flexibility such as changing the ordering of questions, modifying existing questions, 
and adding new questions based on the context, experience and flow of conversation. (Saunders, 
Lewis, & Thornhill, 2000). This two-way communication offers more opportunities to ask 
probing why and how questions following the general response. Semi-structured interviews 
have been used to get both response and plausible explanations for such answers (Flick, 2009) 
and these have therefore helped us in exploring invaluable in-depth and nuanced qualitative 
data (Denscombe, 2014). This approach is consistent with previous SER studies in Bangladesh 
(e.g. Belal, 2004; Islam, 2009). 
 
The project was duly approved by the research ethics committee of The University of Sheffield 
before conducting the fieldwork in Bangladesh.  
 
Selection of interviewees  
Given the qualitative nature and broad scope of the study involving the influence of global, 
country and firm-level governance on SED, the sample interviewees were selected using the 
judgement technique (Marshall, 1996) based on some pre-determined characteristics (Corbetta, 
2003) so that the experience and informed perceptions of diverse stakeholders could be captured 
to attain the research objectives. The criteria for selection include the work experience and 
position held in the organisation, industry spreading, understanding of governance and SER, 
contribution towards good governance and sustainability. The interviewees were chosen from 
87 
 
a variety of stakeholders who can be broadly divided into two groups: corporate and 
noncorporate. Corporate interviewees include CEOs of local and multinational listed companies, 
independent directors, female directors, board chairman, chairman of the audit committee, 
heads of CSR department, members of CSR reporting committee, business leaders (including 
country representatives, president and directors of international, national and regional trade 
associations, including the President of a Woman Chamber).  
 
Noncorporate interviewees were interviewed to understand their perceptions of the 
relationships between  governance and SER, considering that “perceptions matter because 
agents base their actions on their perceptions, impression, and views.” (Kaufmann, Kraay, & 
Mastruzzi, 2010, p. 18). The noncorporate interviewees include regulators (including the CEO 
and director of the Stock Exchange, commissioners and directors of the BSEC, General 
Manager, the former Governor and Deputy Governor of the central bank), CSR experts 
(including the President of a CSR Award Committee, consultants and CEO of international 
CSR initiatives), professional accountants (including the President of Accountants’ Institute), 
former Secretaries (bureaucrats), former Cabinet members (ministers), NGOs and civil society 
organisations (CSOs) (who work for good governance, control of corruption, poverty 
alleviation and hunger, multi-stakeholder dialogue and policy advocacy for addressing the 
macro problems), and academics. Business leaders of international, national and regional trade 
associations were included because of their wider exposure and understanding of the 
governance and SER issues both at home and abroad. Moreover, they actively participate and 
intervene in policy formulation and negotiate with national and international stakeholders on 
behalf of their member companies. The justifications for the selection of different interviewee 
groups are as follows.  
 
• Companies that are well-known for the adoption of the global CSR standards (e.g. GRI, 
UNGC, ISO standards), issuing stand-alone CSR reports and receiving awards and 
accolades because they have been pioneering CSR reporting in Bangladesh; and also, 
companies that are not known for CSR reporting were deliberately included.   
• The interviewees also include the heads of CSR department, heads and members of CSR 
reporting teams who appeared to be the most knowledgeable persons in the company 
regarding CSR and SER because they engaged with the CSR reporting process. Hence 
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an intensive open-ended conversation with them helps explore their experiences, 
reasons, insights, expectations (Qu & Dumay, 2011), particularly the hows and whys of 
SER in Bangladesh along with its credibility.  
• Independent directors, female directors, board chairpersons, chairpersons of audit 
committees and executive committees, other directors, chief executive officers (CEOs) 
were interviewed because their position and boardroom experience is critical to 
understanding corporate governance and SER practice along with the role of the board 
members.  
• It is argued that MNCs act as a conduit in importing global SER practices to the 
developing counties (Beckman, Colwell, & Cunningham, 2009), and SER varies across 
different industries due to the difference in regulations and stakeholders. Therefore, 
corporate interviewees were chosen from different industries and both from local and 
multinational companies to cover diverse views.  
• The current and former regulators were included because they frame the disclosure 
rules for listed companies in Bangladesh. Also, as national regulators, they make 
national and corporate governance frameworks, act as intermediaries between the firm-
level governance and global governance. Hence, they knew about three levels of 
governance, SER issues and their role were important in influencing SER in Bangladesh. 
• NGOs have been playing a significant role in the socio-economic development in 
Bangladesh, whereas the CSOs offer new ideas and constructive suggestions as a ‘think 
tank’ and exert pressures on the government and corporations to act in line with the laws 
and expectations of the mass. They play a remarkable role in improving the social and 
environmental condition in Bangladesh (Islam, 2000 as cited in Belal, 2004, p. 126).   
• The Chairman of the CSR Award Committee was included because his views were 
critical to understanding how the best CSR firm is selected and how the dynamics of the 
global, national and firm-level actors shape SER in Bangladesh.  
• Other CSR experts and consultants were included because they act as a conduit in 
importing global CSR reporting technologies and offer training and advocacy for the 
development of CSR and SER in Bangladesh.   
• Accountants were included because they are actively involved with the preparation of 
both financial and non-financial disclosures in Bangladesh, including the social and 
environmental disclosure in the corporate annual reports. Besides, they play an 
89 
 
important role in national policymaking as a professional group, and they offer 
accolades, for example, the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Bangladesh (ICAB) 
offers Awards for best presented annual reports, and the Institute of Cost and 
Management Accountants of Bangladesh (ICMAB) has agreed with GRI to promote 
sustainability reporting in Bangladesh.   
 
Since Bangladesh is a collectivist society49 (Hofstede, Hofstede, & Minkov, 2005), personal 
contacts and the snowball sampling technique were used simultaneously to identify and access 
the appropriate interviewees. As cultural factors influence access to the interviewees in 
qualitative studies (Marshall et al., 2013), these sampling strategies were proved useful in 
getting access to the interviewees (Denscombe, 2014; Stigliani & Ravasi, 2012). Based on the 
sampling strategy, the engagement of an appropriate number of appropriate interviewees was 
critical to achieving the research objectives (Marshall et al., 2013) as Mason (2010) argues that 
the guiding principle for determining the sample size in qualitative research should be based on 
the concept of saturation, which means a researcher should be satisfied that he has learnt and 
understood the phenomenon to adequately create knowledge. 
 
The interview was started by interviewing an accountant followed by a director of a national 
trade association, who are known for their professional excellence having active involvement 
with corporate affairs and who helped, as peers in getting access to other interviewees. The 
author was in an advantageous position in getting access to interviewees because of his 
affiliation with an apex national institute as an academic having networks with business and 
regulators in Bangladesh. Moreover, some of his cohorts and peers who are working in different 
companies helped him in getting access to corporate interviewees. Otherwise, it would have 
been more difficult to access the desired elite interviewees. Based on this strategy, the potential 
interviewees were contacted through emails, telephone calls, personal contact, and persuasion 
by their peers. However, the majority of the interviewees were contacted over the phone and 
personal visits during the author’s field visit to Bangladesh from February to May 2019. 
 
 
49 Collectivism indicates a preference for a firmly interweaved framework in a society wherein individuals expect 
their relatives or group members to take care of them in exchange for unquestioning loyalty (Hofstede, Hofstede, 
& Minkov, 2005). 
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Following the selection procedure above, a total of 53 people were interviewed. However, three 
interviewees did not agree to be recorded and to sign the consent form according to the ethical 
approval of the project, and an interview appeared not to be useable. After eliminating these 
four, a total of 49 interviews were found, processed and analysed as depicted in Table 5.2 (and 
in Appendix table 4). Despite the initial plan of conducting about 30 interviews, the author tried 
to be opportunistic to cover more interviewees (Buchanan, Boddy, & McCalman, 2013) and he, 
fortunately, got access to a sufficient number of interviewees given the difficulty in getting 
access in qualitative research (Bryman, 2003). 
 
Table 5.2 shows that the sample interviewees include 26 corporate interviewees who were 
classified as CEOs (5) including three female CEOs, Board Chair (1), members of CSR 
Reporting team (4), Independent directors (5) (the actual number is 12 included in other 
respondent groups), Female directors (3) (the actual number is six included in other interviewee 
groups), Business leaders (trade associations) (5), other corporate interviewees (3). Some 23 
noncorporate interviewees who were classified as CSR Experts (3), Accountants (1) (actual 
number of Certified Accountants is 11 included in other respondent groups), Regulators (9), 
NGOs/CSOs (4) and Academics (6). The views of eleven female interviewees (22%) have been 
captured through the proportion of female directors of the listed companies in Bangladesh is 
17% only. Our samples include seven interviewees who are working or worked in MNCs. It is 
noteworthy that majority of the corporate interviewees belong to firms, which have 
international exposures in terms of exports, borrowing from international lenders, MNC 
subsidiaries, and trade financing (such as, letter of credit). 
 
Appendix Table 4 presents the profiles and details of the interviewees. The interviewees have 
been referred to by a coded number. Hence, the anonymity of interviewees is maintained to the 
greatest possible degree while still allowing adequate information to be provided about them. 
Besides, pseudonyms have been used for the organisations and persons whose names were 
mentioned by the interviewees to ensure anonymity. 
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Table 5.2: Distribution of interviewees   
Categories of Interviewees Number of 
Interviewees 
Percentage 
Corporate interviewees  
CEOs 5 19 
Board chair 1 4 
Members of CSR reporting team (CSR Team) 4 15 
Independent directors (Actual number is 12 included in other 
respondent groups) 
5 
19 
Female director (Actual number is 6 included in other 
respondent groups) 
3 
12 
Business leaders (Trade Associations) 5 19 
(Other) corporate 3 12 
Total  26 100 
Non-corporate interviewees  
CSR Experts 3 13 
Accountant (Actual number of Certified Accountants is 11 
included in other respondent groups) 
1 
4 
Regulators 9 39 
NGOs/CSOs 4 17 
Academics 6 26 
Total  23 100 
Corporate interviewees 26 53 
Noncorporate interviewees 23 47 
Male interviewees  38 78 
Female interviewees  11 22 
Total interviewees 49 100 
 
Interview procedure  
Interviews were conducted according to the ethical approval of The University of Sheffield. 
Before each interview, an interview invitation letter and a participant consent form were sent 
to the potential interviewees to give them a primary idea about the objectives of the research, 
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why they were selected, the broad themes to be asked, such as CSR disclosure, global, country 
and firm-level governance in Bangladesh. All interviewees were assured that the interview data 
would be used solely for academic purposes and confidentiality and anonymity will be ensured.  
 
Before the interview, prima facie understanding of the interviewees’ profile, the organisations’ 
role and in case of corporate interviewees, the forms, focus and extent of the SED of the 
company were gathered from the annual report, CSR report and websites. All interviews started 
with a brief introduction to the study outlining the objectives and how the interview data will 
be used. Everyone was also given a participant information sheet written in English, with 
contact information explaining the project. The consent form was signed agreeing to the terms 
and conditions of the interview. 
 
The interviews were conducted mainly in English and very few cases in Bengali. All interviews, 
except one, were tape-recorded with the consent of the interviewees and subsequently translated 
and transcribed. As one of the interviewees did not agree to be tape-recorded, intensive notes, 
with the consent of the interviewee were taken. Translation and transcription were carefully 
scrutinised against the tape recordings and amendments were made where necessary. All 
interviews were conducted in person at the interviewees’ offices, except in three cases, where 
the interview took place at the respondents’ residence. The interviews lasted between half an 
hour and two hours, with an average of 58 minutes (see Appendix Table 4) depending on the 
interest and expertise of the interviewee and the flow of discussion. All interviews were done 
on-site however, some follow-up issues were discussed in three cases.  
 
Two sets of semi-structured interview schedules were used for corporate and non-corporate 
interviewees. Interview questions were developed based on a review of CSR literature, 
theoretical considerations, the researcher’s knowledge of the context of Bangladesh. The 
interviews started with some general questions followed by specific questions about why (or 
why not) Bangladeshi companies do SER, how the three levels of governance interact with each 
other in creating an overall governance environment and how the global governance (e.g. GRI, 
UNGC), country governance (e.g. voice and accountability, media, corruption, the rule of law, 
NGOs and CSOs, national institutions) and firm-level governance (e.g. independent directors, 
female directors) influence SER in Bangladesh. The length of the interviews varied depending 
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on the exposure of the interviewee, flow of discussion and the organisational context. The 
interview schedules were used as a guide, but in most of the cases, the questions asked were 
open-ended. Interviewees facing difficulties in English or respondents who are not familiar with 
the accounting technologies and terminologies were supported with clues.  
 
The fieldwork experience was not enjoyable in all cases. On several occasions, it was difficult 
to convince the interviewees to be recorded, and three interviewees declined to be recorded and 
to sign the consent form, hence they were eliminated from the sample. This reflects the cultural-
cognitive difficulty to record interviews (Uche, Adegbite, & Jones, 2016) due to fear, 
misunderstanding and mistrust in developing countries. One of them was a former Senior 
Secretary of the Government of Bangladesh and the chairman of an insurance company, who 
was not satisfied with the letter of ethical approval from the University of Sheffield, participant 
information sheet and consent form; he asked for a letter from the supervisor. A commissioner 
and a director of BSEC declined to be recorded and to sign the consent form, arguing that they 
are not freelancers, they are government servants and cannot sign and be recorded without prior 
approval of their top authority. One female director of a state-owned bank was interviewed after 
making 15 phone calls and one office visit before the interview. Another female director could 
not be accessed because whenever the author called her, her son received the phone and he did 
not cooperate. More importantly, a handful of interviewees posed counter questions. For 
example, one respondent who was a lawyer, independent director and the president of a 
multilateral trade association contended that in Bangladesh ‘CSR’ is confined to the list of CSR 
expenditures allowable for tax exception referring to the circular of NBR and the central bank. 
Being a lawyer, that respondent insisted on and stuck to the ‘legal and objective’ definition of 
CSR, though CSR is subjective, flexible and emergent depending on the context (Kokubu et al., 
2019). 
 
Data analysis procedure 
The interview data were analysed using qualitative content analysis technique that assisted the 
interpretation of our transcribed textual data by using a systematic classification process of 
coding and detecting themes (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). In contrast to the conventional content 
analysis, the qualitative analysis is not constrained to frequency counts (Schreier, 2012) rather 
the latter offers an opportunity to explore core themes (Mayring, 2000). Employing interview 
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data analysis of O’Dwyer (2004) and Elo and Kyngas (2008), the data were processed following 
three major reviewing and coding steps (data reduction, data display and data interpretation). 
Out of the 49 interviews, 43 were conducted in English and 6 were conducted in Bengali, and 
hence, they were translated and transcribed into English. Drawing upon the institutional 
perspective, the responses were identified and coded under three broad levels of institutional 
factors, namely (1) global-level governance; (2) country-level governance and (3) firm-level 
governance. Under these three core themes, various sub-themes were created, and the specific 
responses were coded and recorded. This ensured that key terms of the transcribed interviews 
were classified into much smaller content categories (Weber, 1990) to generate themes. The 
themes in the sub-categories represented the views of participants regarding the levels of 
governance, say for example, for global governance, nodes were why companies adopt 
international CSR standards such as GRI, UNGC; for country-level governance how the rule of 
law, control of corruption, voice and accountability affect SED and why; for firm-level 
governance, how independent directors and female directors affect SED and why. The interview 
notes, records and observation made were utilised and revisited to ensure that no key elements 
are omitted in this process. Finally, the similar responses were reordered, abstracted and 
synthesised to emanate answers to the research questions such as how the dynamics of different 
levels of governance interact and influence SER in Bangladesh (Polit & Beck, 2004). In 
analysing interview data, the study adopted NVivo 12, a qualitative data analysis software that 
helps in both effective data management (Bazeley & Jackson, 2013) and preparation, organising 
and reporting findings.  
 
Limitations of the interview method  
Despite the suitability of the interview method in collecting facts and perceptions that might 
not otherwise be available, it is not flawless. The interview responses cannot be deemed to be 
fully unbiased because responses might be influenced by various cultural-cognitive factors such 
as the race, gender, religion, age, social class (Buckley, Buckley and Chiang, 1976), and the 
willingness and ability of the interviewees to give an accurate account of their experiences and 
understanding. There is also the problem of reflexivity which means the interviewees may 
prefer giving information that they assume the interviewer wants to hear, rather than giving the 
real account (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe, & Lowe, 1991). Therefore, any conclusions drawn based 
on the interview responses should be interpreted, taking such limitations into account. However, 
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the author has tried his best to overcome the limitation of this method as much as possible by 
designing the interview giving the maximum possible convenience to the interviewer. To make 
the interviewee familiar with the research project, the research objectives were emailed, 
participant information sheet and consent form were offered and an assurance that the interview 
will be used for academic purposes only was given. To ensure the comfort of the interviewees, 
the interviews were conducted in their offices and at their most convenient time. Although the 
project is in English, all the interviewees were informed that there is no language barrier and 
they could speak either in English or Bengali, or both.  
 
5.3 Summary 
This chapter has delineated the research design adopted to attain the research objectives. To 
summarise, the study employs a quantitative method (ordinary least squares regression 
technique) to understand the relationship between the three levels of governance and SER in 
developing countries in general by utilising the third party provided ESG and governance 
dataset from 2007 -2016. To overcome the limitations of the quantitative methods in answering 
why such relationships exist and provide in-depth nuanced ground-level realities in Bangladesh, 
the study used semi-structured interviews. In explaining the findings of the fieldwork, the study 
adopts a subjective view (perspectives, opinions, perception, beliefs, experience, expectations) 
of the social world. The findings of the quantitative analysis are presented in Chapter 6, and the 
findings of the fieldwork are presented in Chapter 7. Following the systematic approach of 
scientific research, this chapter acts as a bridge between the preceding conceptual discussions 
and the following empirical findings. 
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Chapter 6 
The influence of global, country and firm-level governance on social 
and environmental reporting in developing countries 
 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter addresses the first research question by examining the relationship between the 
global, country and firm-level governance and corporate social and environmental reporting 
(SER) in developing countries using the Bloomberg ESG disclosure data and the worldwide 
governance indicators data.  The details of data, samples, measurements of variables, and model 
specification are discussed in Chapter 5. The results indicate that social and environmental 
disclosure (SED) in developing countries is significantly positively associated with the global, 
country and firm-level governance. The rest of the chapter discusses and summarises the 
findings of the quantitative analyses. 
  
6.2 Results and discussion 
This section presents the descriptive statistics, correlation matrix, regression results for the 
hypothesised relationships between the global, country and firm-level governance and SED, and 
additional analyses for the relationships of the social disclosure and environmental disclosure with 
the three levels of governance, the relationships of SED with twelve individual governance variables, 
the robustness tests of the main analysis, and additional analyses by excluding the Chinese firms as 
about 49% of the firm-year observations are from China. 
 
6.2.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 6.1 provides descriptive statistics for the variables used in the study. The SED score is 
on a scale of 0 -100 and it has been normalised in such a way that it varies from 0 - 1.0 Panel 
A of Table 6.1 shows that the average SED score is 0.215 (median = 0.173), which indicates 
that the level of SED in developing countries is still low. The maximum and minimum SED 
scores are 0.805 and 0.021, respectively. The average global governance score 
(GLOBAL_GOV) is 0.216, whereas the maximum and minimum scores are 1 and 0, 
respectively. Panel B of Table 6.1 depicts the mean values for the SED score and global, country 
and firm-level governance from 2007-2016. The average country-level governance score 
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(COUNTRY_GOV) is -0.318, and the maximum and minimum scores are 1.121 and -1.106, 
respectively. The values of country governance range from -2.5 to +2.5, where -2.5 and +2.5 
mean the weakest governance and the strongest governance, respectively. The low or negative 
values of country governance indicate weak governance in developing countries. The average 
firm-level governance score (FIRM_GOV) is 0.520, whereas the maximum and minimum 
FIRM_GOV scores are 1 and 0, respectively. Despite the oscillations, the three levels of 
governance and SED scores have shown a rising trend. Panel C shows the mean values of both 
dependent and independent variables by countries.  
 
Table 6.1: Descriptive statistics 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics of dependent and independent variables  
Variable 
No of 
Obs. Mean Median SD Q1 Q3 Min Max 
SEDS 10599 0.215 0.173 0.133 0.126 0.266 0.021 0.805 
SDS 10599 0.273 0.228 0.160 0.175 0.344 0.031 0.947 
EDS 10599 0.157 0.109 0.129 0.070 0.186 0.008 0.767 
GLOBAL_GOV 10440 0.216 0 0.343 0 0.500 0 1 
COUNTRY_GOV 10599 -0.318 -0.420 0.345 -0.557 -0.218 -1.106 1.121 
FIRM_GOV 10599 0.520 0.500 0.234 0.250 0.750 0 1 
ROA 10599 0.075 0.066 0.068 0.033 0.113 -0.136 0.217 
FSIZE 10599 21.203 21.246 1.661 20.097 22.384 17.804 24.639 
MTB 10599 2.549 1.919 1.995 1.091 3.345 0.387 7.846 
LEV 10599 0.523 0.532 0.193 0.381 0.669 0.152 0.933 
LNGDP 10599 8.501 8.754 0.792 8.152 8.996 6.294 11.447 
Panel B: SED score and governance score by year 
Year 
SEDS  
(Mean) 
GLOBAL_GOV 
(Mean) 
COUNTRY_GOV 
(Mean) 
FIRM_GOV 
(Mean) 
2007 0.1337 0.242 -0.163 0.509 
2008 0.1576 0.176 -0.262 0.499 
2009 0.1720 0.190 -0.291 0.506 
2010 0.1711 0.120 -0.427 0.490 
2011 0.1788 0.219 -0.327 0.508 
2012 0.1864 0.212 -0.364 0.516 
2013 0.1988 0.228 -0.352 0.521 
2014 0.2057 0.228 -0.301 0.513 
2015 0.2089 0.218 -0.301 0.540 
2016 0.2562 0.288 -0.259 0.568 
Notes: SEDS = Corporate social and environmental disclosure score; SDS = Social disclosure score; EDS 
= Environmental disclosure score; GLOBAL_GOV = Global governance score; COUNTRY_GOV = 
Country-level governance score; FIRM_GOV = Firm-level governance score; ROA = Ratio of earnings 
before interest and taxes and total assets; FSIZE = Natural logarithm of total assets; MTB = Market value 
of stock to book value of stock; LEV = Ratio of book value of total debt and total assets; LNGDP = Natural 
logarithm of GDP per capita at current price. 
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Panel C: Descriptive statistics – SED score and governance scores by country 
Countries SEDS GLOBAL_GOV COUNTRY_GOV FIRM_GOV 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Argentina 0.295 0.137 0.784 0.364 -0.319 0.069 0.583 0.239 
Bangladesh 0.195 0.065 0.556 0.527 -0.852 0.051 0.722 0.083 
Bermuda 0.194 0.117 0.071 0.179 1.099 0.032 0.429 0.275 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina  0.163 0.030 0.000 
0.000 
-0.275 0.092 0.500 0.000 
Botswana 0.327 0.045 0.500 0.000 0.675 0.029 0.458 0.102 
Brazil 0.413 0.172 0.637 0.392 -0.001 0.094 0.508 0.239 
Bulgaria 0.088 0.012 0.000 0.000 0.223 0.024 0.500 0.000 
Chile 0.342 0.119 0.669 0.400 1.105 0.030 0.506 0.191 
China 0.175 0.063 0.085 0.205 -0.514 0.051 0.496 0.222 
Colombia 0.396 0.124 0.789 0.341 -0.258 0.069 0.620 0.200 
Croatia 0.400 0.116 0.895 0.209 0.421 0.031 0.513 0.222 
Egypt 0.166 0.020 0.417 0.376 -0.864 0.080 0.792 0.246 
Hungary 0.449 0.192 0.750 0.442 0.658 0.143 0.750 0.255 
India 0.150 0.127 0.132 0.298 -0.277 0.053 0.514 0.232 
Indonesia 0.254 0.123 0.316 0.253 -0.332 0.106 0.357 0.194 
Jordan 0.275 0.067 0.833 0.250 -0.063 0.062 0.611 0.182 
Kazakhstan 0.086 0.015 0.000 0.000 -0.564 0.109 0.708 0.102 
Kenya 0.381 0.040 0.900 0.224 -0.622 0.065 0.500 0.000 
Kuwait 0.219 0.081 0.389 0.220 -0.124 0.100 0.722 0.083 
Malaysia 0.229 0.121 0.250 0.324 0.336 0.081 0.552 0.230 
Mauritius 0.241 0.077 0.429 0.189 0.840 0.012 0.417 0.250 
Mexico 0.382 0.138 0.727 0.349 -0.192 0.059 0.656 0.212 
Mongolia 0.294 0.053 0.125 0.250 -0.079 0.103 0.375 0.144 
Morocco 0.245 0.010 0.000 0.000 -0.319 0.011 0.500 0.354 
Nigeria 0.198 0.056 0.333 0.309 -1.070 0.040 0.417 0.181 
Oman 0.307 0.059 0.500 0.000 0.169 0.043 0.344 0.129 
Pakistan 0.176 0.106 0.283 0.362 -1.071 0.039 0.336 0.261 
Panama 0.182 0.115 0.250 0.267 0.129 0.054 0.722 0.232 
Peru 0.278 0.081 0.526 0.348 -0.209 0.072 0.487 0.164 
Philippines 0.280 0.136 0.408 0.217 -0.361 0.125 0.366 0.195 
Poland 0.297 0.130 0.507 0.429 0.827 0.071 0.668 0.139 
Qatar 0.167 0.155 0.222 0.264 0.549 0.072 0.425 0.169 
Romania 0.379 0.158 0.400 0.224 0.152 0.059 0.200 0.112 
Russia 0.292 0.131 0.311 0.342 -0.732 0.023 0.606 0.217 
Saudi Arabia 0.262 0.128 0.542 0.498 -0.243 0.347 0.396 0.198 
Serbia 0.428 0.041 0.375 0.250 -0.035 0.100 0.750 0.000 
South Africa 0.352 0.137 0.484 0.355 0.230 0.045 0.731 0.208 
Sri Lanka 0.300 0.126 0.604 0.412 -0.279 0.139 0.460 0.163 
Thailand 0.328 0.176 0.418 0.390 -0.306 0.025 0.705 0.221 
Turkey 0.314 0.134 0.508 0.399 -0.149 0.133 0.438 0.188 
Ukraine 0.315 0.088 0.313 0.372 -0.709 0.119 0.656 0.186 
United Arab 
Emirates 0.208 0.110 0.314 0.423 0.596 0.074 0.539 0.184 
Uruguay 0.201 0.033 0.167 0.258 0.835 0.043 0.792 0.188 
Vietnam 0.207 0.092 0.091 0.202 -0.474 0.058 0.409 0.202 
Zambia 0.209 0.006 1.000 0.000 -0.287 0.056 0.375 0.177 
 
99 
 
 
 
Table 6.2: Correlation matrix 
Variables  SEDS 
GLOBAL 
_GOV 
COUNTRY 
_GOV 
FIRM 
GOV ROA FSIZE MTB LEV LNGDP  
SEDS 1         
GLOBAL_GOV 0.763 1 0.341       
COUNTRY_GOV 0.336 0.341 1       
FIRM_GOV 0.187 0.173 0.146 1      
ROA 0.120 0.120 0.081 0.013 1     
FSIZE 0.405 0.363 0.103 0.211 -0.084 1    
MTB -0.009 -0.068 -0.082 0.024 0.342 0.168 1   
LEV -0.011 0.047 0.012 0.055 -0.268 0.212 -0.114 1  
LNGDP 0.295 
 
0.172 0.233 0.070 -0.153 0.415 0.047 -0.114 1 
 
Notes: SEDS = Corporate social and environmental disclosure score;  GLOBAL_GOV = Global governance score; COUNTRY_GOV = Country-level 
governance score; FIRM_GOV = Firm-level governance score; ROA = Ratio of earnings before interest and taxes and total assets; FSIZE = Natural 
logarithm of total assets; MTB = Market value of stock to book value of stock; LEV = Ratio of book value of total debt and total assets; LNGDP = Natural 
logarithm of GDP per capita at current price.  
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Table 6.2 shows the correlations among the variables. The SED score is significantly positively 
correlated with global governance (r = 0.763, country-level governance (r = 0.336) and firm-
level governance (r = 0.187). SEDS is also positively correlated with the control variables, ROA 
(r = 0.120), firm size (r = 0.405), GDP per capita (r = 0.295), and negatively correlated with the 
market value of stocks to the book value of stocks (r = -0.009) and leverage (r = -0.011).  
 
6.2.2 Regression results    
Table 6.3 reports the regression results of the hypothesised relationship of three governance 
variables with SEDS. In model 1, the study examines the impact of global governance on SEDS 
and finds a significant positive coefficient (β = 0.2454, p<0.01) of global governance, 
suggesting that the adoption of global governance standards promotes SER in developing 
countries. Therefore, the first hypothesis (H1) is supported. In model 2, the study finds a 
significant positive coefficient (β = 0.0882, p<0.01) of country-level governance, which implies 
that the better the country governance, the greater is the SED. Therefore, the second hypothesis 
(H2) is supported. In model 3, the study finds a positive and significant coefficient (β = 0.0457, 
p<0.01) of firm-level governance. This suggests that better firm-level governance results in 
greater SED. Therefore, the third hypothesis (H3) is supported. In model 4, the study finds that 
all three levels of governance have significant positive coefficients: global governance (β = 
0.2375, p<0.01), country-level governance (β = 0.0265, p<0.01) and firm-level governance (β 
= 0.0121, p<0.01). Besides, SED is significantly positively related to the control variables 
return on asset, firm size, GDP per capita, and significantly negatively related to leverage.  
Results of the control variables are consistent with prior studies (Muttakin, Mihret, & Khan, 
2018; Haniffa & Cooke, 2005). The findings suggest that better governance leads to greater 
social and environmental disclosure in developing countries. Therefore, the overall hypothesis 
that there is a significant positive relationship between global governance, country-level 
governance, firm-level governance and SER is supported. The value of the adjusted R2 indicates 
that model 4 has the highest explanatory power. Among the three decision variables, global 
governance has the strongest influence on SED.  The results suggest that firms that adopt global 
governance initiatives (such as GRI and UNGC) are highly likely to disclose their CSR 
practices. The findings are consistent with Weyzig (2006), who argues that “CSR developments 
are mainly driven by global developments, but shaped by context-specific factors” (p. 69).  
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Table 6.3: Multiple regression results50 using SEDS as the dependent variable: main analysis 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
VARIABLES SEDS SEDS SEDS SEDS 
Constant -0.1660*** -0.3891*** -0.4675*** -0.1481*** 
  (-11.176) (-17.997) (-19.975) (-10.139) 
GLOBAL_GOV 0.2454***   0.2375*** 
  (81.020)   (74.736) 
COUNTRY_GOV  0.0882***  0.0265*** 
   (21.337)  (8.680) 
FIRM_GOV   0.0457*** 0.0121*** 
    (9.803) (3.598) 
ROA 0.0975*** 0.2022*** 0.2710*** 0.0825*** 
  (7.292) (11.173) (14.792) (6.166) 
FSIZE 0.0089*** 0.0241*** 0.0210*** 0.0094*** 
  (12.962) (26.751) (22.373) (13.436) 
MTB 0.0021*** 0.002*** -0.001 0.0026*** 
  (4.620) (3.160) (-1.106) (5.706) 
LEV -0.0186*** -0.0148** -0.0065 -0.0210*** 
  (-3.891) (-2.270) (-0.985) (-4.386) 
LNGDP 0.0185*** 0.0129*** 0.0261*** 0.0153*** 
  (12.266) (6.022) (12.025) (10.054) 
Industry Included Included Included Included 
Year Included Included Included Included 
Adjusted R2 0.654 0.372 0.335 0.658 
F -Stat 128.93 41.48 35.44 129.69 
Sig 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Observations 10,440 10,599 10,599 10,440 
 
Notes: SEDS = Corporate social and environmental disclosure score; GLOBAL_GOV = Global governance 
score; COUNTRY_GOV = Country-level governance score; FIRM_GOV = Firm-level governance score; ROA 
= Ratio of earnings before interest and taxes and total assets; FSIZE = Natural logarithm of total assets; MTB 
= Market value of stock to book value of stock; LEV = Ratio of book value of total debt and total assets; LNGDP 
= Natural logarithm of GDP per capita at current price. t-statistics in parentheses.  *, **, ***Statistically 
significant at less than the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
50 Our results are not affected by multicollinearity because none of the variables have a variance inflation factor 
value in excess of 10 (Neter, Wasserman, & Kutner, 1983) and correlations between the decision variables are low. 
It can be argued that examining the contemporaneous relationships between firm-level governance and SER is not 
appropriate given the time needed to see the former’s effects on the latter, There is a possibility of reverse causality 
because the qualified independent directors and female directors may be appointed more by relatively more 
responsible firms doing more SER. There is also a chance of endogeneity for other reasons. To mitigate the 
concerns of potential endogeneity, two stage least square method or lagging the values of the independent variables 
by one year are commonly used. Here, the study has lagged the firm-level governance variables  by one year 
following Fich and Shivdasani (2006) for convenience. The unreported results of the lead-lag regression for firm-
level governance are consistent with the reported results.  
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6.3 Additional analysis  
In addition to the aforesaid main analysis, the study has conducted some further analyses to 
have a deeper understanding of the relationships between different levels of governance and 
SED in developing countries. The relationships of the global, country and firm-level 
governance with the social disclosure score (SDS) and environmental disclosure score (EDS) 
are examined separately and the results are presented in Table 6.4. In Model 1, 2 and 3, the 
study finds positive and significant coefficients of all three levels of governance, both for SDS 
and EDS. In Model 4, the study finds positive and significant coefficients of global governance 
(β = 0.268, p<0.01), country governance (β = 0.017, p<0.01) and firm-level governance (β = 
0.021, p<0.01) for SDS. But for EDS, it finds positive and significant coefficients of global 
governance (β = 0.219, p<0.01) and country governance (β = 0.045, p<0.01), and a positive but 
insignificant coefficient of firm-level governance (β = 0.005, p>0.10). The results suggest that 
all three levels of governance have a positive influence on both social and environmental 
disclosure in developing countries. The insignificant positive influence of firm-level 
governance on environmental disclosure can be explained as the lack of motivation of firms 
and the absence of pressures on them for environmental causes.  
 
The study has also examined the relationships of SED with twelve governance variables51 and 
the results are reported in Table 6.5. In Model 1, the study examines the influence of two global 
governance variables on SED in developing countries and finds significant positive coefficients 
of UNGC (β = 0.0988, p<0.01) and GRI (β = 0.1387, p<0.01). In Model 2, the study examines 
the influence of six country-level governance variables on SED in developing countries and 
finds significant positive coefficients of voice and accountability (β = 0.0458, p<0.01), political 
stability and absence of violence (β = 0.0206, p<0.01), regulatory quality (β = 0.1395, p<0.01) 
and control of corruption  (β = 0.0284, p<0.05), while significant negative coefficients of 
governance effectiveness (β = -0.0995, p<0.01) and  the rule of law (β = -0.0946, p<0.01). In 
Model 3, the study examines the relationships of SED with four firm-level governance variables 
and finds significant positive coefficients of board independence (β = 0.0806, p<0.01),  female 
director on board (β = 0.0183, p<0.10), board size (β = 0.0353, p<0.01) and  the number of 
board meetings (β = 0.0011, p<0.01).  
 
51 Two global governance variables, six country-level governance variables and four firm-level governance variables. 
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In Model 4, the study examines the relationships of SED with twelve governance variables 
together and finds a significant positive coefficient (β = 0.0860, p<0.01) of UNGC, which 
suggests that the ten UNGC principles of human rights, labour rights, environment, and anti-
corruption encourage member firms to do sustainable business practices, care for the interests 
of stakeholders including environment, and report the same. It also finds a significant positive 
coefficient (β = 0.1187, p<0.01) of GRI, which indicates that GRI promotes SED in developing 
countries. Being developed with true multi-stakeholder contributions and rooted in the public 
interest, the GRI sustainability reporting standard promotes transparency and accountability of 
firms to the stakeholders52. Between the two global governance variables, GRI has a greater 
influence on SED in developing countries than that of the UNGC (0.1187>0.0860). The 
difference between the degree of influence of GRI and UNGC on SED can be explained as the 
mismatch between ‘what is told’ (the disclosure) and ‘what is done’ (the reality) (Duarte & 
Imbun, 2016; Momin, 2013; Slack, 2012).  
 
Regarding the country-level governance, the study finds that voice and accountability has a 
significant positive coefficient (β = 0.0221, p<0.01), indicating that the greater the citizens’ 
ability to elect their government, freedom of expression, freedom of association and media, the 
more is the likelihood that companies will be exposed to pressure to be accountable (Newell 
and Frynas, 2007) and socially responsible, and disclose more CSR information. This is 
consistent with prior studies (e.g. de Villiers and Marques, 2016). These results also support 
the notion that democratic governments and systems improve the feeling of security and 
confidence among the citizens regarding the capacity of laws, law-enforcing agents and the 
judiciary to ensure freedom for all (Simnett, Vanstraelen, & Chua, 2009). The study also finds 
a significant positive coefficient (β = 0.0230, p<0.01) of political stability and absence of 
violence, which implies that the greater the political stability and absence of violence, the more 
is the likelihood that companies will disclose CSR information. The study finds a significant 
positive coefficient (β = 0.0887, p<0.01) of regulatory quality, which implies that the better the 
government ability to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations to promote the 
private sector development, the more is the likelihood that companies will do CSR and disclose 
the same. The results also support the notion that quality government services and the 
 
52 https://www.globalreporting.org/Information/about-gri/Pages/default.aspx 
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government’s commitment to policy formulation and implementation encourage companies to 
invest their resources in socially beneficial projects, with an expectation of better company 
performance in the long run. On the other hand, the study finds a significant negative coefficient 
(β = -0.0565, p<0.01) of governance effectiveness, which supports the notion that the less 
effective the government services, the more business supplements government responsibility, 
fills the institutional voids and discloses more information (Doh et al., 2017; Ghoul, Guedhami, 
& Kim, 2017; Amaeshi et al., 2016; Healy & Serafeim, 2016; Matten & Crane, 2005). Similarly, 
The study finds a significant negative coefficient (β = -0.0471, p<0.01) of the rule of law, which 
implies the unwillingness of firms to disclose any unwanted additional information for fear of 
pressure/bad publicity/risk (Kirsch, 2018; Belal & Cooper, 2011). The findings are consistent 
with previous studies (e.g. Ioannou and Serafeim, 2012; Baldini et al., 2018). However, the 
study finds an insignificant negative coefficient (β = 0.0149, p>0.10) of control of corruption, 
which implies that control of corruption does not have a significant influence on SED.   
  
Regarding the firm-level governance, the study finds a significant negative coefficient (β = -
0.0102, p>0.10) of board independence. The result is consistent with previous quantitative 
studies (Alotaibi & Hussainey, 2016; Sundarasen, Je-Yen, & Rajangam, 2016; Barakat, Pérez, 
& Ariza, 2015; Kiliç, Kuzey, & Uyar, 2015; Giannarakis, 2014b; Haji, 2013) and with the 
qualitative study of Uddin & Choudhury (2008), who document that independent directors in 
Bangladesh are appointed based on the personal connections rather than the skills and expertise. 
The result is inconsistent with the previous studies, which document significant positive 
relationships (Deschênes et al., 2015; Kiliç, Kuzey, & Uyar, 2015; Muttakin & Subramaniam, 
2015; Khan et al., 2013; Dunn & Sainty, 2009; Rashid & Lodh, 2008). Although some previous 
studies find a positive association between board independence and SER, independent directors 
in developing countries may not be truly independent (Uddin & Choudhury, 2008). 
 
The study finds a significant positive coefficient (β = 0.0204, p<0.01) of a female director on 
board, which implies that the greater the number of females on a company board results in 
greater SED. The result also supports the notion that gender diversity leads to greater board 
efficiency through greater monitoring (Adams & Ferreira, 2009), and the inclusion of a female 
on the board can lead to better corporate governance (Bernardi, Bean, & Weippert, 2002) and 
decision-making, as a result of the active participation and discussion in board meetings 
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(Letendre, 2004). Thus, they can exert pressure on companies to harmonise between 
organisational goals and actions with societal goals and expectations through CSR and SER. 
The result is consistent with the findings of previous studies (Ullah, Muttakin, & Khan, 2019; 
Williams, 2003; Wang & Coffey, 1992) who document a positive association between the 
proportion of female directors on the board and CSR disclosures. However, the finding is in 
contrast to the finding of Muttakin, Khan and Subramaniam (2015), who document that SER is 
significantly negatively correlated with family firms in Bangladesh and of Husted and de Sousa-
Filho (2019), who document a significant negative relationship between board gender diversity 
and SER in four Latin American countries (Brazil, Mexico, Colombia and Chile). 
 
The study has a significant positive coefficient (β = 0.0215, p<0.01) for the board size, which 
implies that the board size has a significant positive impact on the extent of SED in developing 
countries. The result supports the notion that the larger board acts as an effective monitoring 
tool of corporate governance (Lee & Chen, 2011) and offers diverse resources to the companies 
because they might have different backgrounds, education and expertise reflecting the diverse 
needs of the society and thus leading the companies to engage in CSR to meet the needs of 
diverse stakeholders (Akhtaruddin et al., 2009; Chen & Jaggi, 2000). The findings are 
consistent with prior studies (Majumder, Akter, & Li, 2017; Alotaibi & Hussainey, 2016; Javaid 
Lone, Ali, & Khan, 2016; Majeed et al., 2015; Barakat, Pérez, & Ariza, 2015; Supriyono et al., 
2015; Haji, 2013; Siregar & Bachtiar, 2010). The study finds a significant positive coefficient 
(β = 0.0004, p<0.01) of the number of board meetings which implies that the more frequent the 
board meetings are, the greater is the extent of SED. The result supports the notion that frequent 
board meetings offer constant and effective monitoring of the corporate actions (Giannarakis, 
2014b) and thus help keep the companies being operated in the right direction, performing 
better CSR activities, and disclosing the same. The finding is consistent with prior studies (e.g. 
Alotaibi and Hussainey, 2016; Majumder, Akter and Li, 2017). 
 
With regards to the control variables, the findings suggest that firm size, ROA, market value of 
the stocks to book value of the stocks, and GDP per capita positively and significantly explain 
SED. However, the study finds a significant negative relationship of leverage with SED. The 
results for the control variables are consistent with the previous studies (Muttakin, Mihret, & 
Khan, 2018; Haniffa & Cooke, 2005). 
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Table 6.4: Multiple regression results using SDS and EDS as dependent variables: additional analysis 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
VARIABLES SDS EDS SDS EDS SDS EDS SDS EDS 
Constant -0.368*** 0.010 -0.541*** -0.245*** -0.674*** -0.278*** -0.304*** -0.030* 
  (-15.699) (0.389) (-18.903) (-13.206) (-18.369) (-12.400) (-14.904) (-1.801) 
GLOBAL_GOV 0.253*** 0.231***     0.268*** 0.219*** 
  (72.433) (64.321)         (74.458) (59.257) 
COUNTRY_GOV     0.081*** 0.100***     0.017*** 0.045*** 
      (17.293) (24.150)     (4.617) (13.089) 
FIRM_GOV         0.051*** 0.038*** 0.021*** 0.005 
          (9.424) (7.935) (5.304) (1.283) 
ROA 0.041** 0.138*** 0.164*** 0.199*** 0.222*** 0.299*** 0.044*** 0.103*** 
  (2.365) (9.564) (8.433) (12.243) (10.352) (16.108) (2.831) (8.002) 
FSIZE 0.011*** 0.008*** 0.029*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.020*** 0.012*** 0.010*** 
  (12.125) (11.174) (28.954) (27.347) (21.065) (20.791) (14.429) (14.151) 
MTB 0.006*** -0.001** 0.006*** -0.001 0.003*** -0.004*** 0.006*** -0.000 
  (9.826) (-2.451) (9.218) (-1.201) (4.388) (-6.143) (11.251) (-0.145) 
LEV -0.037*** -0.003 -0.029*** -0.002 -0.024*** 0.008 -0.032*** -0.006 
  (-5.967) (-0.574) (-4.092) (-0.346) (-3.088) (1.224) (-5.609) (-1.328) 
LNGDP 0.034*** 0.003* 0.017*** -0.003 0.042*** 0.010*** 0.024*** -0.002 
  (17.926) (1.753) (7.083) (-1.637) (16.535) (4.680) (13.127) (-1.393) 
Industry Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Year Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Adjusted R2 0.601 0.569 0.353 0.278 0.350 0.341 0.602 0.58 
F -Stat 102.98 90.56 38.25 27.39 44.76 39.01 102.00 93.52 
Sig 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Observations 10,440 10,440 10,599 10,599 10,599 10,599 10,440 10,440 
 
Notes: SDS = Social disclosure score; EDS = Environmental disclosure score; GLOBAL_GOV = Global governance score; COUNTRY_GOV = Country-
level governance score; FIRM_GOV = Firm-level governance score; ROA = Ratio of earnings before interest and taxes and total assets; FSIZE = Natural 
logarithm of total assets; MTB = Market value of stock to book value of stock; LEV = Ratio of book value of total debt and total assets; LNGDP = Natural 
logarithm of GDP per capita at current price.  t-statistics in parentheses.  *, **, *** Statistically significant at less than the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, 
respectively. 
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Table 6.5 Multiple regression results using SEDS as the dependent variable: additional analysis 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Variables SEDS SEDS SEDS SEDS 
Constant -0.1593*** -0.3909*** -0.5031*** -0.1113*** 
  (-10.801) (-8.227) (-20.227) (-3.073) 
UNGC 0.0988***     0.0860*** 
  (29.734)     (21.624) 
GRI 0.1387***   0.1187*** 
 (53.147)   (42.205) 
VA  0.0458***   0.0221*** 
   (16.998)   (8.036) 
PV  0.0206***   0.0230*** 
   (4.501)   (5.593) 
GE  -0.0995***   -0.0565*** 
   (-11.394)   (-6.738) 
RQ  0.1395***   0.0887*** 
   (17.470)   (11.370) 
RL  -0.0946***   -0.0471*** 
   (-9.208)   (-4.504) 
CC  0.0284**   -0.0149 
  (2.541)   (-1.390) 
BIND   0.0806*** -0.0102 
    (7.484) (-1.311) 
FEMD   0.0183* 0.0204*** 
   (1.768) (2.872) 
LNBSIZE     0.0353*** 0.0215*** 
      (7.120) (6.287) 
BMTG     0.0011*** 0.0004*** 
     (6.885) (3.102) 
ROA 0.0971*** 0.0453*** 0.2386*** 0.0242* 
  (7.340) (2.594) (12.238) (1.757) 
FSIZE 0.0089*** 0.0232*** 0.0220*** 0.0101*** 
  (13.107) (27.554) (21.259) (13.658) 
MTB 0.0022*** 0.0044*** 0.0006 0.0029*** 
  (4.791) (8.093) (0.927) (6.233) 
LEV -0.0185*** -0.0294*** -0.0337*** -0.0369*** 
  (-3.911) (-4.810) (-4.837) (-7.667) 
LNGDP 0.0176*** 0.0184*** 0.0211*** 0.0129*** 
  (11.829) (4.619) (8.350) (3.479) 
Industry Included Included Included Included 
Year Included Included Included Included 
Adjusted R2 0.657 0.464 0.359 0.690 
F -Stat 130.23 58.34 34.58 126.55 
Sig 0.000 0.000 0.000 0 
Observations 10,440 10,599 10,599 10,440 
 
Notes: SEDS, corporate social and environmental disclosure score;  UNGC, dummy variable equals 1 if 
the firm is a signatory of UNGC otherwise 0; GRI, a dummy variable equals 1 if the firm complies with 
GRI requirement otherwise 0; VA, voice and accountability; PV, political stability and absence of 
violence; GE, governance effectiveness; RQ, regulatory quality, RL, the rule of law; CC, control of 
corruption;  BIND, the proportion of independent directors on board; FEMD, the proportion of female 
directors on board; LNBSIZE natural logarithm of board members; BMTG number of board meetings; 
ROA, the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes and total assets; FSIZE, the natural logarithm of total 
assets; MTB, the market value of the stock to book value of the stock; LEV, the ratio of the book value of 
total debt and total assets; LNGDP, the natural logarithm of GDP per capita at the current price. t-statistics 
in parentheses. *, **, *** Statistically significant at less than the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
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6.4 Robustness Test  
In this section, the relationships between the three levels of governance and SED have been 
examined to test whether are our results are robust or not by excluding the sample companies 
from China as the lion’s share of the firm-year observations (approx. 49%) are from China. The 
findings are presented in Table 6.6, which shows that even after excluding the companies from 
China, the SEDS has significant positive relationships with the global governance (β = 0.245, 
p<0.01) and firm-level governance (β = 0.016, p<0.01) and an insignificant positive relationship 
with the country-level governance (β = 0.005, p>0.10) and thus our results are robust. Like the 
findings shown in Table 6.4, the relationships of SDS and EDS with the three levels of 
governance excluding China have been examined (as shown in Table 6.7) and both the EDS 
and SDS have found significant positive relationships with all three levels of governance. Hence, 
the main results are robust. 
 
The study has also conducted a robustness test by examining the relationships between the 
global, country and firm-level governance and SED using the firm-fixed effect model and the 
results are shown in Table 6.7. Models 1, 2, and 3 show that SED has significant positive 
relationships with global governance (β = 0.159, p<0.01), country-level governance (β = 0.039, 
p<0.01), and firm-level governance (β = 0.009, p<0.05), respectively.  In model 4, SED has 
significant positive relationships with global governance (β = 0.158, p<0.01), country-level 
governance (β = 0.059, p<0.01), and an insignificant positive relationship with firm-level 
governance (β = 0.003, p>0.10), respectively. Therefore, the results are robust. 
 
Like the findings shown in Table 6.4, the relationships of SDS and EDS with the three levels 
of governance excluding China have been examined (as shown in Table 6.7) and both the EDS 
and SDS have been found significant positive relationships with all three levels of governance. 
Hence, the results are robust. 
 
6.5 Summary 
The objective of this chapter is to examine what is the relationship between the global, country 
and firm-level governance and SER in developing countries using the third party provided 
social and environmental disclosure and governance data. The study finds that there are 
significant positive relationships between the global, country and firm-level governance and 
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SER in developing countries. The findings suggest that better governance leads to greater social 
and environmental disclosure in developing countries. 
 
Additionally, the study has also examined the relationships of the global, country and firm-level 
governance with the social disclosure and environmental disclosure separately and found a 
significant positive impact of all three levels of governance on social disclosure. However, there 
is a significant positive influence of global governance and country-level governance but an 
insignificant positive influence of firm-level governance on environmental disclosure. The 
insignificant positive influence of firm-level governance on environmental disclosure can be 
explained as a lack of motivation of firms and the absence of pressure on them for 
environmental causes. The relationships of twelve individual governance variables53 under 
three levels of governance with SER have also been examined. Results show that there is a 
significant positive relationship of UNGC with SER, which suggests that the adoption of UNGC 
encourages firms to be socially and environmentally responsible and report the same. There is 
a significant positive influence of GRI on SER, indicating that reporting in line with GRI 
promotes SER in developing countries. However, between UNGC and GRI, GRI has a greater 
influence on SER, indicating the mismatch between the reporting contents and reality in 
developing countries (Duarte & Imbun, 2016; Momin, 2013; Slack, 2012). Regarding the 
country-level governance, the study finds a significant positive impact of voice and 
accountability, political stability and absence of violence, and regulatory quality on SER. 
However, there are significant negative relationships of SER with governance effectiveness and 
the rule of law and an insignificant negative relationship of SER with control of corruption. 
Finally, there are significant positive relationships of SER with female directors on board, board 
size and the number of board meetings and an insignificant negative relationship of SER with 
board independence. As a considerable portion of the sample firms is from China, some 
analyses excluding the Chinese sample firms have been conducted to see if the results are robust 
or not, and the results are found robust even after excluding Chinese firms. 
 
Therefore, the overall hypothesis that there is a significant positive relationship between global 
governance, country-level governance, firm-level governance and SER is supported. The 
 
53 Two global governance, six country-level governance and four firm-level governance variables. 
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results suggest that firms that adopt global governance initiatives such as GRI and UNGC are 
most likely to disclose their CSR information.  
 
Although the main analysis shows that the global, country and firm-level governance have a 
significant positive impact on SER, the results of our additional analyses show that some 
country-level governance and firm-level governance variables have significant and 
insignificant negative impacts on SER in developing countries. This chapter has analysed and 
discussed the findings according to the multilevel (global, country and firm-levels) institutional 
framework of Scott (2002). However, the multidimensional analysis (coercive, normative and 
cultural cognitive pressures) of the governance variables is not possible in this chapter because 
of the limitation of data. Therefore, the following chapter will address this limitation. Moreover, 
Muttakin, Khan and Subramaniam (2015) document that female directors in the family firms 
have a significant negative influence on the SER in Bangladesh and some studies (e.g. Uddin 
and Choudhury, 2008) express suspicion about the appropriateness and effectiveness of the 
Western governance model and their influence on the SER in a traditional setting, Bangladesh. 
Therefore, the next chapter will examine how is the relationship of SER with some of the 
specific governance variables such as female directors, independent directors, voice and 
accountability, GRI, UNGC in Bangladesh as a case of a developing country.  
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Table 6.6: Multiple regression results54 (excluding China): robustness test 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
VARIABLES SEDS SEDS SEDS SEDS 
Constant -0.226*** -0.639*** -0.656*** -0.212*** 
  (-10.516) (-19.000) (-19.890) (-9.271) 
GLOBAL_GOV 0.246***     0.245*** 
  (60.958)     (60.519) 
COUNTRY_GOV   0.018***   0.005 
    (3.186)   (1.144) 
FIRM_GOV     0.036*** 0.016*** 
      (4.828) (2.856) 
ROA 0.027 0.095*** 0.084*** 0.032 
  (1.374) (3.511) (3.139) (1.559) 
FSIZE 0.011*** 0.026*** 0.024*** 0.011*** 
  (11.535) (19.798) (17.586) (10.433) 
MTB 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 
  (5.050) (3.959) (3.913) (4.918) 
LEV -0.024*** -0.007 -0.010 -0.024*** 
  (-3.276) (-0.701) (-1.037) (-3.310) 
LNGDP 0.022*** 0.041*** 0.045*** 0.021*** 
  (10.897) (13.354) (16.670) (9.241) 
Industry Included Included Included Included 
Year Included Included Included Included 
F value 98.37 33.67 34.32 97.16 
Sig 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Observations 5,261 5,420 5,420 5,261 
Adjusted R2 0.714 0.456 0.461 0.715 
Notes: SEDS = Corporate social and environmental disclosure score; GLOBAL_GOV = Global governance score; 
COUNTRY_GOV = Country-level governance score; FIRM_GOV = Firm-level governance score; ROA = Ratio of 
earnings before interest and taxes and total assets; FSIZE = Natural logarithm of total assets; MTB = Market value of 
stock to book value of stock; LEV = Ratio of book value of total debt and total assets; LNGDP = Natural logarithm 
of GDP per capita at current price. t-statistics in parentheses.  *, **, ***Statistically significant at less than the 0.10, 
0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
54 Our results are not affected by multicollinearity because none of the variables have a variance inflation factor 
value in excess of 10 (Neter, Wasserman, & Kutner, 1983) and there are weak correlation between the decision 
variables. 
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 Table 6.7: Multiple regression results (with firm-fixed effect model55): robustness test 
     
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Variables SEDS SEDS SEDS SEDS 
Constant 0.438*** 0.493*** -0.469*** 0.553*** 
  (10.804) (9.776) (-12.190) (12.205) 
GLOBAL_GOV 0.159***    0.159*** 
  (46.059)    (46.370) 
COUNTRY_GOV   0.039***   0.059*** 
    (3.380)   (5.717) 
FIRM_GOV    0.009** 0.003 
     (2.049) (0.806) 
ROA 0.031** 0.033** -0.043*** 0.035*** 
  (2.322) (2.161) (-2.733) (2.602) 
FSIZE 0.002 0.006*** 0.024*** -0.000 
  (0.828) (2.628) (11.114) (-0.122) 
MTB 0.000 0.000 0.001 -0.000 
  (0.444) (0.480) (1.351) (-0.167) 
LEVERAGE -0.008 -0.008 -0.012 -0.005 
  (-1.064) (-1.046) (-1.414) (-0.707) 
LNGDP -0.030*** -0.040*** 0.022*** -0.038*** 
  (-9.984) (-10.890) (7.307) (-11.409) 
Firm FE FE FE FE 
Year FE FE FE FE 
Adjusted R2 0.353 0.184 0.071 0.195 
F -Stat 301.57 126.46 58.03 269.02 
Sig 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Observations 10,440 10,599 10,599 10,440 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    
Notes: SEDS = Corporate social and environmental disclosure score; GLOBAL_GOV = Global governance 
score; COUNTRY_GOV = Country-level governance score; FIRM_GOV = Firm-level governance score; 
ROA = Ratio of earnings before interest and taxes and total assets; FSIZE = Natural logarithm of total assets; 
MTB = Market value of stock to book value of stock; LEV = Ratio of book value of total debt and total assets; 
LNGDP = Natural logarithm of GDP per capita at current price. t-statistics in parentheses.  *, **, 
***Statistically significant at less than the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
55 The firm fixed effect model has been used based on the result of the Hausman test. 
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Table 6.8: Multiple regression results using SDS and EDS as dependent variable excluding China: robustness test 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
VARIABLES SDS EDS SDS EDS SDS EDS SDS EDS 
Constant -0.334*** -0.148*** -0.785*** -0.548*** -0.719*** -0.719*** -0.322*** -0.134*** 
  (-10.807) (-5.224) (-17.006) (-18.600) (-17.364) (-17.364) (-9.867) (-4.577) 
GLOBAL_GOV 0.261*** 0.225***         0.260*** 0.225*** 
 (53.480) (48.348)         (53.117) (48.108) 
COUNTRY_GOV     0.017** 0.019***     0.002 0.006 
      (2.556) (3.312)     (0.296) (1.361) 
FIRM_GOV         0.045*** 0.023*** 0.022*** 0.006 
          (5.255) (2.959) (3.295) (0.869) 
ROA 0.007 0.044** 0.115*** 0.093*** 0.070** 0.095*** 0.009 0.049** 
  (0.268) (2.031) (3.692) (4.133) (2.220) (3.472) (0.354) (2.228) 
FSIZE 0.011*** 0.014*** 0.028*** 0.027*** 0.024*** 0.026*** 0.010*** 0.013*** 
  (8.947) (12.082) (18.912) (22.007) (15.284) (18.019) (7.762) (11.519) 
MTB 0.007*** 0.001 0.007*** 0.001 0.007*** 0.001 0.007*** 0.001 
  (6.934) (1.243) (6.248) (1.025) (5.970) (0.952) (6.839) (1.150) 
LEVERAGE -0.035*** -0.012 -0.012 0.002 -0.021* 0.001 -0.036*** -0.012 
  (-3.833) (-1.538) (-1.047) (0.215) (-1.784) (0.059) (-3.926) (-1.485) 
LNGDP 0.032*** 0.011*** 0.042*** 0.028*** 0.057*** 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.009*** 
  (13.151) (4.909) (11.987) (9.541) (18.203) (11.953) (11.630) (3.760) 
Industry Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Year Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Adjusted R2 91.31 57.82 34.20 29.11 39.00 22.10 90.25 57.03 
F -Stat 0.698 0.593 0.444 0.388 0.494 0.351 0.699 0.593 
Sig 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Observations 5,261 5,261 5,420 5,420 5,420 5,420 5,261 5,261 
 
Notes: SDS = Social disclosure score; EDS = Environmental disclosure score; GLOBAL_GOV = Global governance score; COUNTRY_GOV = 
Country-level governance score; FIRM_GOV = Firm-level governance score; ROA = Ratio of earnings before interest and taxes and total assets; 
FSIZE = Natural logarithm of total assets; MTB = Market value of stock to book value of stock; LEV = Ratio of book value of total debt and total 
assets; LNGDP = Natural logarithm of GDP per capita at current price. t-statistics in parentheses.  *, **, *** Statistically significant at less than 
the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
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Chapter 7 
The influence of global, country and firm-level governance on social and 
environmental reporting in Bangladesh 
 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter aims at exploring the answer to the research question ‘how do the global, country and 
firm-level governance influence social and environmental reporting in Bangladesh and why?’. The 
findings are presented in order of the three levels of analysis – the global, country and firm-level 
governance – and the three forms of pressures of institutional theory – the coercive, normative and 
cultural-cognitive pressures. The findings are discussed in line with the theoretical framework, and 
the final section summarises and concludes the chapter. 
 
7.2 Global governance 
7.2.1 Global governance environment 
The term ‘global governance’ has been used to indicate the regulations, systems and norms of the 
interdependence between the actors across the globe in the absence of an all-encompassing 
political authority (Rosenau, 1999). That is why global governance is sometimes termed as 
‘governance without government’. “Now, governance has got many dimensions – it’s not only the 
rules and regulations but also practice. So, the governance concept is now percolating to the 
different levels of the government and the bureaucracy” (REG1). Global governance standards, 
such as the GRI, UNGC, SDGs have been working toward achieving sustainable development 
goals. The CSR Centre, the local network of UNGC in Bangladesh, has been raising awareness 
about sustainability and collaborating with the government in framing the national CSR guidelines. 
Similarly, GRI is working with the DSE and ICMAB to increase awareness of sustainability 
reporting in Bangladesh. 
 
Governance in the region (Indian subcontinent) came after the second world war, through the 
World Bank, to ensure accountability of the governments for the projects funded by it. The 
international development partners have been working with the government in building 
infrastructure, developing governance, enhancing transparency and accountability, and combating 
corruption, at both the government and firm levels. For example, the Anti-Corruption Commission 
of Bangladesh was established with the assistance of the World Bank. The World Bank, along with 
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the government of Japan, is supporting the government of Bangladesh to ensure one-stop service 
at Bangladesh Investment Development Authority to improve the ‘ease of doing business’ in the 
country. The IMF is trying to constantly interact with the government regarding, for example, 
fiscal spending, inflation, tax policy, reserves, exchange rate and public debt. Bangladesh has 
become a signatory to many international conventions and treaties (such as SDGs, United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change, United Nations Convention Against Corruption, fair 
election convention, ILO convention) and as such, the government is expected to follow them.  
 
The International Finance Corporation (IFC), Asian Development Bank (ADB), Japan 
International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and other development partners are working to improve 
the firm-level governance culture in Bangladesh. For example, the ADB has been supporting the 
development of the capital market in Bangladesh, demutualisation of the stock exchange, corporate 
governance, weather index for the Agri-insurance policy, and other infrastructure developments. 
With the financial support from the government of Japan, IFC is working to promote corporate 
governance in the country besides its main function of facilitating the development of the private 
sector through funding, consultation, and technical know-how. The World Bank is contributing to 
the development of corporate governance in the insurance sector by creating and funding a six-
year-long project with Insurance Development and Regulatory Authority Bangladesh. The JICA 
is the largest donor agency supporting the development of Bangladesh. Recently, some other 
international financial organisations, such as DEG KfW (German financing company), the 
Norwegian fund (biggest sovereign fund in the world), FMO are lending funds to the private sector. 
The study tried to understand the strategic interest of international lenders in Bangladesh in 
promoting governance and sustainability. Interviewees opined that these organisations have funds 
to invest in developing economies and their strategic interest for ensuring governance is basically 
to safeguard their funds as well as being benefitted from the long-term investment as a result of 
improved quality of lives. Therefore, they impose various conditions, such as good governance, 
low non-performing loans, high profitability, capital adequacy. 
 
Why global pressures?  
Interviewees opined that the pressures for good governance and SER come from the global 
community (such as buyers and development partners), both for ethical and unethical reasons. The 
international buyers put pressures on the Bangladeshi exporters for ensuring labour rights (e.g. 
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safety, security and fair-pay of the workers), product quality, and accountability, among others, 
reasoning that their products are consumed in developed countries where the consumers are keen 
to know how these products are produced. Similarly, the donors and development partners put 
pressure for accountability because they must be accountable to their citizens. Sharing his 
experience of working with 19 development partners, including the World Bank, ADB, 
Department for International Development  (DFID), USAID, a former secretary to the Ministry of 
Primary and Mass Education said: “The Danish Ambassador told me ‘gentleman this is the money 
of my citizens and my Minister has to answer in the parliament how the Bangladesh government 
is utilising this money.’ … So, they ask for reports, clarifications” (NGO/CSO3). 
 
Interviewees opined that most of the pressures exerted by international buyers are not ethical. They 
also contended that international buyers do not always follow ethical and standard practice, though 
they very often ask for governance and ethical practice. “They keep moving the goal post. They 
have all used fossil fuel and coal. Today we cannot use coal … It makes business sense for them 
as well, not just for social or environmental sense” (TA1). Pointing to the unethical pressure from 
the global buyers, interviewees opined that “Rana Plaza does not define all the garments factories 
in Bangladesh” (TA4); after the Rana Plaza havoc, things have improved tremendously, and now 
eight out of the top 10 LEED-certified platinum greenest garments factories are in Bangladesh. 
But unfortunately, they are facing cost pressure because the international buyers are not paying a 
reasonable price to cover the extra cost. Sharing the experience of an owner of the top 10 garments 
factories in Bangladesh, the President of a trade association said: “The owner was saying ‘if I had 
to do it again most likely I would not because buyers do not give me one extra cent in the price of 
value” (TA1). Questioning the morality of the internal buyer, she added: 
 
They talk about all these social responsibilities, but they negotiate below production cost prices. Is that an 
ethical practice? Is that good governance practice that knowingly you will pay somebody below production 
cost and expect them to provide all the social benefits that your country insists upon? … There are some good 
governance issues, but certainly, they also use it as a weapon. (TA1) 
 
Interviewees opined that the global players are not always driven by actual welfare motivations. 
They are very often funded by protectionist lobbies in industrialised countries. Therefore, part of 
the pressure comes from the genuine concerns for the labourers who produce the goods, such as 
garments, which are the most exported item of Bangladesh. But part of that global pressure comes 
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from the trade union lobbyists, who want to protect their jobs in those countries so that there is no 
cheap export from developing countries. Since export industries (garments) are globally visible, 
there is more discourse about those industries. But there are many formal and informal sectors 
where there are no labour standards at all, and this is a problem in all developing countries, not 
only in Bangladesh. The chairman of a CSR Award committee said that the motivation of the 
global players is unfair. 
 
It is a contradiction that global players and global trade unions push for the labour standards only in the 
industries from which exports go to their country. If they are motivated by humanitarian causes, they should 
be talking even more about the bonded and child labour in informal sectors in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh 
rather than going for labour standards in the readymade garments only. (CSR Expert1) 
 
7.2.2  Global governance and SER 
Business case and coercive pressures 
Most of the interviewees opined that companies in Bangladesh do social and environmental 
reporting for the business case and as a response to the coercive pressures emanated from the 
international powerful stakeholders. Companies that are dependent on the global market or are 
trying to expand their business56  outside the border face coercive pressures to adhere to the 
globally accepted standards and principles regarding labour rights, human rights, environment, 
among others. As a result, they must adopt global sustainability standards (such as GRI, UNGC, 
ISOs) and communicate the same through SER for conformance and organisational conformance 
for SER is expedient and instrumental, irrespective of their choice  (Lounsbury, 2008; Scott, 2001, 
2002; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). For example, “In the case of garments, the importers of Europe 
and the USA come to visit the factories and say that ‘we will buy your commodities if and only if 
you can meet these conditions. Otherwise, we will say goodbye” (NGO/CSO3). Underscoring the 
essence of global membership and SER in meeting the requirements of foreign counterparts, a 
senior executive of a Bangladeshi MNC said: 
 
Now we have sold four of our brands to a US company. So, for that matter, they checked what kind of 
governance we have, what kind of company we are … So, to meet their requirements and to have access to 
funds internationally, we have to have some global standards such as ISOs, UNGC, and compliance in place 
and some avenues, such as CSR reports to communicate with them”. (CORP1) 
 
56 In terms of export, line of credit, listing with the international stock exchange, foreign direct investment, etc. 
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Adoption of global sustainability standards helps companies showcase themselves decently and 
negotiate confidently with international investors (Rahaman, Lawrence, & Roper, 2004; Rahaman, 
2000). The head of a CSR team said: “Being a part of UNGC and UNEP FI and preparing this 
document [sustainability report] in line with GRI is our pledge to them that yes, we follow your 
set of principles; we are in line with your shared values. So, if you have anything in your plate in 
terms of investment, in terms of syndications, please do share with us” (CSR Team2). Similarly, 
the CEO of a bank57 said that they are dependent for credit and equity on a good number of 
international development banks, namely, ADB, DEG KfW, Norway Fund, FMO. Because of 
these dependencies, they have become international and thus, they need to meet the expectations 
of the international community through SER. 
 
Our connections with the international development banks have increased over the years. We are now aligned 
with DEG KfW, ADB, FMO, which are trade finance and lines of credit … Norway Fund last year in May 
signed an agreement of extending US$ 30million credit; Norway Fund is also on the verge of investing 10% 
in the Bank along with the board [equity]. … So, through all these affiliations, we have become a globally 
interlinked bank, and as such, our practices should be of international standards. I know that it [SER] takes 
time, it is expensive, people must learn how to do all this reporting. However, slowly but surely, we must 
adopt all these best standards and reporting practices. (CEO2) 
 
Beside the coercive pressures, companies also adopt SER as a strategic tool to gain competitive 
advantages by branding their business at home and abroad. For example, “We want to create a 
brand image not only in Bangladesh but also in the global marketplace. So, we should follow what 
is being followed globally. That’s why we are reporting according to GRI” (CSR Team3). Large 
Bangladeshi companies with international exposure have recently been allowed to borrow funds 
from international lenders. When any international lenders or donors come to Bangladesh for 
collaborative projects, they investigate the websites, annual reports and SER practices of 
companies to have a prima facie idea about the potential local partner. Consequently, prudent 
companies try to cope with the expectations of their counterparts, as a member of the SER team 
said: “We are disclosing our economic, environmental and social impacts so that our stakeholders 
can have a holistic understanding about us that although we are in Bangladesh, we are very much 
in line with global best practices” (CSR Team3). 
 
 
57 which is a member of UNGC and issues stand-alone CSR report according to GRI. 
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CSR champions in Bangladesh use SER as a strategic and impression management tool to 
differentiate themselves from other companies in the industry, as the chair of a CSR Award 
Committee said: “Standard reporting of CSR helps image building; it’s attractively packaging a 
company in front of the society and global community” (CSR Expert1). By using the logos of 
UNGC and GRI, companies try to position themselves as ‘socially responsible’. A senior executive 
of a Bangladeshi MNC known for its CSR said: “By doing so [SER], we are also differentiating 
ourselves from other corporate houses. So, it’s branding for us – what we stand for” (CORP1). 
Likewise, a chief of CSR said: “We have pioneered sustainability reporting in Bangladesh. So, we 
do differentiate ourselves; we brand ourselves. It’s a global reputation; it’s a global endorsement 
that we have received from the UNGC” (CSR Team2). 
 
A CSR report prepared in line with GRI tells the international investors about the level of 
responsibility, transparency, accountability, and image of a company, as it is a comprehensive 
document that amalgamates the entire annual activities, not only CSR. Emphasising the essence 
of SER as a conversation starter, the head of a SER team said: 
 
So, this report gives a kind of assurance whenever there is an international investor on board, when there is 
a World Bank representative, when we have meetings with ADB, Chevron or any other organisations. Having 
this document is a kind of conversation starter; it depicts us (our image) because it communicates the 
activities we do. It’s a prominent document. (CSR Team2) 
 
A stand-alone CSR report is also used as a strategic tool. 
 
Whenever we meet new investors or potential clients, this helps us to give them an idea about the level of 
responsibility and transparency we have. And as I see, in this South Asian region, people still respect the 
(hard) document more than the electronic document. So, having something in black-and-white is still like a 
kind of pledge – is there and it’s reported. (CSR Team2) 
 
Although the main purpose of a CSR report is to appease the global pressure, companies also try 
to propagate this as a strategic tool to gain support from the local stakeholders, particularly 
regulators and customers who are critical to their success and survival. They also highlight the 
success stories of their clients in the CSR report to motivate the existing clients and attract potential 
ones. “We also highlight their success stories with pictures. We give 10-20 copies to our branch 
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managers. So, when they work with our partners and clients, they show that yes, you have done 
wonderful and your stories have been highlighted in this report” (CSR Team2) 
 
The adoption of SER practices enables companies to offer unique selling propositions and enjoy 
competitive advantages in terms of access to resources at reduced cost, recognition, trust and 
acceptability. For example, “we do have access to various projects, national and international 
credit lines at reduced rates. We are partnered with IFC in their projects in Bangladesh. FMO also 
has given us syndication loans” (CSR Team2). Similarly, a CEO said that they had gained the 
public trust and support from the stakeholders; their return on equity (ROE) is the highest, and the 
non-performing loan (NPL) ratio is the lowest in the industry, and they have access to funding at 
7%, in contrast to the market interest rate of 11%, because of good governance and SER. 
 
I am an accountant. Normally accountants are very conservative. Without seeing the end number, we don't 
invest money. … Last year our ROE was the highest in the entire financial sector because everywhere we 
got support from our stakeholders. The day before yesterday, we issued a 250 crore Taka bond – one bond at 
7% coupon rate, whereas the market interest rate is 11%. … So, what we are practising good is coming back 
to our profitability. (CEO3) 
 
Normative pressures 
In addition to the aforesaid coercive pressures, some companies in Bangladesh are voluntarily 
doing SER following global standards because of their internal motivations and moral obligations 
to act in a socially responsible manner (Dacin, Goodstein, & Scott, W, 2002; Scott, 2001). A 
member of the SER team said: “With the help of GRI standard, we can disclose the environmental, 
social and economic performance in a structured manner, which cannot be done with any other 
standards. It is more than an annual report. It tells you about your credibility, your footprint, your 
commitment and contribution to the society” (CSR Team3). Another interviewee said: “It is 
always good to write things in a structured way. If you report things in an ordered manner, things 
can be easily followed, assessed and results can easily be seen (CSR Team2).” 
 
The structured CSR report brings recognition, endorsement, and reputation that ultimately 
positively affects the financial health of companies. For example, the South Asian Federation of 
Accountants (SAFA) gives awards for integrated reporting and sustainability reporting. The 
Institute of Chartered Accountants of Bangladesh (ICAB) gives awards for best presented annual 
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reports. Companies report their CSR activities following GRI because it helps them in getting 
various awards by meeting all the requirements58 of the awarding organisations. “Some companies, 
like IDLC, Prime Bank, Mutual Trust Bank, Bank Asia, are following that [GRI] because that 
gives them some kind of advantage in the form of awards and recognitions” (CORP1). Likewise, 
the member of a SER team said: “Last year we were awarded the Gold Award from National 
Centre for Sustainability Reporting (NCSR) Indonesia. … we have been getting the first or second 
award for the best presented annual report for the last 8 to 10 years. So, a very positive impression 
has been created in the market” (CSR Team3). Also, the GRI standard helps the UNGC-member 
firms to prepare and submit their CSR report in compliance with the ten principles of UNGC. 
 
The GRI and CSR Centre (the local network of UNGC) provide a learning and development 
platform (Buono, 2014) for the companies in Bangladesh to know how to discharge and report 
CSR according to globally accepted SER framework. Therefore, “they are getting equipped with 
global reporting technologies to cope with the rest of the world (FD1)”. The head of the SER team 
said: “It’s a kind of a proud feeling of being part of something global where we can vote on UN 
SDG Summit as a member of UNGC. We also have access to webinars, AGMs, global roundtables, 
networking, knowledge-sharing and contributing to what will be the next global agenda” (CSR 
Team2). 
 
Beside global pressures and opportunities, the ethical stance of the sponsors is an important driver 
for being part of global best practices and doing SER. The City Bank, a listed commercial bank in 
Bangladesh, shared some of its equity with the IFC, the private sector wing of World Bank. 
Stressing the difference in the ethical obligation of the sponsors of two banks and sharing his 
experience, an independent director said: “Because of the equity participation of IFC, the 
governance, transparency, accountability and compliance of the City Bank will be enhanced. I 
proposed them to do that, but they felt that once they invite these people [IFC] to be the part of the 
company, they will not be able to manoeuvre how they would like to do” (ID1). 
 
Some companies realise that they have to address issues such as labour rights, environment, 
community, product quality to succeed and survive (Pachauri, 2006). In response to why 
companies adopt UNGC, a CSR expert said: “Look at Rana Plaza in the RMG sector in 2013; the 
 
58 Such as economic, social, environment, management and governance. 
122 
 
horrific accident killed more than a thousand people because of an irresponsible business. The 
businessmen also lost their business. So, day by day, they realise that they have to engage in good 
corporate behaviour and, as such, they want to become part of the UNGC” (CSR Expert2). 
 
Cultural cognitive pressures 
In contrast to the strong coercive pressure and moderate normative pressure, the cultural-cognitive 
pressure from the global level is weak. The audience of sophisticated stand-alone CSR reports is 
mainly the international market, as a head of CSR said: “They [people in Bangladesh] don’t 
understand how to read the report and the importance of it. Almost all the people see it as an annual 
report” (CSR Team2). Confronted with global pressures for social and environmental compliance, 
companies look for ways to minimise the uncertainty of losing the market and follow (imitate) the 
MNCs operating in Bangladesh, and other companies globally known for SER address similar 
concerns. For example, a member of the SER team said: “When we decided to start sustainability 
reporting, we didn’t know how to do it. So, we checked sustainability reports of some reputed 
companies to see how they do it. Then, we visited their websites, offices and projects, talked to 
the officials and policymakers and attended training programs on sustainability reporting” (CSR 
Team3). A handful of leading firms have been doing SER according to GRI, which had a 
demonstration effect on other local firms, which are in turn trying to learn and emulate from the 
pioneers. A member of the SER team said: 
 
Most of the banks in Bangladesh are following us. We have prepared our sustainability report in line with 
GRI G4 for the first time in Bangladesh. Bangladesh Bank talks about us and BIBM also highlighted our 
CSR reporting in several research works. So, a very positive impression has been created in the market, which 
has a demonstration effect on other banks. (CSR Team3) 
 
Responses from the non-GRI adopting firms 
We have also tried to understand the perception of corporate interviewees who are yet to adopt 
GRI for SER, and we have received divided opinions, although the majority of them are in favour 
of adopting GRI. For example, a deputy CEO said: “Since being a signatory of UNGC or reporting 
according to GRI carries value at global level, it is better to adopt those standards so that the donors 
and international lending agencies put their footprint in our organisation” (CORP2). By contrast, 
a few of them opined that they need not follow GRI because it is a costly exercise and their key 
stakeholders are local. For example, the chairman of the executive committee of the largest private 
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bank in Bangladesh said: “We do not need GRI because we report according to Shariah principles 
which are more than GRI. Moreover, our main clients are local people, and we can communicate 
our CSR activities through our annual report” (BC). 
 
Impacts of SER 
We have tried to understand how SER impacts both the operations of the firms and the lives of the 
local stakeholders (e.g. customers, community and environment) and found evidence of (1) win-
win situations, improving the wellbeing of both the firm and the stakeholders, in limited cases, and 
(2) cosmetic disclosures, improving the financial health of the firms but having no real impact on 
the lives of the locales. We have also found opposite views from the corporate and non-corporate 
interviewees. 
 
Some corporate interviewees opined that the volume of their social and environmental disclosure 
had increased enormously after of the adoption of GRI (and UNGC) because earlier they did not 
know what to report and how to report it. A member of the SER team said: “When we do any 
activities, we think of reporting. When there was no reporting, we did not think this way” (CSR 
Team3). They also opined that SER is a continuous process that requires the support of every 
department. The head of a SER team said: “When a company adopts GRI reporting framework or 
sustainability practices of UN Global compact, it has to maintain some sort of criteria because it’s 
not a one-day activity; it’s a day-to-day activity” (CSR Team1). Some corporate interviewees 
known for SER highlighted their financial interest suppressing the interest of diverse stakeholders. 
In response to the question of ‘how do you see the impact of your SER’, a CEO said: “It improves 
our image and reputation as a good global citizen that we are adopting the best global practices, 
and we are setting an example for the rest of the country, very simple” (CEO2). Then in response 
to the question “how your SER impacts the lives of the local stakeholders?”, he said: “We do a lot 
of green finance, we are the leader in setting up solar irrigation pumps. However, the visible 
changes are still not there; you can’t see them; they will be there in the future” (CEO2). 
 
In contrast to the aforesaid positive views, SER in Bangladesh lacks credibility and stakeholder 
engagement. We have evidence of decoupling, particularly from the responses of the non-
corporate interviewees and corporate interviewees who are not known for SER. Some interviewees 
opined that there are huge mismatches between what is reported and what is done. For example, a 
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regulator contended that SER in Bangladesh is still hype, the awareness is still limited to the 
reporting team and top management, and there are things (e.g. maternity leave, baby care, ETP) 
being reported which are either non-existent or not in practice as reported. 
 
Things are in black and white, but if you visit an organisation, if you observe meticulously, you will find that 
things are not in practice. If you talk to someone in the higher-ups, they will tell you everything is going well. 
But when you talk to someone in the mid or lower level, then you will come to know the reality. Say, for 
example, maternity leave and baby care, everything is good in the CSR report, but if you visit the organisation 
or if you talk to woman workers, you will find that things are not as reported. There are many problems, 
many mismatches. (REG9) 
 
Companies usually try to highlight their good deeds and hide their misdeeds. For example, 
cigarette companies highlight their attractions and hide the harms, as an interviewee said: “Their 
advertisements, attractions, are highlighted with big font size. But the negative effects and 
warnings are written in very small size and narrow font so that these can be overlooked by the 
people” (ID4). Similarly, a regulator said: “They want to disclose everything in a better way; so, 
it is very difficult to understand the actual situation of a company” (REG3). Interviewees also 
opined that there is a need to customise the reporting framework as not all global practices can be 
implemented in Bangladesh because of the uniqueness of the country in terms of limited land area 
and density of population. For example, a corporate interviewee said: 
 
Mismatches exist in the entire environmental management and compliance with the internal green office 
guideline because many things are written but not possible to do. For instance, rainwater harvesting is 
nowhere, but I have to write. Where to harvest rainwater? No space in Bangladesh. All global practice cannot 
be implemented in Bangladesh. (CSR Team2) 
 
The listed companies in Bangladesh that are publishing CSR reports in line with GRI are mostly 
in the financial sector. But the manufacturing industries that adversely affect the environment and 
violate labour rights are yet to join the race, as a regulator said: “But if you look at the 
manufacturing companies, they have to run ETP and they are labour intensive. So, from the 
economic and environmental point of view, it is very easy for financial companies to comply with 
the reporting requirements but not for the manufacturing companies” (REG5). 
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In the absence of any validation process, the credibility of voluntary SER can be questioned in 
Bangladesh, where the lack of credibility of other basic and mandatory disclosures is a common 
phenomenon. The voluntary SER in Bangladesh is just a kind of compliance with global 
requirements. An interviewee said that the basic credibility problem with the SER lies with the 
lack of governance, accountability, and reliability of the information. 
 
To follow GRI, governance structure and accountability are crucial, but these are not available … it’s very 
difficult to validate all those reports, … especially regarding governance. … many reports do not have an 
arrangement for validation. (CSR Expert3) 
 
However, some interviewees said that only very few companies are reporting CSR following GRI. 
In response to the question if there is any visible improvement in the CSR reporting due to the 
adoption of GRI, a general manager of the central bank said: “We can’t see that much GRI 
activities of so many banks. It’s only with the multinational Banks and two or three local banks. 
So, I am not that much comfortable to make any comments on the current scenario” (REG6). 
Similarly, another interviewee said: “We should not question about credibility at this stage as they 
are printing it, they deserve thanks. First, let them do it and get habituated. We must ensure the 
credibility only once a considerable number of companies adopt this” (ACA6). 
 
Unsurprisingly, we have found that corporate interviewees known for their stand-alone CSR 
reports mentioned their engagement with the powerful stakeholders (namely the international 
buyers, lenders, regulators) who are instrumental to their success and those who are involved with 
the preparation of the reports (such as advertising and designing agencies), with little or no mention 
of the local customers, community, and less powerful vulnerable and marginalised stakeholders 
(Brown, 2013; Derry, 2012). Besides, companies that do not report their CSR according to GRI 
think that there is little to no difference in the actual practice. 
 
7.3 Country Governance 
7.3.1 Country governance environment 
Country-level governance is very poor in Bangladesh. The president of an international trade 
association said: “The corporate governance of Bangladeshi companies is critical, but the 
governance of all the government offices is the most critical issue” (TA3). The weak country-level 
governance also affects firm-level governance. “We have not only bad governance, but we have 
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governance failure, and the basic things of governance are absent. So, this also affects the corporate 
level” (NGO/CSO2). We have found that the underlying reasons for the weak country-level 
governance include the lack of political will, absence of democracy, unholy nexus between 
business, politics and government, weak regulators and inefficient institutions, corruption and 
impunity, absence of accountability, politicisation and control over the print and electronic media, 
civil society organisations (CSOs), non-governmental organisations (NGOs), trade unions, 
professional accounting bodies, stock exchanges, registrar of joint-stock companies. 
 
Lack of political will and impunity 
Interviewees opined that the lack of political will is the root cause for weak country governance in 
Bangladesh. After independence in 1971, at the cost of millions of lives, “The successive 
governments have never tried to introduce good governance, the rule of law and promotion of all 
these ideas (e.g. SED)” (NGO/CSO1). Although there were some reforms during the caretaker 
governments, all the reforms and achievements have been abandoned by the subsequently elected 
governments. “Our constitution talks about laws such as privilege Act, Act to appoint Election 
Commission … but those are not enacted” (NGO/CSO2). The government enacts whatever laws 
they want to prolong their survival, rather than to safeguard the public interest and “Some laws 
curtailed the rights of the citizen. For example, the Digital Security Act 2018 and NGO law59” 
(NGO/CSO2). 
 
Interviewees opined that the government is not willing to establish the rule of law, as a CSO 
interviewee said: “We do not have the rule of law, we have a rule of individual, we have total 
impunity” (NGO/CSO2). The government makes laws for cheap popularity and breaks the laws 
when their interest is affected. “The same parliamentarians who have passed the laws, influence 
the regulators not to implement it properly. So, lawmakers are lawbreakers” (ID5). According to 
the constitution, they are supposed to enact laws and engage in related activities. But they are 
heavily involved with local development activities violating the Constitution. They interfere with 
all the financial processes “… that means allocation; distribution will depend on the whims of the 
MPs. They are the ex-officio of the chairman of different local government organisations 
automatically, and normally state-level budget allocation is dependent on them - where it will be 
spent, how it will be spent” (REG3). “There is a Court judgment indicating that such involvements 
 
59 Foreign Donations (Voluntary Activities) Regulation Act, 2016. 
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are a violation of the constitution, but they are going on doing it”. (NGO/CSO2). Because of the 
lack of political will, laws are not respected and enforced if any political leader is impacted. “The 
enforcement of laws depends on the desire of the influential section of the country, especially the 
ruling party. As a result, we see chaos everywhere. In fact, … fires, strikes, rapes, brutalities, 
killing on the roads are going on and on, and many times they go on with impunity because laws 
are not respected” (NGO/CSO2). 
 
Impunity has become a culture. “The government compromises and patronises their people” 
(NGO/CSO3). An interviewee questioned: “I am simply a peon in a government office, but I use 
Pajero car and have three luxurious houses in the Capital, and it comes in the newspaper, but I am 
not facing any legal action, so how come you can ensure governance? So, is it governance?” 
(ACCNT). In a developing country like Bangladesh, the political connection is very important 
because “The laws in this country are for the weak, but the influential people can bypass the laws” 
(TA5). There are numerous instances of state-sponsored impunity. The deeply rooted undue 
influence and impunity by the ruling party can be understood from the following: 
 
Before the last election, one senior police officer was assaulted by a ruling party member; then he was sent 
to Singapore without taking any measure against him. On the other hand, when a member of the opposition 
without committing any crime is being taken to the custody just for harassing that party, how can you expect 
the rule of law? (NGO/CSO3) 
 
The entire politics in Bangladesh is built on patronised politics, distributing favours but since (almost) all the 
political players are also businessmen, now patronisation means you allow them to become wilful defaulters 
or not to abide by the rules of BSEC and manipulate the share market and so on and on. (CSR Expert1) 
 
The government unduly interferes with the implementation of laws. For example, the government 
owns public banks and disobeys the central bank, the regulator leading to misgovernance because 
“If you want to own a bank, own it and leave it to the regulators to regulate” (REG1). The 
government sometimes disregards the opinions and concerns of the masses as an interviewee said: 
“In fact, many times the government misgoverns, harms the national interest. For example, in 
Rampal, they are destroying the Sundarbans” (NGO/CSO2). Another interviewee said: “Against 
all the opinions and advice from national and international experts, they have been constructing 
Ruppur Nuclear Power Plant. The specialists have been cautioning them … they disregard these 
concerns”. (NGO/CSO1) 
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Absence of democracy 
Many interviewees opined that the absence of democracy is the main reason for weak governance. 
In the absence of democracy, democratic institutions have become weak and autocratic ruling has 
evolved: “We do not have anything named democracy … In the absence of competition, 
democracy is meaningless” (CEO4). Democracy is the prerequisite for good governance, and good 
governance is the prerequisite for good SER practices - “Without democracy, there is no good 
governance, no justice. … no question of CSR” (NGO/CSO1) 
 
Some interviewees opined that after five decades of independence, the country is still in a feudal 
society where the dynastic leaders make all the institutions subservient. There is no separation of 
power, and the Constitution has given enormous power to the Prime Minister while making the 
President a figurehead. In the absence of the separation and balance of power, “the imperial Prime 
Minister not only runs the executive branch but also the legislative branch; even the Judiciary is 
now under the hegemony of all-powerful Prime Minister. And she runs her party; she runs other 
parties including Jatiyo Party. So, we have a total hegemony - one person, one party, and as a 
result, you can call it a dictatorship” (NGO/CSO2). 
 
The interviewees opined that there were many ups and downs and experiments of the political 
system in Bangladesh. Holding a free, fair and credible election by a neutral non-political 
government - ‘caretaker government’ - was devised as a result of a movement of an alliance led 
by all political parties in 1990. Four consecutive national elections were held by the all-party-
agreed caretaker governments with a minimum of complaint. Unfortunately, the current party in 
power rescinded the caretaker government system from the Constitution. Consequently, the 
election process has been questioned along with the reappearance of chaotic politics in the country. 
Many interviewees considered that the last national election was not fair: “Probably annual 
democracy or 5-year democracy is still questionable because we didn’t have the best election” 
(REG1). The people of the country have lost trust in the election system, becoming afraid and 
frustrated and are not interested in casting their votes even in the election of the local government: 
“We know it was not fair. … then, the Upazila chairman got elected with 6% votes only. That 
indicates the environment we live in and the governance we have, but people got afraid of saying 
so” (ID1). 
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If the government is not elected fairly, then it is difficult for them to ensure good governance 
everywhere because people question their legitimacy and moral right to rule the country. The 
enforcement of laws becomes difficult, which in turns affects the country and firm-level 
governance. As the government is backed by the law-enforcing agencies, not by the mass (true 
owners of the country), they have to depend and satisfy the desires of these agencies: “Even at this 
moment, a sub-inspector of police tells me that we are the people who kept the government in 
power” (NGO/CSO3). The country has become an authoritarian state allowing no political 
opposition and patronising the corrupt. 
 
It’s an absolute state capture by ‘the quoatary’. They have made the country a police state, and there is no 
political opposition now, and it’s a one-party dictatorship. (NGO/CSO2) 
 
If the government is not fair, they cannot control corruption; they have to depend on the corrupt. 
(NGO/CSO3) 
 
Historically, Bangladesh is known for political instability. Interviewees opined that the overall 
governance environment in Bangladesh has been getting worse over time, though the current 
regime is in power for three consecutive terms: “Things are getting worse and worse. Although we 
have some growth in some dimensions, overall governance, institutional problems have become 
more problematic day by day” (ACA4). Interviewees also expressed their concerns about the 
continuity and sustainability of some of the achievement: “All kinds of achievements this regime 
has made will become useless unless you can make the democratic institutions strong to play” 
(ID1). A former regulator is worried: “But if it is a very long government and it’s not accountable, 
then it will create lot other complications, particularly corruption may go up because [there is] no 
one to question them or the political cadres can be arrogant” (REG1). 
 
Nexus between business, politics and government 
There is a nexus between business, politics, and government. About 62%60 of the MPs of the 
current parliament are businessmen, in contrast to only 18% in the parliament of 1973. 
Interviewees opined that the corporate leaders could do and undo anything because they are also 
the lawmakers, many of them being ministers. “Everything has gone to a small number of people 
 
60 A few interviewees have said that this 62% MPs represent those who have declared themselves as businesspeople; 
another 10% may not have declared but, actually, their first profession is business. Therefore, more than 70% MPs 
are businessmen. 
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who are everywhere- in politics, business, trade unions, media, and where not?” (CEO4) Therefore, 
the difference between business and the government is becoming blurred, as they serve each 
other’s interests. “Now the government is trying to reward the loan defaulters. Recently, the NBR 
chairman has said the next budget will be business-friendly. The country is running in the interest 
of businessmen who are also part of the government. This is a governance failure” (NGO/CSO2). 
The unholy politics-business-government nexus is so pervasive that the regulators are being 
regulated by the people who should be regulated. Underscoring the hegemony of the super-rich, a 
former governor of the central bank said that “Even the regulators are being captured by the 
superrich, the non-performers. They are the ones who are the most powerful. They even buy the 
government; they buy the banks.” (REG1) 
 
Interviewees opined that the regulators have become subservient to the political leadership and the 
super-rich. A typical example of regulatory capture in the context of Bangladesh is the undue 
influence on the banking sector: “Even today, the central bank has offered many facilities to the 
defaulters. They have become a part of plundering the depositors’ money. They are simply 
facilitating the defaulters” (ID5). Interviewees said that regulators are either helpless or cohorts of 
the culprits. Likewise, the following illustrates how pervasive is the pressure of the super-rich cum 
politicians in the country. 
 
Last year, the Central Bank Governor was invited to a hotel and was asked in front of the Minister that he 
had to reduce the cash reserve ratio (CRR) from 6% to 5%. The businessmen were pressurising him that ‘you 
have to declare it today’ … The Governor was under pressure to declare it. So, if the Governor himself cannot 
say no, how can you expect the Bangladesh Bank, the BSEC people can say no in many cases? And now it’s 
coming more and more. (CEO3) 
 
The people who are politically and economically powerful don’t respect laws. They don’t let the law 
enforcing agencies to enforce the law when it comes to their interest, and it becomes a tradition in the country. 
(CEO4) 
 
Institutional failure 
Democratic and regulatory institutions in Bangladesh are getting weaker day by day “because of 
partisan appointments and corruption” (NGO/CSO2). “The government is only looking for the 
subservient, not the qualified people” (NGO/CSO3). “All the major appointments are based on 
whether you are loyal or not; not the quality” (CEO3). The institutional failure is so prevalent that 
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even the Central Bank cannot exercise its power to remove corrupt government-appointed 
directors. “The central bank finds it very difficult; maybe they don’t want to go for a head-on 
collision with the government. … I think the weakness lies in the national governance” (REG1). 
Interviewees opined that ineffectiveness of the institutions is so severe that school children had to 
control traffic and demand ‘repair the state’. “If a child can control the traffic system, then why 
traffic police cannot” (CEO4)? 
 
Judiciary 
Interviewees opined that the judiciary is very weak and the government influence on it is common. 
“The judiciary is being unduly influenced by the regime. The regime can get the verdict as they 
want, and it has been reflected” (ID1). “Even the judiciary is now under the hegemony of the all-
powerful Prime Minister” (NGO/CSO2). Interviewees argued that the influence of the government 
is evidenced from the forceful resignation of Mr S. K. Sinha, the former Chief Justice of the 
country, as he did not agree to all the unlawful desires of the regime. It was observed that Barrister 
Moinul Hosein, a lawyer and former adviser to the caretaker government, was given bail by a court 
in several defamation cases against him but after the public instruction of the Prime Minister in a 
press conference, another court declined to give him bail for the same accusation. “We have the 
judiciary, anti-corruption commission and this and that, but political pressures seem to work 
against them being fully functional” (TA1). The judiciary is overburdened with cases. The more 
time it takes to give resolutions, the more governance gets diluted. Therefore, “there is no effective 
resolution or deterrent to corrupt practices within the regulatory framework” (TA1). In some cases, 
even though the judiciary has given some exemplary verdicts, we are not getting benefits of 
judgement because of weak enforcement. 
 
Corruption – a cultural phenomenon 
Interviewees opined that corruption in Bangladesh is widespread and has become a part of the 
culture: “People like us believe that we have to bribe in some places and it has become a norm, 
though we also believe that it is not right” (TA4). Corruption has been accepted by the people: 
“We have relatives and friends who are thoroughly corrupt, and we still interact with them. We 
never tell them that you are corrupt, and I will not go to your house. Do you? I don’t” (TA1). 
People depend more on belief than science. That’s why corruption has become culturally 
acceptable. 
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We are building mosques, madrasas with corrupt money. Nobody questions about the source of money. If I 
compare with the 1960s, people used to discuss who is corrupt. But bribing, illegal things now have become 
part of our social life. (NGO/CSO3) 
 
As a society, we don’t hate corruption. I may be a Secretary of a Ministry. My monthly income is less than 
BDT1 00,000, but I am sending my child who is studying abroad more than BDT 100,000. So, corruption 
has become an institution in our country. (REG5) 
 
Corruption 
Corruption in Bangladesh has been politically institutionalised because “politicians are corrupt, 
and they depend on the corrupt to survive in power because honest people will not support them 
(NGO/CSO3). Corruption starts from the head of the government: “If the Prime Minister and his 
or her family is free from corruption, then the country will be 50% corruption-free; then the 
ministers and secretaries will not dare to do corruption. Lump-sum corruption at the lower level 
may be overlooked. But the bulk sum of corruption in the large projects is sponsored by the state” 
(ACCNT). Corruption is sometimes an apparatus for the politically patronised clienteles to show 
their loyalty, and they feel proud to talk aloud about their corrupt practices. For example, “the VC 
of the Jagannath University declared that only Student League candidates will get jobs in the 
Jagannath University during his tenure” (NGO/CSO3). 
 
Bribing has become common in government offices, starting with the recruitment of the people 
who will run the offices and enforce the laws. Almost all the interviewees said that the government 
offices are corrupt. “If a police constable has to pay BDT 10,00,000 before joining, how can he be 
honest?” (NGO/CSO3). “Everybody knows that he is getting this job by paying and he has to 
collect the money back” (CEO3). Thus, “once he gets the job, he would like to recover his money 
or more from the very day one. So, it is like a vicious cycle” (TA4). Even a politically patronised 
bank that was chaired by a former minister and an influential leader of the ruling party has been 
an example of corruption in every sphere, starting from recruitment: “In Farmers Bank, for every 
recruitment, people had to pay money” (CEO3). 
 
Doing fair business in Bangladesh is difficult, and most of these difficulties are created by the 
government agencies: “Doing business is a hell of difficulty in Bangladesh as it has also been 
documented by the World Bank” (ID1) and “Cost of compliance is more than the cost of non-
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compliance” (TA1). The difficulties have been aggravated due to “manual intervention and 
discretionary power of the operators in the absence of a standard operating procedure and 
automation” (CEO4). Instead of discharging their bestowed responsibilities, the people in 
government offices create obstacles for undue benefit: “I cannot maintain corporate governance 
because of corruption. The environment is such that you cannot avoid corruption” (ACCNT). “The 
state agencies, whose duties are to prevent corruption, invite and make people bound to be corrupt” 
(NGO/CSO3). Many interviewees said that the tax authority (NBR) harasses taxpayers for a bribe: 
“Even if you provide the right information, they will ask you to pay more tax. Then, there will be 
a negotiation, and in that negotiation, you have to pay some money. Even to pay the right tax, you 
have to bribe. So, companies think, why should we pay the tax and the bribe. We should pay an 
amount so that the tax and bribe are equal to the tax.” (TA4). 
 
Government control over media  
The print and electronic media have been playing a remarkable role, though the space for them has 
been squeezing recently due to the enactment of the Digital Security Act, 2018. Interviewees 
opined that print and electronic media have been politicised and there are a lot of censorships from 
the government, leading to true journalism being difficult in Bangladesh. Even Prime Minister 
criticises the press and says that she does not keep some newspapers in her office, giving a negative 
signal to the audience. The press can work freely “as long as they do not touch politics or 
institutions that matter” (NGO/CSO4). Since the regime doesn’t like the way they (Prothom Alo) 
present, the businesses or listed companies have been told not to give advertisements to them. The 
interviewees believed that the government established control over the media skilfully, by creating 
ownership, and the owners are also the beneficiaries of many government projects. Thus, they are 
subservient, except a few. Those who want to be exceptions face pressures and harassments: “For 
example, 70–80 cases against Mahfuz Anam, the editor and publisher of The Daily Star and there 
have been a lot of efforts to chain Matiur Rahman, the editor of Prothom Alo” (NGO/CSO2). 
Despite government control, the media have shown courage in many cases. “Among the 
newspapers, ‘Prothom Alo’, the largest circulated newspaper in Bangladesh, has been an exception” 
(ID1). However, some interviewees opined that media is also part of the society which is entangled 
in corruption. Media has become one kind of power management tool, and almost all the 
newspapers and TV channels are now owned by big corporate houses. 
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NGOs and civil society organisations 
NGOs have been playing a remarkable role in the socio-economic development of Bangladesh in 
terms of public innovations, low-cost solutions, education, health and hygiene, poverty alleviation, 
among other aspects. Akin to the press, NGOs are unaffected as long as they do not criticise the 
government and are also chained by the amended NGO law. CSOs are politicised and divided 
through patronised distributions and undue control. The state has become a police state. “If you 
say anything against the government, they will take you and shoot you in your foot or kill you or 
make you disappear, and no questions asked. They will file cases against you, and you have no 
remedy” (NGO/CSO2). 
 
Besides the dynamics at the global level, many developments have happened in Bangladesh in the 
recent past. Some of the key developments include a consistent economic growth supported by 
demographic dividend, growing exports (garments) and foreign remittance, absence of devastating 
political activities (e.g. strike), policy consistency due to one-party dominance for long-term; trade 
liberalisation, a policy allowing large corporates to borrow in foreign currency directly from the 
international markets. 
 
Some of the positive developments related to sustainability include achieving all the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs), heading towards the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), 
enactment of environmental laws and regulations, numerous policy documents for climate change, 
fiscal incentives for allowable CSR expenditures, policy guidelines for CSR and green banking for 
the banking sector, issuance of corporate governance guidelines and codes by Bangladesh 
Securities and Exchange Commission, the introduction of CSR Awards, Awards for best presented 
annual reports, the establishment of CSR Centre (the local network of UNGC in Bangladesh), 
training and research on CSR and sustainability issues following the central bank initiatives, 
preparation of stand-alone sustainability reports according to GRI by a few companies. 
 
On the other hand, some of the negative developments include the absence of democracy, the rule 
of law, independent judiciary; control and politicisation of media, CSOs and democratic 
institutions; corruption and impunity; guided democracy; accumulated grievance and tension 
among the people against the ruling party for grabbing their voting right. The exile of the Chief 
Justice S. K. Sinha, imprisonment of the legendary photographer journalist Shahidul Alam or the 
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killing of BUET student Abrar Fahad for their expression of opinions indicate the severity of the 
recent governmental control over judiciary and freedom of expression. These dynamics condition 
and shape the overall governance environment, which, in turn, affects the SER of companies in 
Bangladesh. 
 
7.3.2 Country-level governance and SER 
The following sub-section depicts how and why SER in Bangladesh is affected by country-level 
governance. The concept of SER is a recent phenomenon in Bangladesh, which started in the 
banking sector as a response to the requirements of the CSR guidelines issued by the central bank 
in 2008. That year, Bangladesh Bank (BB) issued a comprehensive guideline on CSR - 
underscoring CSR as an integral part of the strategic objectives (at the highest corporate level) - 
outlined the priority areas and reporting of CSR to BB, and to publish in the banks’ annual reports 
and websites for the first time. BB has been monitoring CSR performance of banks and financial 
institutions, requiring them to report to it their CSR activities every six months in the prescribed 
format that includes the financial involvement, social projects and community investments, the 
amount of investment and number of beneficiaries61. The policy guidelines for green banking from 
2011 also required banks to publish an independent green annual report following internationally 
accepted frameworks, such as GRI, with the arrangement of external verification by 2013. The 
guidelines also require SER to BB every quarter, starting from July 15, 2011. To encourage CSR 
practice, BB has been providing various incentives (such as subsidised refinance facilities, 
favouring compliant banks in CAMELS rating and opening new branches, declaring top ten banks 
for their overall social and environmental performance, allowing to use ‘Green Branch Logo’ for 
the green branches). The appropriate and timely initiatives of BB, especially under the leadership 
of the then Governor Dr Atiur Rahman, have a remarkable impact on SER of banks in Bangladesh, 
as an interviewee said: 
 
Bangladesh Bank, a national level authority, issued the CSR guidelines and instructed all banks to create a 
CSR fund out of their budget every year, spend for certain purposes and report to Bangladesh Bank and in 
their reports. And after that, 100s crore Taka has been mobilised and spent under the CSR fund, and those 
are being reported. This wasn’t there before. It has started when Dr Atiur Rahman has become the governor 
of the central bank. (CSR Team3) 
 
61 DOS Circular Letter No. 07 ‘Mainstreaming Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) in banks in Bangladesh’ dated 
15 July 2010. 
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Now all the scheduled banks make CSR decisions at the board-level, as opposed to 77% of banks 
in 2010 (Ullah, 2013). All banks now include their CSR activities in their annual reports and 
websites, as per the BB CSR guidelines. Besides reporting to BB, almost all the banks have a 
separate chapter for CSR in their annual report, as opposed to only 51% of the banks in 2010. Now 
a handful of local banks (namely Prime Bank Limited, Mutual Trust Bank Limited, Bank Asia and 
IDLC Finance Limited) publish stand-alone sustainability report in line with the GRI G4, as 
opposed to only two foreign banks, namely HSBC and Standard Chartered that published a 
sustainability report in 2010 (Ullah, 2013). 
 
Print and electronic media and SER 
Despite the tight space for voice, accountability and freedom of expression in a state characterised 
by a guided democracy, corruption and impunity, the politicisation of media and governmental 
control, some print and electronic media have been showing courage in unveiling the truth and 
promoting SER in Bangladesh. Media influence SER with the coercive, normative and cultural 
cognitive pressures. 
 
Coercive pressures 
The role of the press and media is more effective than regulations in overseeing governance and 
social and environmental issues in the context of Bangladesh, which has a weak institutional 
setting. Because once any problems (such as environmental pollution, grabbing the river land, 
violations of human rights) are highlighted by the media, these come to the attention of the people, 
the government and the regulators, as the Chair of a CSR Award Committee said: “They [the press] 
are more effective than the regulatory bodies because regulatory bodies are so corruption-driven 
that unless there is a civic action or a media report, none of the regulatory bodies does their jobs” 
(CSR Expert1). 
 
Media reports, particularly the negative ones, create coercive pressure on the large companies that 
are sensitive to any news regarding their company or the industry and instantaneously respond to 
such reports due to reputation risk. In response to the question ‘how do you respond to media 
reports?’, a deputy CEO said: “We follow the print and electronic media regularly and we readily 
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respond to the media if there is any news about our company, particularly in case of negative news. 
We value them; we also judge whether it is correct or not” (CSR Team1). 
 
Normative pressures 
Beside the coercive pressures, the role of the print and electronic media is pervasive in creating 
awareness, bringing various local problems to the eyes of the mass along with the global best 
practices (seeing is believing), encouraging companies to do more CSR by publishing their 
commendable initiatives, offering awards, or partnering with the corporates in implementing their 
CSR programmes. 
 
Media raise awareness of sustainability and SER among the masses. Whatever good or bad people 
come to know is mainly due to the press and media, as an independent director said: “I was on the 
Buriganga river yesterday. The water is still a mess, and it is the NGOs and press that have brought 
up those issues and are forcing the government and private sector to do something about it” (TA1). 
 
Seeing is believing. Some corporate interviewees opined that they have been motivated to adopt 
some green practices in their organisations by watching the TV programme ‘Life and Nature’, 
which depicts the social and environmental problems  - how wastewater is recycled, how does a 
green building look like, and other useful information. 
 
Shaykh Seraj visited a factory in the Netherlands and showed in a TV programme how wastewater is treated 
and recycled, and he drank a glass of the treated water. We saw it in the media, and we started believing that 
it is also possible in Bangladesh. Similarly, we saw green buildings in the media, and now we have 7 or 8 of 
the world top 10 green buildings in Bangladesh. (CSR Team3) 
 
‘Life and Nature’ is a TV programme on ‘Channel i’ and there are other programmes. They focus not only 
on the environment but also some other areas, like child labour, labour rights, working conditions, waste 
management, non-compliance, etc. They also go to some places instantly, show that this is the scenario which 
should not be. So, they are playing their role. (REG6) 
 
Corporate-media partnership, media exposure and appreciation play an important role in catalysing 
SER in Bangladesh. Some media also act as partners with corporates in implementing CSR 
programmes. For example, a chief of CSR said: “We are a partner with the Prothom Alo Trust, 
which is the CSR wing of the Prothom Alo … They are doing something very different in terms 
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of raising awareness of the people about education, health and hygiene” (CSR Team2). The print 
and electronic media also motivate companies to be socially and environmentally responsible by 
offering accolades and awards and by publishing the same. Sometimes, “When they (the press) 
give various types of best awards to businesses and report the same, they consider not only profit 
but also how a company is doing for the workers, the community and the society” (NGO/CSO4). 
By publishing corporate social and environmentally friendly practices (such as education and 
scholarship, women emancipation, supporting victims of natural calamities, environmental 
conservation), the print and electronic media encourage companies to do more CSR. Also, the 
news clips published in the media are included in the annual report, the CSR report, and on the 
websites. 
 
Some of the interviewees from the companies known for SER said that they collect and circulate 
media reports and news clipping every day and pay special attention to the environment and social 
issues of their company, competing companies and potential clients. For example, one interviewee 
said: 
 
If we find from the media that any commercial organisations are performing well in social and environmental 
aspects, then we consider them as our potential priority clients. Also, when we find that any of our 
competitors do something good, we try to adopt and practice those things. (CSR Team3) 
 
The print and electronic media play a significant role in overcoming limitations of the traditional 
formal SER in the context of Bangladesh, a country where the literacy rate is still low, and people 
are not interested in the published corporate reports. Some corporate interviewees argued that they 
mainly rely on print and electronic media to communicate their CSR activities. For example, an 
interviewee said, “Although we have CSR report, we focus on the print and electronic media to 
communicate our CSR practices because it is easily accessible. By using electronic media, such as 
TV, we can reach to the mass people who cannot read and write” (CSR Team3). Besides, the media 
help the companies to reap the benefits of double publicity of their CSR efforts – publishing in the 
media first and then in the annual report, CSR report or website. For example, the member of a 
SER team said: 
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Say, for example, we observe ‘Earth Day’, we observe the ‘World Environment Day’, and we publish those 
events in the newspaper and our sustainability report. We try to showcase what we’re doing good for the 
society and environment so that others can also know these good things. (CSR Team3) 
 
Changing needs of the millennials, social media and firm response 
With an increasing rate of literacy, use of information technology and social media (e.g. Facebook, 
YouTube, Twitter, WhatsApp), the choices of the young generation, popularly known as the 
‘millennials’, are different from that of the earlier ones. A major segment of the population in 
Bangladesh is young people who use social media. As such, smart companies use innovative 
alternative channels for communicating their social and environmental activities with the key 
stakeholders, considering their preferences and accessibility to information, and the impact of such 
communication on the audience. For instance, the largest telecom company in Bangladesh, which 
is also an MNC, produces sustainability reports but does not follow GRI and is not a member of 
the UNGC, despite having both the expertise and resources, as opposed to many of the local firms. 
Instead, they use alternative avenues to reach their target stakeholders and showcase their CSR 
because the majority of their clients are students and young people who use social media more 
than the traditional formal media (such as corporate annual report and other formal reports). In 
response to the question that ‘CSR is being good, doing good and saying good, but why companies 
in Bangladesh are not interested in CSR reporting?’, one interviewee said: 
 
They have various ways of communication. Say, for example, the Great Phone, they have ongoing campaigns, 
and they are making fantastic videos touching the heart of the target group. Sometimes, they portray themes 
like ‘love for mother’, ‘power of youth’, ‘patriotism’, ‘women empowerment’, ‘say no to dowry’, ‘fight for 
your right’, ‘health and safety’, etc. (CSR Team2). 
 
Cultural cognitive constraints and limitations of media  
However, some interviewees argued that the media is also part of society. They also feel pressure 
and are scared of oppressions due to the lack of democracy and freedom of expressions. The recent 
harassment and imprisonment of the legendary photojournalist Shahidul Alam or the killing of 
Abrar Fahad, a university student, for expressing their opinions in support of the national interest, 
depict the state of control over voice and accountability, and freedom of expression. Underscoring 
the culture of fear and control over the media, a CSO interviewee said: “We have seen recently 
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that some high-profile journalists were punished unlawfully for telling the truth. So, there is a 
culture of fear” (NGO/CSO2). 
 
Beside governmental control, the media lack independence because their control is in the hands of 
the businessmen. The owners of the print and electronic media are the owners of the large business 
groups and politicians. Therefore, the good news about the affiliated business group is highlighted, 
but the bad news is not. Underscoring the nexus between media and business, an interviewee said: 
“The motto of the media and the business is the same, though there are very few exceptions” 
(CORP3). About one-fourth of the interviewees opined that media is also a business that goes with 
the notion of the market. “The problem with the media is that they are also working in this market 
and they have to report according to the choice of the market” (ID5). Interviewees contended that 
the media look for sensational news only. Sharing the bitter experience of the CSR Centre, the 
local network of UNGC in Bangladesh, to encourage the reporters of print and electronic media to 
highlight the positive news of companies (instead of negative) so that someone can learn from 
someone else in 2008, an interviewee said the following: 
 
We didn't get much headway. They (reporters) said that would not be sensational news; that will not sell a 
newspaper. Why don’t you call our CEOs? Give them a session on CSR. Then, we invited the CEOs of the 
print and electronic media. They came in and said the same things – it's not sensational enough, and the public 
wants to hear sensational news only. Our bosses are interested in profit. (CSR Expert2). 
 
A few interviewees opined that the media also lack awareness of SER and their responsibility. 
Criticising the role of the media, an interviewee said: “They should promote and monitor the CSR 
disclosure in the country. But the problem is that they are not even aware of their responsibilities. 
And I think they even don’t know what to do and how to do it” (TA5). Another interviewee said 
that “there is a potential for the media, but we have to train them, we have to educate them to 
highlight the good practices of CSR” (CSR Expert2). However, a regulator who is also a 
professional accountant said: “Media reporting has significant implication on improving 
governance but CSR disclosure, I have no idea even how it can be linked actually” (REG3). 
 
Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and SER  
Bangladesh is a hub of non-governmental organisations (NGOs), where some of the leading NGOs, 
including the largest NGO of the world – BRAC, are rooted. More than half of the interviewees 
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opined that what Bangladesh has achieved so far is because of the private sectors and the voluntary 
sector (NGO), rather than the government. For example, an interviewee said: “Fortunately, we 
have done well in the MDGs. I wouldn’t say that is because of the government; rather it is despite 
the government. It is because of the vibrant voluntary sectors” (NGO/CSO2). 
 
Normative pressures 
NGOs are playing a significant role in educating and making people aware of their rights and 
responsibilities and impacting the society in terms of education, health, hygiene and nutrition, 
women empowerment, public innovation, low-cost solutions, poverty alleviation, agriculture, 
disaster management, adaption and mitigation of climate risk, through their widespread network. 
Having a wide range network across the country, NGOs can easily access the grassroots and act 
as an intermediary between the government, corporates and social goals. Some of the NGOs have 
gained social acceptance for their long-standing trust-worthy contributions. Having unique 
expertise, experience and access to the mass, NGOs can play a great role in implementing 
corporate social and environmental agenda, and thereby, they can promote SER, as well. 
Companies use the descriptions and photographs of these activities in their CSR report, annual 
report, website as well as in the print, electronic and social media. For example, a corporate 
interviewee said: “To report, you need to have something. If you look at our sustainability report, 
you will see that we have reported all our activities with the NGOs that have a significant impact 
on the wellbeing of the society” (CSR Team2). Thus, the role of NGOs in promoting social 
wellbeing, achieving corporate social and environmental goals and reporting the same is enormous. 
 
Partnering and collaborating with established NGOs help companies in attaining tri-partite goals 
– the goals of businesses, NGOs and the society – by reaching the ultimate beneficiaries with their 
CSR programmes, and reporting the same. “Businesses do business, so they cannot go to the 
grassroots to deal with needy people. So, sometimes they enter into agreements with NGOs to 
reach to the ultimate beneficiaries through their established network” (ACA5). Such collaborations 
help companies in achieving their business, social and accountability goals. For example, a deputy 
CEO of a bank said: “The linkage with NGOs is good for the banks for expanding their business, 
discharging their social responsibilities and reporting the same” (CORP2). Another interviewee 
said: 
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We need to work with NGOs because my expertise is not to implement social projects. Even my network is 
not strong enough, and people will not listen to me if I talk about it. So, if I go to North Bengal and start 
talking about better vegetation or use of fertiliser, nobody will believe me. So, we have NGO partners who 
are good at those projects. At present, we are working with Ovijatri Foundation, Jago Foundation, Mustol 
Foundation, Society for Education and Inclusion of the Disabled (SEID), Cancer Foundation. (CSR Team2) 
 
Therefore, implementing CSR programmes through an NGO is more effective and beneficial for 
both the target groups and companies, due to professional services, easy accessibility, cost savings, 
uninterrupted operations, and branding. 
 
Coercive pressures 
As opposed to the weak national governance, some of the notable environmental NGOs in 
Bangladesh, namely Bangladesh Poribesh Andolon (BAPA), Poribesh Bachao Andolon (POBA), 
Bangladesh Environmental Lawyers Association (BELA), have been playing a remarkable role in 
putting pressures on both the corporate and government to comply with the environmental laws to 
conserve the natural environment. For example, when there were tanneries in Hazaribagh, they 
filed writ petitions to the higher court of the country and got the verdict in their favour in some 
cases. Thus, the government and businesses sometimes take some measures against the pressures 
exerted by the environmental NGOs. An interviewee said: “For example, just now the Buriganga, 
they are trying to recover the river … So, there are good practices where POBA and BAPA and 
some of the local NGOs are active” (NGO/CSO4). 
 
Besides the legal actions, they are also trying to exert pressures on the polluting companies through 
the print and electronic media and by raising awareness among the masses about how the polluting 
industries are destroying our environment and the rivers. In response to such pressure, some 
companies try to disclose some information in their reports and websites. For example, a corporate 
interviewee said: 
 
When there is any allegation against us for polluting environment, people may look at our website and annual 
report to know more about our measures for safeguarding environment. So, we try to include at least some 
information on the website and in the annual reports to address such concerns. (ID2) 
 
However, our findings indicate that the role of NGOs in promoting SER in Bangladesh is indirect 
– “NGOs are doing very good in creating awareness about environmental and social impact. But 
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with regards to social and environmental reporting of businesses, possibly their interest is not that” 
(ACA6). Interviewees expect more active roles of NGOs in promoting SER in Bangladesh. 
 
For CSR development, yes, there are some NGOs and civil society organisations; they are working, but we 
expect more from them. (CSR Expert3) 
 
Civil society organisations (CSOs) and SER 
Interviewees opined that Bangladesh had a robust civil society and the backbone of the civil society 
was constituted by the professionals – teachers, lawyers, doctors, engineers and others. Civil 
society organisations (CSOs) had a great role in promoting CSR-type voluntary activities. 
Nevertheless, over time, unfortunately, most of the CSOs in Bangladesh have become politicised 
and divided, as a member of a CSO said: “Through patronised distribution, we have divided 
teachers; journalists; doctors; we have divided everybody, and we have a serious misunderstanding 
about the civil society” (NGO/CSO2). Hence, they cannot play their expected roles in ensuring 
transparency, accountability and social justice. Some of the influential politicians are envious of 
the name and fame of the member of the CSOs. So, they do not let the CSOs express their views 
independently. The overall environment does not encourage civil society organisations to be 
actively involved. Impunity and state-sponsored killing have created a culture of fear. In response 
to the question ‘why CSOs cannot play their due role’, an interviewee said: “There is a high-
handedness, and people get scared of the law and order situation. So, sometimes they cannot speak 
out as strongly as they want to” (REG1). Despite the governmental control and oppression, few 
CSOs, namely Transparency International Bangladesh, Centre of Policy Dialogue (CPD), 
Sushasoner Jonno Nagorik (SUJAN – ‘Citizen for good governance’) have been trying to raise 
their voices but “many of their demands go unheard, and businesses also don’t feel pressurised to 
comply with, for example, CSR practices” (NGO/CSO4). 
 
Negative or little influence of country governance on SER 
Country-level governance is a critical determinant of corporate governance and SER. However, 
there is a lack of coercive pressure and the overall governance environment in Bangladesh is not 
conducive for SER because “we cannot expect an oasis of good governance and good CSR in an 
ocean of bad governance” (NGO/CSO4). The low-level of SER is seen as taken-for-granted since 
SER is not a priority in a developing country like Bangladesh, where many companies even do not 
comply with the mandatory disclosure requirements, as an interviewee said: 
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… not to speak about CSR reporting, they don’t even comply with national laws and regulations. So, the 
overall governance environment of the country affects how the businesses will behave, … that’s why, we 
see various anomalies, corruption, underhand dealing, non-transparent bidding process, default culture, 
impunity. (NGO/CSO4) 
 
Lack of national effort and incentives 
Lack of independence of BSEC 
Although the concept of voluntary disclosure first started in the country with the Bangladesh 
Securities and Exchange Commission (BSEC) corporate governance guideline issued in 2006, 
which required the listed companies to take some governance measures at the firm level and 
disclose those in their annual report on a ‘comply or explain’ basis, many interviewees criticised 
the BSEC for their passive role in promoting CSR reporting in Bangladesh. They opined that 
BSEC should follow the CSR policy of Bangladesh Bank and come up with some reporting 
framework for all the listed companies in the country. In 2018, the corporate governance code 
required some firm-level governance mechanism and reporting thereof. However, there are no 
visible initiatives on the part of the BSEC to promote SER in Bangladesh. With the limited capacity, 
BSEC tried to introduce a guideline for CSR. Three regulators and a handful of corporate 
interviewees confirmed that while formulating the corporate governance code 2018, BSEC was 
trying to include some of the social and environmental issues, including the requirement of female 
directors. BSEC also drafted the guideline and asked the stakeholders to give their feedback. But 
BSEC could not do that because of acute resistance from some influential business associations, 
including the Bangladesh Association of Publicly Listed Companies. The listed companies in 
Bangladesh are still not ready even to accept voluntary disclosure guidelines. 
 
In our latest corporate governance code, we haven’t included it because we were resisted by the companies 
arguing that these are very costly to comply and it’s too early to introduce these kinds of things in Bangladesh. 
But, as I know, the BSEC is thinking of introducing ESG disclosure in the future. (REG7) 
 
You know there is an association of listed companies named Bangladesh Association of Publicly Listed 
Companies; they are the promoters of all business in the country and majority of them resisted it; although 
we never resist it because we think this is good, they think that these are too much. (CEO3) 
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The interviewees also said that resistance was even from within the BSEC. For example, as a CEO 
of a company known for CSR reporting said: “Actually, it was even within BSEC, there were 
people who were not ready for that, maybe one commissioner was trying to do it, but other people 
said no, it is not required. So, they were not in a position to push it. I know the inner stories” 
(CEO3). The institutional failure is so common and pervasive that being asked why the BSEC is 
ineffective, an interviewee reacted: “That’s a very big question. Why Bangladesh government is 
ineffective? Why Bangladesh government is corrupt? So why do you ask me these questions?” 
(CSR Expert1). 
 
National CSR guideline 
There is no national CSR guideline in Bangladesh. Interviewees said that after a long time, a 
committee was formed to formulate a national CSR guideline for Bangladesh. The CSR Centre 
steer the National CSR Guideline for Bangladesh with the Ministry of Planning (as the focal point) 
and 25 relevant ministries. It took two and a half years to prepare the guideline. But an interviewee 
who was inextricably involved with the process expressed her frustrations that they submitted the 
report to the concerned minister who highly appreciated the work and since then there is no 
progress. 
 
We submitted it to the then Planning Minister. He looked at it and said it's Fantastic. We had over 100 
workshops, 200 consultations; it was a huge process; everybody was very excited because everybody thought 
there should be a National CSR Guideline. … it hasn't been launched yet. Unfortunately, that is also a 
weakness in the governance structure. Companies did say that they want to report, but they want a structure 
for reporting. (CSR Expert2) 
 
Some of the interviewees were also involved with the committee and shared their experience. 
Everybody is waiting for the national CSR guideline after being approved by the government. 
They expressed their enthusiasm that the upcoming guideline will help them to report their CSR 
activities in a structured way. Even the central bank is waiting for it with an expectation that it will 
help to strengthen its CSR policy. 
 
Once the national CSR guideline is finalised, Bangladesh Bank will consider and consult that to identify and 
minimise the gaps in its CSR guideline, and it will automatically strengthen the CSR guidelines for banks 
and financial institutions. (REG6) 
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Role of national institutes of professional accountants 
It is unfortunate that professional accountants in Bangladesh also lack the understanding of SER. 
Many of them do not consider SER as a responsibility and a tool for ensuring accountability and 
transparency. Being asked what the role of their institute for promoting SER, the president of an 
accountants’ body said: “Our main job is to take care of the financial audit. That’s not within our 
jurisdiction” (ACCNT). However, it is good to see that GRI has recently entered an MOU with the 
Institute of Cost and Management Accountants of Bangladesh (ICMAB) and DSE. Both Stock 
Exchanges of Bangladesh are members of sustainability stock exchanges initiative of UN. Thus, 
they are committed to introducing ESG disclosure for the listed companies. The collaboration 
between the GRI, ICMAB and DSE will help raise awareness and conduct formal training on how 
to prepare a sustainability report. A fellow of the ICMAB said that “Now GRI has a strong network 
with DSE and ICMAB and since the financial audit, the statutory audit is under the purview of 
ICAB, ICMAB is trying to capture these types of reporting – integrated reporting, sustainability 
reporting under GRI guideline” (REG3). Recently, DSE has issued an ESG guideline in 
collaboration with the GRI. 
 
Other state actors such as the Registrar of Joint Stock Companies and Firms (RJSC) has no role 
for SER in Bangladesh as an interviewee said: “RJSC, they have no function. They are just like a 
post office. When any organisations need a certified copy, they just issue it. They don’t monitor 
anything” (REG3). Similarly, there is no visible role of trade unions for SER in Bangladesh. 
Interviewees opined that trade unions are highly politicised and extremely corrupted. The top trade 
union leaders use common labour as a platform for their self-benefits. 
 
Trade unions are infiltrated and influenced by outside influences, who are not necessarily working for the 
betterment of that industrial or manufacturing unit or the betterment of those workers but who have their 
other agenda. So that is something that concerns me deeply. (TA1) 
 
Interviewees also said that if there is an environment for the healthy development of trade unions, 
they could be a major stakeholder in pressurising the firms to go for CSR type of activities. Besides 
politicisation, companies also do not encourage trade unions. There are many harassments, as an 
interviewee said: 
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When the workers go and sign, the initiators are then expelled from the factories; they are harassed and 
arrested under false allegations, etc. So, there are a lot of things that we have to do. (NGO/CSO4) 
 
SER is costly (Belal & Cooper, 2011) and there is a lack of incentives and pressures for SER in 
Bangladesh, as an interviewee said: “When we are talking about reporting, we talk about cost. So, 
unless it is mandatory or unless there are any incentives, domestic firms will try to reduce cost and 
will not be interested in doing these things” (ACA6). Although there are some forms of incentives 
from the government in the form of tax rebate for CSR expenditure in some specified areas, there 
is no incentive for CSR reporting. For the banks, Bangladesh Bank has offered some sort of 
incentives in the form of CAMELS rating and low-cost refinance facility. A general manager of 
the central bank said: “Bangladesh Bank has not made it compulsory, but it has given some 
indication that your CAMELS rating and somehow and someway you will be rewarded if you go 
with these sorts of standards (reporting standards)” (REG6). However, no such incentive for 
reporting CSR is there for other businesses. Companies expect some form of recognition from the 
government as a head of CSR said: 
 
I don’t see any influences of country-level governance on the CSR reporting because unless and until it gives 
me some recognition or incentive for publishing a stand-alone sustainability report. (CSR Team2) 
 
Political pressures for donations, not for SER 
Interviewees opined that there are coercive pressures from the government for political CSR 
(donations), not for SER in Bangladesh. Like many other developing countries, the main form of 
CSR in Bangladesh is a philanthropic donation (Ullah, 2013), which is a voluntary giving to charity. 
The larger portion of the donations in Bangladesh is made in response to the directives and coercive 
pressures from the government and the ruling party (Uddin, Siddiqui, & Islam, 2018). At least 
nineteen interviewees have said that the large chunk of the donations out of the CSR funds of 
companies, especially banks, go to the Prime Minister’s Relief Fund (PM Fund). Although there 
is a list of purposes for which donations can be made to be eligible as CSR, companies are 
unofficially asked to donate to the politically motivated projects (such as the PM Fund, autistic 
initiatives, where some of the relatives of the Prime Minister is an adviser or Bangabandhu 
Memorial Museum). Sharing his experience, an independent director said: “The bigger chunk of 
the fund is being spent on that; last six years I have seen that it’s five times more than philanthropic 
donations to other areas” (ID1). 
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Interviewees opined that firms are bound to respond to satisfy the call of the regime. They have to 
donate whether they like it or not. In response to the question of why you donate money to the 
PM’s fund, interviewees replied that companies have no choice except responding to the directives 
from the government for such donations. The CEO of a bank said: “Last year we gave BDT 180 
million to that Fund … I can’t comment on that because I am already in trouble, off the record. 
The sovereign wills, we act. That is the law. You see, we have to support the government first. 
Whatever the government wants, we want to support them” (CEO2). Likewise, an independent 
director said: “At the firm level, there is a gulf of difference between what they believe and what 
they do because they do not have the liberty to turn down that request. If they turn down, they will 
invite troubles for them; they will not be able to survive” (ID1). Interviewees also contended that 
the beneficiaries would be benefitted more if they could distribute the fund through their channels, 
but they have to follow the order. Some interviewees argued that CSR should come from within 
rather than from orders. 
 
We could distribute donations through our own channels, but it is required to do through the Prime Minister’s 
office (Prime Minister’s Relief Fund). So, it’s a political target achievement. But if I could give BDT five 
million through my channels, then definitely the beneficiaries could have been benefitted more. When any 
ruling party asks for donations, you cannot avoid it. (CORP2) 
 
In addition to the order for donating to the political project, the government sometimes gives 
directives to donate to certain purposes. For example, an interviewee said: “I have seen the 
government directly asks that we have a cricket tournament here. So, you have to contribute this 
much money. So, these are all directives. CSR comes from within, not from orders” (NGO/CSO1). 
However, only one interviewee who is the CEO of an insurance company argued the following for 
donating to the PM fund. 
 
Corruption is everywhere, even in the government. That’s why I felt I could give the fund to the Prime 
Minister rather than giving it to Tom, Dick and Harry. Also, we thought that everyone would know it. (CEO1) 
 
As CSR is mainly meant as ‘philanthropic donations’, CSR reporting is also dominated by the 
news and photos of those events. It is observed that the donations given in response to the coercive 
pressure of the government are highlighted with colourful photos and pictures in corporate reports 
and websites. Importantly, there are pressures from the government for donations, not for CSR 
reporting. There is no visible effort on the part of the government or the regulators of the country 
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to enhance SER. Besides, the nexus between business, politics and government discourage voices 
for reforms and developments of CSR reporting. 
 
Business-politics-government nexus and SER 
In Bangladesh, where about 72% of the lawmakers (Members of Parliament) are businessmen, 
political connections are considered as a huge capital because political support is required for 
running and expanding business smoothly. Hence, a visible nexus between business and politics 
has been developed. This unholy nexus adversely affects the development of good governance and 
SER. The politician-businessmen prioritise profit and personal interest over the interest of the 
society at large, as a former Governor of the Central Bank said: “The politician-businessmen only 
care for their profit, they don't have much interest in the social development or CSR development” 
(REG1). Because of this overwhelming dual power along with impunity, “some of them tend to 
do whatever they like to do; they make the law, and they break the law when it affects them” 
(NGO/CSO4). They do not follow many of the mandatory requirements, whereas SER is a 
voluntary issue. For example, some of them looted the public money – “Most of the banks are 
captured by the MPs and ministers” (ACA4). This unscrupulous nexus affects the demand for 
reforms and development of CSR. Because of conflict of interest and power imbalance, this nexus 
also hinders the development of civil society organisations (CSOs) and trade unions that could put 
pressure for CSR and SER in Bangladesh. An interviewee said: 
 
We have seen that when there is an unscrupulous collaboration between politics and business, regrettably the 
demand for reforms for these types of activities (CSR) becomes muted. So, this is one of the reasons why we 
don’t have very strong independent CSOs, or independent trade unions which could have put pressure for 
good CSR practices. (NGO/CSO4) 
 
Unethical use of CSR funds to influence the government and regulators  
Interviewees opined that voluntary CSR expenditure should be an ethical response to social 
problems, such as poverty, inequality, illiteracy, hunger. Unfortunately, in many cases, CSR funds 
are used unethically for personal benefits that widen inequality and injustice in society, as opposed 
to the expected social justice (Rawls, 1971). There are numerous instances of using CSR funds 
unethically to influence the government to amend laws and influence the regulators and law 
enforcing agencies in the vested interest of some businessmen. For example, a regulator said: “We 
have seen that bank owners’ association donated a big sum of money to the Prime Minister’s Fund 
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in the last fiscal (year) and subsequently their tax rate was reduced significantly” (REG5). 
Correspondingly, interviewees pointed to the misuse of the CSR fund referring to the illegitimate 
amendments in the Bank Company Act to accommodate four members from one family from the 
existing two and to extend the tenure of directorship from six years to nine years. A former deputy 
governor of the central bank said: “Very recently the law has been amended to accommodate four 
directors from one family of a bank board, which is unethical. It has been done because one of the 
big donors to the party in power demanded it” (REG2). CSR fund is used for immoral benefits, 
undue influence and impunity. Despite severe problems in the banking sector, “They are making 
huge contributions to the Prime Minister’s Fund, and in return, they are getting all kinds of benefits” 
(NGO/CSO2). They also do so to “demonstrate that they are with the government” (ACCNT); 
“influence central bank’s regulatory functions” (NGO/CSO1), and “to get impunity in the absence 
of an independent commission to investigate what’s happening in the banking sector” 
(NGO/CSO2). Therefore, the scope and understanding of CSR have been confined to donations, 
and consequently, the scope of the CSR reporting has also been confined to publishing those 
activities. 
 
Ineffective regulatory agents and misuse of CSR 
Weak enforcement of laws and corruption are common in a traditional setting like Bangladesh. 
(Uddin & Choudhury, 2008). Interviewees opined that the law enforcing agencies of the country 
cannot discharge their bestowed duties independently due to the undue influence and the 
unwillingness of the government. Unfortunately, instead of ensuring justice and right doings, some 
of the law-enforcing agencies and their members have become dependent on some companies by 
accepting undue benefits, including unethical use of CSR funds. In Bangladesh, it is seen that 
businesses (some of them are also known for violations of laws) donate vehicles and other facilities 
to the police department and it is written on the property that ‘this is sponsored by X company’. 
Many of the interviewees were fed up with this practice and said that it is uncommon anywhere in 
the world. They criticised such practice as an unfair means on the part of the companies to make 
the police subservient to and dependent on them so that they can bypass the laws and getaway. 
 
It is not fair. I would not support it because when you take these types of benefits, then it is difficult for you 
to implement laws against that company or person. It makes the law enforcing agencies obedient or 
subservient to them. (NGO/CSO3) 
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They are donating to the law enforcing agencies to keep them satisfied, and behind this, they may take undue 
advantage. (CORP3) 
 
Both the companies and the law enforcing agencies are liable for the misuse of CSR funds. The 
problem has been aggravated over time and spread from the Police department to the individual 
members of the police. Our interviewees said that there are instances of misuse of CSR funds in 
response to the coercion of the law enforcing agencies even in the banking sector, one of the most 
regulated sectors, which indicates the severity of the problem in other areas. A former governor of 
the central bank said: 
 
Recently we heard that many of the police officials were given CSR fund. They are not supposed to. So those 
kinds of anomalies are there. … but this is only in the banking sector; I don’t know what about in other 
sectors because, in other sectors, we don’t have good regulators. (REG1) 
 
The misuse of the CSR fund limits the scope and diversity of CSR; therefore, the SER is also 
limited. 
 
Corruption is engulfing all good initiatives including SER 
Almost all the interviewees unanimously agreed that corruption is everywhere in Bangladesh, 
particularly in the government offices. Unfortunately, the government offices incentivise unfair 
and immoral practices that create an environment where non-compliance is easier than compliance. 
As a result, the cost of compliance in Bangladesh is more than the cost of non-compliance, as the 
President of a multilateral trade association said: “Sometimes I find it easier to circumvent our 
regulator than to comply with the laws. Currently, it is less expensive not to comply and more 
expensive to comply” (TA1). Corruption is so pervasive that SER cannot be separated from it – 
“In case of CSR practices also, there is a lot of corruption” (ID5); “Sorry to say that corruption is 
endemic, and it also affects CSR reporting to some extent” (ACA1). 
 
Corruption makes doing business difficult, eating up the surplus to spend for social and 
environmental causes and SER. “If I can get away by paying a bribe of BDT 500,000, why would 
I invest BDT 10,000,000 for an ETP (effluent treatment plant)? Moreover, I have to bribe even if 
I have an ETP” (NGO/CSO4). The impact of corruption on SER is widespread because it is taking 
people far away from morality, justice and social obligations – “If I have to give bribes, then I will 
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go far away from the corporate social responsibility because I don't have much money to spend 
for CSR. So, corruption is engulfing all good initiatives” (NGO/CSO3). Also, being ethical and 
doing the right things is costlier in terms of time, money and dignity as an interviewee said: 
 
If you go by maintaining the moral standard, you will have to go to the police station or land office for 15 
times. It is more expensive, more time-consuming – coming again and again and standing here and there 
helplessly. Then you may think it is okay to spend Taka 10,000 and get the job done by today; it is better for 
me in all ways – cost-saving, time-saving, even dignity-saving. (NGO/CSO3)  
 
Some of the interviewees (including those from the central bank, BSEC, stock exchange) also 
acknowledged that SER in Bangladesh is affected by the overwhelming corruption. Interviewees 
opined that the CSR fund had been misused by some of the directors of banks and the scenario in 
other sectors may be worse. A former governor of the central bank said: 
 
Corruption is quite overwhelming in Bangladesh. But in CSR, there have been few examples, not much 
because the central bank monitors them (banks). But even then, some people misused, the board members 
themselves took advantage of this. (REG1) 
 
Lack of accountability, transparency and SER 
SER is expected to ensure transparency and accountability of corporate social and environmental 
performance. However, in most of the cases, companies in Bangladesh do not consider CSR 
reporting as a part of their responsibility and accountability. Interviewees opined that the absence 
of accountability of the state also affects the accountability and transparency of the corporates. For 
instance, an interviewee said: “If there is no accountability of the government to the citizens, the 
owners of the country, how can you expect accountability from the companies?” (NGO/CSO3). 
The CSR fund is used for many purposes because there is no clear-cut definition. In most of the 
cases, CSR funds are being misused because there is no transparency and accountability, proper 
CSR reporting and validation process, as an interviewee said: “Whenever any powerful people in 
any companies want to do something, they first look at the CSR fund where the accountability and 
transparency are less … You are saying charities, but you are doing all those parties and everything 
with this fund” (CSR Expert3). Therefore, “CSR needs to be institutionalised, and we need to 
ensure that CSR is used for the proper purpose, properly accounted and reported” (FD2). 
 
153 
 
More importantly, there is no accountability of the Prime Minister’s Relief Fund. Several 
interviewees said that funds are raised on different occasions, but nobody knows how the fund is 
utilised. “When we give money to the Prime Minister’s Fund, unfortunately, we don’t know how 
the money is being used, what considerations are taken into account in selecting the recipients 
(CORP2)”. Another interviewee said: “When there are natural calamities, we find that donations 
are pouring in, funds are raised, but we don’t know how far these donations reach the real recipients. 
How are these funds utilised? There is no accountability; nobody is there to monitor it or inspect 
it” (ACA1). 
 
Some interviewees were found fed up with the lack of commitment and accountability of the 
government in utilising the Prime Minister’s Relief Fund. The Public Service Review Commission, 
formed in 2003 at the request of the World Bank, recommended that the PM Fund should come 
under the jurisdiction of the Comptroller and Auditor General. However, regrettably and 
shamelessly, nobody took any notice of their recommendation. A former Secretary and the 
Chairman of Public Service Review Commission contended that CSR in Bangladesh is mostly 
meaningless, and the very idea of CSR is missing. He shared his experience and untold story about 
the accountability of the PM Fund. 
 
How this fund is utilised is a matter of serious question. Money is spent on political considerations. We had 
tried when I became the Chairman of the Public Service Review Commission, a commission formed at the 
request of the World Bank. We recommended that this fund should come under the jurisdiction of the 
Comptroller and Auditor General. But nobody took any notice of our recommendation. It has become a waste 
of time, energy and money. It was established in 2003 January. We worked for one and a half years, and we 
submitted our report. The report was appreciated by the World Bank and others. But the government did not 
appreciate it. Although the Finance Minister was very pleased when I submitted the report to him, then he 
was helpless. He could not do anything. So that’s why the CSR in our country is mostly meaningless, and 
the very idea of CSR is missing in the way these responsibilities are discharged. (NGO/CSO1) 
 
Cultural and contextual factors and SER 
With the increasing influence of globalisation, the local context has also been gradually changing. 
But still, the local traits, culture and context dominate the SER of the business in Bangladesh. 
Although only a handful of companies in Bangladesh publish their CSR reports according to the 
global standards such as GRI, they must address the needs and concerns of the local context. 
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SER is not a priority in Bangladesh. There is no visible pressure for SER from the government, 
the market or the society at large. Interviewees opined that in Bangladesh, where the mandatory 
audited financial reports lack credibility, people do not have much interest in the voluntary CSR 
report. Because of the long-standing corruption, impunity and wrongdoings, people do not expect 
much from corporates in the form of CSR. Interviewees opined that not only the companies but 
the government and the law enforcing agencies are liable for the violations of laws. Considering 
the stage of development and density of population, people do not differentiate much between 
companies for CSR and SER. 
 
Bangladesh is in a unique position. No other countries are so densely populated like Bangladesh. If you want 
to set up a factory, it cannot be far from a locality. So, air pollution and water pollution affect the population 
around. (CSR Expert1) 
 
Non-compliance of normal regulations is common, and many businesses evade legal taxes in 
Bangladesh, where paying taxes is considered as CSR. For example, a lawyer who is also the 
president of a trade association contended: “Companies contribute to the society by paying the 
lion's share of taxes in Bangladesh. Why are they expected to do more?” (TA1) Companies that 
evade legal taxes are non-compliant and irresponsible. Therefore, CSR is a secondary issue for 
such companies. The chairperson of a CSR award committee shared his experience of how they 
evaluate firms for the award. He said that to be eligible for the CSR Award, a company must fulfil 
the necessary condition, which is a legal responsibility. If a company passes the necessary 
condition, then they evaluate the sufficient condition, which is a voluntary responsibility, the CSR 
and SER. 
 
Before we consider how much CSR a business does, we look at more fundamental issues, like whether a 
company is law-abiding, whether it pays its taxes, because tax evasion is so common. Then, whether it does 
something more than what is required by the regulations in terms of factory standards, environmental 
protection, and then we should go for what is called CSR. (CSR Expert1) 
 
Our findings show that, surprisingly, the CSR Award Committee in Bangladesh does not consider 
CSR reporting as a criterion for the CSR Award. Similarly, there is no mention of the CSR 
reporting in the government order that consists of a list of purposes for CSR spending to be eligible 
as CSR for the tax credit. 
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Religion asks for donations in silence 
About 90% of people of Bangladesh are Muslims and giving donations is an integral part of Islamic 
culture because of ‘Zakat’, one of the five basic pillars of Islam. One of the possible reasons for 
the low level of SER in Bangladesh is religion, because “In Islam, making donations in silence is 
encouraged [rather] than disclosing it” (CORP3). In Islam it is said that donations should be made 
in such a way so that when you give donations with the right hand, do not let the left hand know, 
meaning to donate in silence. Thus, the culture of donating in silence also affects SER in 
Bangladesh. 
 
No relationship between governance and SER 
There are some cultural cognitive peculiarities in the context of Bangladesh. Some interviewees 
said that they do not find any relationships between SER and firm-level governance. For example, 
the Chairperson of a CSR Award Committee said: “A business having very good corporate 
governance is doing no CSR at all” (CSR Expert1). By contrast, firms having very poor 
governance are spending money in the name of CSR and reporting the same. For example, a former 
deputy governor of the central bank said: 
 
I do not find any relationship between corporate governance and CSR reporting as such because most of the 
banks have very weak corporate governance, which is evident from the high level of classified loans. But 
they are the corporate bodies who are paying a large amount of CSR expenditure because of directives. And 
other corporate bodies which are not bound to do so, they are not doing it. So, I don’t understand any impact 
of governance over CSR in Bangladesh. (REG2) 
 
Thus, CSR (and SER) in Bangladesh is largely determined by the coercive political pressure rather 
than firm-level governance. 
 
The way forward: mandatory vs voluntary SER in Bangladesh 
Currently, SER is voluntary in Bangladesh, and there are no guidelines for it. We have tried to 
understand the views of the interviewees – whether CSR reporting should be made mandatory – 
and we have found mixed views. However, some interviewees recommend following the ‘carrot 
and stick approach’ (Gatti et al., 2019). About two-thirds of the interviewees argued that in a 
developing country like Bangladesh, people do not follow anything unless they are bound to do 
so. While extant literature seems concerned that making SER mandatory may cause further 
156 
 
corruption – “… such policy recommendation is not without reservations” (Belal and Roberts, 
2010, p. 320) – interviewees considered quite the opposite. They argued that even if there is some 
corruption initially, the benefit of increased SED will outweigh the initial drawbacks because of 
enhanced transparency and accountability with institutionalised, systematic, and organised 
reporting. A member of a CSR team said: “If there is corruption, it will be very insignificant. But 
reporting has many dimensions so, making CSR disclosure mandatory will not result in further 
corruption, rather it will enhance transparency and reduce corruption” (CSR Team3). Another 
interviewee said: 
 
Now firms are spending money but no transparency and accountability. So, if CSR reporting is regulated by 
law, then transparency and accountability will be ensured, and things will be institutionalised, organised and 
far better. … I don’t disagree with that (further corruption), but if it is under a certain law, then disclosure 
and presentation will be more systemic and organised than the present scenario. (CSR Team4) 
 
Referring to the Indian experience, a former governor of the central bank said that making SER 
mandatory will not result in further corruption – “No, that is everywhere, not only in CSR. India 
has done it. So, look at the Indian example. They have a law; they have made it mandatory for five 
billion-plus Rupees companies, and they need to get audited by the government. So, I think that 
model is quite doable” (REG1). Interviewees argued that only regulation will not work if it is just 
pushed from the top. Businesses should believe that this is good for them. Otherwise making SER 
mandatory will not work. The CEO of a company known for SER said: “We have so many laws 
in Bangladesh, people don’t follow. We don’t need to introduce any other laws. Because if you 
just introduce laws, people don’t follow. It has to come from within, voluntarily” (CEO3). Another 
interviewee commented: 
 
This is not the right time to make CSR reporting mandatory. First of all, the development of awareness and 
understanding of how both the demand-side and supply-side will be benefitted from CSR reporting is 
important. (ACA6) 
 
Some interviewees emphasised on having a common guideline for CSR reporting is more 
important than making it mandatory. “If it is made mandatory, CSR will no more exist. Everyone 
will do for compliance, just like box-ticking, not from the heart. But there can be a CSR guideline” 
(REG8). Referring to the weak governance, an interviewee said: “Look, companies are ticking 
boxes for corporate governance guidelines, but governance hasn’t improved” (ID1). 
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Since there is no guideline, there is no benchmark to follow, compare and regulate the CSR reporting. We 
should have a transparent system of procedures (SOP) for CSR starting from how to select or give money 
and what will be the impact and then how to report. Just giving money is not CSR. (FD1) 
 
Some interviewees expressed careful thought in favour of adopting a ‘carrot and stick’ approach 
– a combined approach arguing that if the market is not ready, then they will go for regulatory 
arbitrage that may cause further bad things (Gatti et al., 2019; Belal & Roberts, 2010). 
 
If I am not convinced that I should go for this kind of reporting, then I will look for regulatory arbitrage. So, 
we need both elements side by side – try to encourage people, start with voluntary, bring some elementary 
imposition because we need both. (CSR EXPERT3) 
 
Six interviewees said that there is a lack of an overseeing authority (such as an ombudsman) to 
oversee the need for new laws, flaws and effectiveness of existing laws and various institutions, 
and to coordinate among different public and private organisations. They recommended forming 
a national coordinating authority. For example, one interviewee said: “There is a need for a 
national organisation of the government that will be supervising for enacting right laws, 
implementing laws, whether there are any deficiencies and taking corrective measures” (ACA6). 
The government prefers offering surprising agenda and declarations to implementing them 
effectively. Referring to the lack of coordination, one interviewee said: “I think Bangladesh is the 
only country that has SDG office in the world. But the SDG office has no coordination with the 
CSR Centre, the local network of the UNGC. So, how can you expect a good outcome?” (CEO1) 
 
7.4  Firm-level governance 
7.4.1 Firm-level governance environment 
To understand how and why firm-level governance influences SER, it is necessary to understand this 
type of governance in Bangladesh. This section presents the status quo and the effectiveness of firm-
level governance in Bangladesh. 
 
Absence of corporate culture 
Interviewees opined that corporate governance in Bangladesh is mostly superficial, and companies 
maintain some structural arrangements for the sake of compliance because the effective separation 
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between owners and management is largely missing in the listed companies in Bangladesh. For 
example, interviewees said: “You cannot differentiate between management and ownership; they 
are the same. You will find that everything is directed and controlled by the owners (ACA6)”; 
“What is going on in the Bangladeshi corporates, you can say it’s the owners’ governance, it’s not 
corporate governance” (ID5); “Frankly speaking, in Bangladesh, this (CG) is very poor, and I am 
telling you because I know about the board of many banks and insurance companies” (CEO4). The 
sponsors unduly interrupt management decisions and day-to-day affairs of the company for 
personal benefits. The dominance is so severe that in some cases, top management has to either 
compromise with unlawful pressures or quit the company. Interviewees said that some CEOs had 
to resign even in the highly regulated banking sector for not agreeing with the unethical desire of 
the owners. However, there are no visible and effective attempts on the part of the regulators to 
safeguard the management in such circumstances. A CEO said: 
 
We saw suddenly the CEO switched a company or was forced to resign because he did not satisfy their 
unlawful desire in business or employing someone (recruitment). So, corporate governance is very weak in 
majority cases … I think in 70% of companies. (CEO4) 
 
Knowledge, expertise, experience and the attitude of sponsors are critical to effective governance 
because “unless the sponsors believe in corporate governance, it is very difficult to bring corporate 
governance in the firm-level” (ACCNT). To make the board effective, each board member should 
be prepared to contribute, which is, unfortunately, lacking in Bangladeshi companies. A Deputy 
CEO of a bank said: “They do not know how to operate the board of a bank and how to contribute 
to the policy-making of a bank. So, I think good governance part is lacking” (CORP2). Likewise, 
an interviewee who sits on many local and international boards said: “In Bangladesh, I don’t see 
that much readiness (of the directors) and most of the members don’t give any strategic guidance” 
(CSR Expert2). One of the key reasons for poor governance in Bangladeshi companies is family 
control and misgovernance. 
 
The family firm, family control and misgovernance 
Most of the companies in Bangladesh are family businesses (Humphrey, 1987). Starting as a sole 
proprietorship, they become bigger over time and are transformed to a private or limited company 
to manage the augmented operations and get access to certain facilities, such as formal credit, 
reduced tax rates, business contracts with government and others. As the Companies Act requires 
159 
 
limited companies to have a minimum number of directors, they bring their family members, 
including women, who do not actively participate in the business decision-making process. 
Interviewees opined that family control is more acute in financial companies. There are certain 
restrictions in the banking regulations regarding the maximum number of directors from the same 
family and their tenure. Therefore, in most of the cases, females are on the board to represent their 
male counterparts to comply with the regulatory requirements and, at the same time, retain the 
family control (rather than to actively participate in the decision-making process). A former 
regulator said: “Mostly two or three families really dominate the board and the quality as a board 
member is always questioned” (REG1). An interviewee who is a former Cabinet Member 
(Ministry of Finance) said: 
 
Family control in banking company is more rampant because, in other companies, you have to have profit, 
you cannot run by loss. In banks, you can survive for a long time by taking away depositors’ money, can 
remain afloat; a bank can remain liquid at the same time losing its capital base, it’s easier to rob a bank than 
other company. (CSR Expert1) 
 
Interviewees opined that most of the boards are family-based and many problems are created by 
these boards. Family control in Bangladeshi companies is too strong to influence the government 
to enact regulations of their choice. For instance, to ensure an absolute family control over the 
banks, the super-rich businessmen have recently successfully increased the number of board 
members from the same family to four (from the earlier two), and the maximum tenure of an 
individual director to nine years (from the earlier six years), by influencing the government to 
amend the Bank Companies Act 1991. A former governor of the central bank said: 
 
We used to allow two members from a family, but now people are so powerful; they have motivated the 
government to increase that number to four, and they can continue up to 9 years. So, these are not signs of 
good governance. (REG1) 
 
Family dominance is a common phenomenon, as a CEO said: “In most of the companies, the board 
of directors are all family members and too many problems are created by the board” (CEO4). The 
banking sector of the country is now crumbling because of the family dominance and unholy nexus 
between the boards, as a former governor of the central bank said: 
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The individual bank board, they work with the boards of other banks to have mutual collaboration in terms 
of loan sanctioning. So, that creates a lot of irregularities in sanctioning the loans. That’s why a lot of loans 
are now non-performing mainly because of this nexus … So, interlinked, managed governance has developed. 
(REG1) 
 
The lack of governance, transparency and accountability of family-owned private companies is 
also common, as the president of an international trade association said: 
 
Bangladeshi businesses are mainly family-owned business and the lack of corporate governance and 
transparency. … So, it’s very difficult to do due diligence and decide whether to invest in Bangladesh 
or not for foreign investors, especially for the Japanese. (TA3) 
 
From the real-life experience of the interviewees, it is evident that powerful family members also 
unduly interfere with the recruitment and promotion of the top management to keep their control. 
 
I have served in the insurance sector for 29 years, but she has held the post as her father was the Managing 
Director of DGX. This is the real scenario. She was just a VP (Vice-President) in a bank, but suddenly her 
father took her as an Additional Managing Director. At that time, I was the executive director. Then, before 
Fahima joined, my Managing Director, her father, told me that ‘Shahzadi I have a dream for BDT 200 crore 
business.’ … I went to the door to door, and I collected premium amounting to BDT 205 crore through my 
managers. I have filled up the target, and I asked for the DMD post. Then my immediate boss said ‘Shazadi, 
if you ask for money, whatever it is, the MD will give you, but he will not give you the post because Fahima 
came here for the post of MD in future.’ … So, it’s a total family dominance. (CEO4) 
 
Interviewees opined that to meet the regulatory requirements while keeping family control, 
sponsors appoint the non-shareholder ceremonial chairman who implements their agenda. The 
companies propagate that they have a chairman made from the independent directors, but in reality, 
he is just a figurative chairman. I know at least two non-owner chairpersons of listed companies 
in Bangladesh at the time of the fieldwork. While visiting the office of BSEC, I observed that a 
member of the commission was asking a corporate visitor to follow the model of a company that 
has a non-owner chairman to comply with the regulations. An interviewee said: “I have seen that 
instead of being a chairman, dominant shareholders nominated outsiders as a board chairman who 
acts just like a dummy for them” (CORP3). 
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Family control, regulatory restrictions and female directors  
Interviewees contended that family control over the financial companies, particularly banks, is 
very high as it is easier to control public money, and the business of banking can be continued for 
a long time without making a profit in the context of Bangladesh. In response to the question 
‘despite the existence of family businesses in various sectors in Bangladesh, why the concentration 
of women directors is in the banking and financial companies?’, interviewees said: “99% female 
directors are because of family control” (CORP3); “Truly speaking, you will find that most of 
them are their wives or daughters or sisters-in-law” (REG5); “In fact, the presence of women on 
the board is not because of their qualifications or shareholdings, rather we have seen that they join 
the board as an alternative director (in most of the cases) to meet the rules and regulations given 
by the central bank” (CORP2). 
 
In Bangladesh, in all the businesses, 99% promoters are male. … It's not that they are independently 
professionally reached there, in most of the cases, I think 99% plus cases. (CEO3) 
 
I know one who has become Member of Parliament and Minister and cannot be chairman of a bank. So, he 
has made his wife chairman. But she was a housewife and did not know anything about business. (TA2) 
 
Other reasons for the inclusion of a woman on the board 
Coercive pressure from regulators and buyers  
A recent publication of DSE62 shows that only 17.70% of the board of directors of the listed 
companies in Bangladesh in 2018 are women, of which a more than 54% of woman directors are 
in the financial sector, followed by textiles (24%) and pharmaceuticals and chemicals (13.9%). 
More than half of the female directors are in the financial sector because of regulatory bindings. 
Similarly, the second and third categories – textiles, pharmaceuticals and chemicals – which 
combinedly consist of 38% of the woman directors in Bangladesh, are highly dependent on the 
global market for their lion’s share of revenues. Thus, the presence of about 92% of women in the 
first three sectors (financial, textiles, and pharmaceuticals and chemicals) is in response to 
regulatory compliance and external coercive pressures from the foreign buyers. 
 
 
 
62 Women on Boards of Companies Listed on the Dhaka Stock Exchange, 2019 
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Tax management 
Two interviewees opined that women are made directors to manage tax and properties. One of 
them said, “Normally, the main [male] member of the family is subject to more scrutiny by the tax 
authority” (CSR Expert1), and another interviewee added that “to reduce the tax burden, they try 
to spread it among the family members” (NGO/CSO3). 
 
Encouragement from the government 
The government and regulators encourage women to come forward and get involved with the 
development process. In some governmental jobs, local government election and even in the 
National Parliament, a certain portion of the posts are reserved for women. Interviewees pointed 
out that now the prime minister, speaker, and the leader of the opposition are women. This might 
be seen as an example, thus promoting women at the board level is done to be aligned with the 
government. For example, an interviewee said: “Our PM encourages woman empowerment. So, 
the companies may want to show that they are empowering women to gain political legitimacy” 
(ACA3). 
 
Family control and board independence 
Board independence in a family business is poor, caused by the owners, who do not want to listen 
to others, as a regulator said: “As far as I understand, wealthier people are more arrogant, more 
powerful and are not even habituated to listen to something criticising them” (REG3). The 
dominant and intolerant attitude of most of the sponsors does not let the independent directors play 
an independent role. Being asked about the effectiveness of corporate governance in Bangladesh, 
the secretary-general of a chamber contended: “But I would also question how effective these 
independent directors are in Bangladeshi corporations. I don’t think that many companies give 
importance to the views of the independent directors” (TA4). 
 
Reasons and motivations for independent directors 
The Bangladesh Securities and Exchange Commission (BSEC) requires companies to have at least 
20% of independent directors. Interviewees opined that BSEC requires it in conformity with the 
global practice, with an expectation that independent directors may bring expertise that the owners 
may lack and make a balance between the interests of various stakeholders. Some of the responses 
were: “I think its global practice. … this will take a lot of time” (REG1); “Basically, it came from 
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the OECD guidelines and other regional markets” (CEO3); “they are kind of representative of the 
society, … But in our culture, it’s kind of compliance” (CSR Expert3). Most of the interviewees 
said that companies have independent directors out of compliance with the BSEC requirements 
because they think companies would not appoint independent directors in the absence of such 
conditions. 
 
The study tried to explore the motivations of independent directors to become a director of a 
company and has received mixed responses. The remarkable motivations include “This provides 
a learning opportunity to know how a multinational company is governed” (ACCNT); “Because I 
want to know what they do in the board, whether they do something different from us; the learning 
is mutual” (CEO4); “That is because the image of the company” (FD1); “These are very good 
companies and I feel that if I could help them to fulfil their statutory requirements and, also, benefit 
them with my expertise being a corporate lawyer and chamber committee member for many years” 
(TA1). However, independent directors who are passive in their role were found to be a bit hesitant, 
and their responses were, for example, “The company proposed me, and I accepted the offer” (ID3). 
 
7.4.2 Firm-level governance and SER 
Independent directors and SER 
The following analysis shows evidence of both ‘positive’ and ‘little or no’ role of the independent 
directors in promoting SER in Bangladesh. Moreover, a case study about the underlying dynamics 
and realities of the role of independent directors in Bangladesh has been developed based on the 
experience of a successful independent director (see Appendix Table 5) 
 
The positive role of independent directors in promoting SER  
Interviewees opined that despite a weak country and firm-level governance in Bangladesh, the 
presence of bona fide independent directors helps companies to be socially and environmentally 
responsible and report the same, although the number is small. A few members of the SER teams 
said that their independent directors are highly qualified and well-known for their professional 
excellence as environmentalists, development activists, businesspeople or chartered accountants, 
for example. However, only two of them said that their independent directors motivated them to 
do CSR and sustainability reporting. A Deputy CEO and head of SER team said: “One of our 
independent directors always motivated us to prepare a sustainability report according to GRI” 
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(CSR Team1). Another member of the SER team said: “Our independent directors oversee our 
CSR activities, address if there are any issues and give us suggestions on how to do better CSR. 
Those are reflected in our sustainability report” (CSR Team4). 
 
The study tried to capture the views of each independent director as to how do they see their role 
in terms of SER and if his/her role is different from other independent directors in promoting SER, 
and why. All the independent directors, except only four, said that their role is like others. All four 
independent directors who said their role is different are certified accountants (such as FCA, 
FCMA) and very much involved with the corporate affairs for a long time. They said that having 
their knowledge of accounting and finance, they help companies in financial and sustainability 
reporting. One of them (who is a female and coded as FD1) said: “Besides financial reporting, I 
meticulously scrutinise the CSR reporting part, the internal control and compliance and even the 
labour issues or compensation packages. I always try to be just and equitable. So, I take care of all 
these issues” (FD1). Another independent director said: “Sometimes, I advise them to make more 
contributions and report clearly” (ID4). These four also claimed that they are different from many 
other independent directors. For instance, 
 
Yes, I am different from many others because, on many occasions, they don’t talk. For example, I am the 
director of a British company. They have proposed to build schools with the CSR fund. I told them that it is 
more important to ensure quality education than building schools – “please spend the money on training the 
teachers”. They have appreciated me and are doing reasonably well. I know the needs here, and I have guided 
them in their CSR and CSR reporting. (ACCNT) 
 
Some corporate interviewees said that their independent directors help them in decision making, 
succession plan, employee welfare, safety and security, to name a few. For example, a CEO said: 
“One of our independent directors raised the importance of our management succession plan, 
which was then discussed and decided” (CEO3). Likewise, another CEO said: “Our independent 
directors discuss safety and security, training and development, employee welfare but in terms of 
CSR reporting, that has not particularly been discussed” (CEO4). An executive director of a 
Bangladeshi MNC said that they consider the independent directors as an asset who will guide 
them with their knowledge and expertise – “We have selected the most qualified people who are 
known for their contributions in their respective field so that they can contribute and guide the 
managing director. They are helping us in addressing the needs of society through our business” 
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(CORP1). Some interviewees argued that if a company does some CSR activities, these should be 
accounted for and reported in annual reports and websites. It is evident from the above that the 
influence of independent directors on SER is indirect. 
 
However, some interviewees opined that the independent directors are expected to ensure fair 
practice and control irregularities. However, there have been several catastrophic irregularities in 
the banking sector, but we have not seen any visible role on the part of independent directors to 
resist such scams. In the same vein, the following shows that there is little or no relationship 
between independent directors and SER in Bangladesh. 
 
Little or no influence of independent directors on SER 
Most of the interviewees opined that independent directors have hardly any role in promoting SER 
in Bangladesh, and they are like any other directors. For example, a female director said: “In our 
bank, independent directors are like other directors; I don’t think they make any differences in 
CSR reporting in our case” (FD2). A CSR expert who works for UNGC in Bangladesh said: 
“Independent director mandate is not promoting CSR. I don’t think that every independent director 
is quite aware of the importance of CSR reporting. I think the board terms of reference is missing.” 
CSR Expert2). A Deputy CEO said: “I haven’t seen any significant role of any independent 
directors for doing CSR or CSR disclosure. … (The) the board is informed but not involved with 
the process of CSR reporting” (CORP2). A good number of interviewees considered that 
independent directors do not improve the decision quality since they are not truly independent. For 
example, an interviewee said: “There are no instances where independent directors raise serious 
questions against irregularities or quit the board because other directors do not listen to him” 
(ACA3) Another interviewee said: 
 
There are several scams in loan sanction and subsequent fund diversion. So, you can question the role of the 
independent directors in both the bank and the borrowing company. The independent directors miserably 
failed to protect the interests of both companies. (TA5) 
 
Why some independent directors can promote SER in Bangladesh? 
Independent mindset, knowledge, experience and expertise of the independent directors 
Interviewees opined that the title of ‘independent director’ sounds good, but the inherent qualities 
and abilities of the person are more important than the title. A regulator said: “If independent 
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directors were independent, I think they could be a blessing for governance and CSR” (REG6). 
Underscoring the importance of an independent personality by both sides, the president of a 
multilateral trade association who belongs to two boards said: “If I am an independent-minded 
person, I will be independent irrespective of my designation. But if I am not independent-minded, 
I cannot play an independent role. Second, with whom I am working? – the chairman and other 
fellows” (TA1). Sharing her experience as both an independent and nominated director, an 
interviewee emphasised on the independent mindset. 
 
I am an independent director on the board of two companies, and I have been before also. But I always 
question how independent can an independent director be? I am telling you that I have been an independent 
director and a nominated director on the same board. My practice hasn’t changed with my designation. (TA1) 
 
There are some genuine independent directors, but the number is small. For example, a regulator 
said: “I know a few people working as independent directors in different listed companies. They 
are highly influential, and the companies are benefited from their suggestions and critical 
comments” (REG3). Expressing satisfaction over her role regarding governance and CSR, an 
independent director said: “There are people who are very passionate but sometimes they overlook 
the governance and CSR part. But I am very careful about my role in the board. That’s why I have 
always been approached by the boards where I am inducted” (FD1). One interviewee boldly 
claimed that he was independent and named some of the independent directors who are very honest, 
sincere and dedicated to their duties. 
 
I have always been independent. I know some very good companies that have some good independent 
directors. For example, Rokia Afzal Rahman in Grameen Phone, Zakir Ahmed Khan was in Lafarge 
Cement, then Sayedul Karim in Southeast Bank. They’re very good persons; they’re very independent 
and honest. (NGO/CSO1). 
 
Strong personality and commitment are critical to be an independent person. Sharing his way of 
doing and saying ‘no’ to anomalies, an independent director said: “I try to be unbiased of the 
system and motion of the board. For example, I scrutinise the audit report meticulously and then 
if there is any discrepancy, I object and say that I cannot sign it without knowing the detailed 
supporting documents” (ACCNT). Another interviewee said: “I’m the chairperson of the audit 
committee in a company. I speak out whenever something goes wrong because I have nothing to 
167 
 
gain or lose. So, I try to prove my professional expertise, experience, and intellectual capability. 
(ID1) 
 
The mindset of the owner directors and corporate culture 
Besides the independent attitude of independent directors, the commitment of the board is also 
important. A good company looks for respectable and knowledgeable people so that it can be 
benefitted from their knowledge, expertise and reputation. The quality of the people who own the 
company also determines the quality and role of independent directors. The latter can give their 
opinions, but if their opinions are accepted or not depends on most of the board of directors. 
Interviewees opined that ethical and benevolent companies consider an independent director as an 
asset. Unfortunately, such companies are very few. On the other hand, the ill-motivated companies 
look for independent directors who will go with them. The chairman of a CSR Award Committee 
said: 
 
A good company like Singer, which is a multinational company, for example, normally looks for good 
independent directors for their image and reputation. … for their own sake, they go for very respectable 
people and persuade them to be a director … The bad companies will look for collaborators just to 
comply with the BSEC regulation” (CSR Expert1). 
 
Why independent directors cannot promote SER in Bangladesh? 
Unfortunately, almost all the interviewees opined that in most of the cases, the independence of 
the independent director is superficial. The underlying reasons for their inability to promote SER 
in Bangladesh, as voiced by the interviewees, can be broadly categorised into three groups: (A) a 
lack of independence of the independent director; (B) an improper appointment process and 
dominance of owner directors; and (C) a lack of support from and independence of the regulators.  
 
(A) Lack of independence of an independent director 
Independent directors cannot play an independent role because of the cultural cognitive factors, a 
lack of independent mindset, their connections with the owners, benefit dependency, and lack of 
incentives. 
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(a) Cultural cognitive factors 
Independent directors are an integral part of the society in Bangladesh, which is characterised by 
power dominance (Hofstede, 1984). The exercise of undue power, authoritarian leadership style, 
corruption, and the overall sociocultural environment in Bangladesh is not conducive for the 
development of independent behaviour. A regulator said: “We are not mentally brought up the 
way we are expecting independent directors to behave – independently. As experience is 
concerned, if you are an independent director, you cannot even complete your tenure, it’s my 
observation” (REG5). The independent directors cannot promote SER much because of their 
connections, submissive attitude, and the lack of a democratic culture. An interviewee said: “Their 
power is limited, and they are mostly the people of the sponsors who are aligned with them. 
Moreover, everything is controlled by one or two persons. We believe in authoritarian style. We 
do not believe in participatory management or participatory decision making” (CORP3). 
 
(b) Independent directors lack an independent attitude, knowledge and expertise 
Interviewees opined that most of the independent directors in Bangladesh lack an independent 
attitude. Therefore, the objective of having independent directors is not fully achieved. They 
considered that it is difficult for a true independent director to survive. We observed that during 
the interview, an independent director, who was very outspoken about SER, was found a bit 
hesitant and requested to switch the recorder off when asked about his role in promoting SER. He 
said: “I am trying, but frankly speaking, actually, as an independent director, my role is as you 
know – independent directors have certain roles to play. The individual role is not that important” 
(ID3). Being asked if his role is different from other directors, off the record, he said that there 
were many controversies about the bank (of which he is an independent director) in the Western 
media those days. Thus, he didn’t feel comfortable talking about this. His company is one of the 
top banks in the country but is not a signatory of UNGC and does not report CSR following GRI. 
When asked if he was thinking of adopting GRI, he was found shaky and said: “This question I 
cannot answer because I am an independent director on the board. The management knows about 
it” (ID3). 
 
We have also observed that independent directors, including former bureaucrats, are unaware of 
their role in promoting SER. Being asked ‘what is your role and achievement in promoting SED 
in your company?’, a government-appointed independent director said: “As an independent 
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director, there are set rules. So, I have nothing to do new; I do not have any chance to change many 
things” (ID3). Another independent director who is a former bureaucrat said: “There is no scope 
for any creative ideas. It’s not my subject; I don’t deal with CSR. CSR issues hardly come to the 
board; it comes to the board only when board approval is needed” (ID2). Another former 
bureaucrat who is an independent director of an insurance company and a cement company. – the 
insurance company publishes a considerable volume of SED, but the cement company does not – 
when asked about the difference in SED between the two companies, he said: “We don’t need CSR 
reporting. We don’t like to prepare a bulk volume of CSR report like women do make-up. What 
do you mean by CSR? Do you know how much is the contribution of this (cement) company to 
GDP in contrast to that of the insurance company? Do you know how much tax we pay” (ID2)? 
 
Some interviewees opined that there are instances where unscrupulous people consider the 
directorship as an instrument to exercise power and get undue benefits. For example, a regulator 
said: “Irregularities in the recruitment process are (almost) everywhere, every sector in the country. 
Although not all, in most cases, independent directors do not play an independent role. In many 
cases, they are the witness of the irregularities, and sometimes they take part in the irregularities” 
(REG8). Independent directors may compromise and not raise their voice against wrongdoings 
because they do not want to lose the position. An independent director said: “If you get a significant 
benefit or remuneration, how independent are you going to be? Don’t you want to continue your 
position?” (TA1). Moreover, independent directors are not the victims of such situations, as an 
interviewee said: “In fact, they do have some moral responsibility, but they are not the victims of 
the events. So, they have failed to protect the interests of the stakeholders in our country” (ACA5). 
Therefore, they may not insist on against the desire of the owner directors to continue their position. 
 
(c) Personal connections with the owner directors 
Almost all the interviewees opined that personal relationships matter in Bangladesh, and in most 
of the cases, family connections, friendships, political connections get priority over expertise and 
experience in appointing independent directors. As such, in a country where corruption, nepotism, 
and impunity are very high, it is usual that the owners will try to bring their people, who will go 
along with whatever they like to do. Contending the scarcity of genuine independent directors in 
Bangladesh, a CEO said, “Maybe in 5–10% cases, it’s okay, but the majority is not. Although we 
are calling them independent directors, in many cases, they are their friends, friends’ friends, and 
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kind of their partners” (CEO3). A former secretary said: “It is independent in the paper, but it is 
more subservient in practice” (NGO/CSO3). Therefore, they remain silent, as a regulator said: “In 
most of the cases, they don’t talk; they remain inactive and ultimately the people of the company 
(owners) do everything” (REG8). In response to the question of why independent directors cannot 
perform their due role, the interviewees replied that independent directors contribute, but they 
remain silent where they should raise a strong voice. A CEO said: 
 
… but when there is an issue, they have to say no; they cannot say no. … when you find the promoter is 
doing something wrong, then you put down your position [saying] that “I don’t agree. That is not happening.” 
(CEO3) 
 
Thus, having such independent directors does not make any visible difference in terms of corporate 
responsibility and accountability. Some interviewees considered that there are some private criteria 
for appointing ex-bureaucrats – as a return of the favours they did to the company while they were 
in the government organisation, and also, they lobby with government agencies, since doing 
business is difficult in Bangladesh. For example, 
 
If you look into the list of independent directors, you will find some interesting information. There are some 
private criteria. They try to appoint some ex-bureaucrats who can get their jobs done from the government 
office. You know the obstacles of doing business in Bangladesh is very high. So, a retired bureaucrat is very 
important to the company so that he can negotiate those issues. (TA5) 
An ex-bureaucrat shared his experience of being invited to lobby for a big company. 
 
In almost all big companies, you will find some retired government officers who are appointed just to lobby 
with the government. You can call it brokering. They will go to the Secretariat; they will talk to the 
government people, and one owner of a very big company came to my house twice to request me to be their 
advisor – just a broker. I told very politely that I am not accustomed to this practice. (NGO/CSO3) 
 
A CSO interviewee who is well-known at home and abroad for his contribution as a development 
activist, working for eradicating poverty, hunger, and promoting governance in Bangladesh, has 
said that he had never been asked to be an independent director of any company, despite having a 
very good background. 
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I am an independent-minded person, and I have some background too. I have never been approached to be 
an independent director by any organisation, and I am sure many other people could become independent 
directors and make contributions; I am not sure whether they are approached. (NGO/CSO2) 
 
My observation while visiting the offices of two bureaucrats63 and talking to them supports the 
notion that bureaucrats are appointed as a reward in return of a favour they did for the companies 
when they were in government service. Being asked what motivate them to be independent 
directors of these companies, one of them said that nothing motivates him – the company was 
under him when he was in the Ministry of Commerce. So, when they offered him the position, he 
accepted it. I have visited the office of an independent director for three days. While visiting the 
corporate office of the cement manufacturing company, I have observed that the independent 
director, who is a former bureaucrat, has a separate office room, similar to the ones for the regular 
executives, and had meetings and negotiations with different government agencies, including the 
Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources, and Home Ministry. It seemed that this independent 
director was working for the company just as a dedicated executive, rather than as an independent 
director. This is contrary to the notion that an independent director is independent of the day to 
day operations, the management, the owners, and also contrary to the purpose of having a non-
executive independent director (Chowdhury, 2015). 
 
(d) Lack of incentives for independent directors 
The interviewees believed that there is a lack of incentives for qualified people to be independent 
directors since it is not easy to work independently in many cases. The financial incentives are also 
not sufficient to attract qualified persons to devote a lot of their time and effort, beyond the 
mainstream activities in their parental organisations. They said that although the remuneration is 
based on the number of meetings, the chairman of the audit committee, who is an independent 
director, has to spend too much time to ensure regulatory compliance. In the case of non-financial 
companies, the remuneration amount is decided by the company, but in the case of financial 
companies, the maximum fee per meeting is fixed by the central bank. Interviewees opined that 
considering the work to be done by an independent director of a bank and a financial institution, 
such amount is not enough to be an incentive for many of the deserving independent directors. An 
interviewee said, “This is mostly a kind of unpaid work. So, why will someone allocate time and 
 
63 They were also independent directors and interviewees. 
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resources for this unpaid job?” (CSR Expert3) At least ten interviewees, including independent 
directors, regulators, and CSOs, expressed similar views. 
 
Except a few, to my understanding, independent directors are not contributing. … even the qualified 
independent director may not be committed to contributing due to poor incentive. (REG3) 
 
(B) Improper appointment process, family control and dominance of owner directors 
(a) Improper appointment process 
The effectiveness of having independent directors largely depends on the selection process, which 
is not proper and transparent. Interviewees opined that the qualifications set by the BSEC make it 
very easy to hire someone ordinary and simply comply with the requirement, as a regulator said: 
“The criteria are good but based on the criteria in this poor country, you will find a million people” 
(REG5). Moreover, the criteria for independent directors are not followed properly. Essentially, 
companies do not want to have independent directors. “Had there been no regulatory requirements, 
I think no company would have any independent directors” (CORP3). The owners may think of 
the independent director as a nuisance (disturbance) and hence, look for someone submissive. That 
is why the role of independent directors is grossly ornamental. 
 
Sometimes, the sponsor directors think that independent directors could be a nuisance. So, better we keep 
someone who aligns with our lines. So, in Bangladesh, in most cases, independent directors fail to perform 
their duties. (NGO/CSO4) 
 
Questioning the appointment process, a corporate interviewee said: “Some of the employees of 
one company of a group are also made independent directors of another company. I would not 
name the companies, but there are” (CORP1). Others also question the appointment process. 
 
These independent members are not chosen by the BSEC or the central bank64, they are chosen by their 
boards, and mostly they take reliable people, their friends who don't ask nasty questions. … So those kinds 
of accountabilities are not ensured. (REG1) 
 
(b) Family control and dominance of owner directors 
An independent director is supposed to bring in an independent perspective. Regrettably, 
sometimes independent directors are chosen by the family owners. Some interviewees opined that 
 
64 However, in the case of banks, the appointment of independent directors must be approved by the central bank. 
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the listed companies in Bangladesh are still family businesses and the super-rich owners are so 
powerful that they can do as they wish. An interviewee said: “In the family businesses, they exert 
a lot of power. … So, they would take the independent directors in that way, so that they would 
listen to them” (TA4) 
 
The diversity of the board is expected to improve decision quality and SER. However, in the 
context of Bangladesh, the inclusion of independent directors doesn’t necessarily increase CSR 
disclosures. The independent directors have less power and less interest in the business. They may 
suggest something, but whether their views are considered or not depends on the attitude of the 
board. Only 20% of the directors are independent in Bangladesh. Therefore, the decisions 
(including SER) are ultimately dominated and made by the 80% owner directors. An interviewee 
said: “Independent directors can at best raise their voice, but they do not have that power to prevent 
that from occurring” (ACA5). 
 
There are many irregularities and irresponsible practices in the Bangladeshi corporates. We asked 
the interviewees why the independent directors do not report those issues to the regulators. They 
answered that independent directors are in the minority and reporting to the regulators requires too 
much documentation and effort, and, at the same time, inviting troubles and making them enemies 
of the influential people. They do not have too much incentive to do that. 
 
There are good independent directors and corrupt independent directors. Now, if anything is going bad, they 
are just one or two, they are the minority. To take the trouble of documenting those things and then reporting 
it to authorities, like Bangladesh Bank or BSEC, requires quite a lot of effort. So why should I, if I am 
appointed as an independent director, take that trouble without any remuneration, to make all those reports 
and many people my enemies? There is no incentive. (CSR Expert1) 
 
Being asked about the role of small shareholders in selecting independent directors, interviewees 
said that sponsor owners not only control the board but also the annual general meetings (AGM) 
with their hired people, suppressing the talk of the small shareholders. For example, one 
interviewee said: 
 
In fact, in our country, the way these AGMs are being held, these are also not proper. Sometimes, the sponsor 
directors hire some external people who don’t allow other shareholders to raise any questions. So, this way, 
they manage the whole game. (ID5) 
174 
 
(C) Lack of support from, and independence of the regulators. 
(a) Lack of support from the regulators 
The lack of adequate support and incentives from the regulators is also responsible for the poor 
performance of independent directors regarding SED. Interviewees criticised BSEC for their 
passive role and failure in overseeing if independent directors are being appointed properly and if 
they are performing their role duly. An interviewee said: “There are problems with supervision. 
Our regulators are not probably putting enough energy into it; this is also another regulatory failure” 
(ID5). The regulators are risk-averse and ignore non-compliance, as a CEO said: “If you ask me, 
BSEC writes letters only to those who are already compliant. I doubt whether they have the right 
kind of workforce or intellect to go through and understand the authenticity of various corporate 
reports” (CEO4). Interviewees also opined that BSEC should offer incentives for firms that do 
CSR and SED. 
 
The BSEC should provide some incentives for CSR and reporting. We in the Bangladesh Bank have done it 
but not in BSEC. (REG1) 
 
(b) Lack of independence and effectiveness of the regulators 
BSEC requires listed companies to have independent directors, but they do not have any 
independent non-executive directors, although the Constitution of the country has a provision in 
this regard (Chowdhury, 2015). Interviewees opined that BSEC cannot work independently 
because its top executives are appointed based on political considerations and absolute loyalty, 
and they serve the interest of the appointing authority. “Because they are all partisans; you see, 
these people are appointed not because they will run these institutions efficiently in the public 
interest; rather almost all of them are appointed to reward and patronise them” (NGO/CSO2.) 
Interviewees questioned the capacity and independence of BSEC, pointing to their experience, 
expertise, composition and actions. The president of a professional accountants’ body contended: 
“Most of them are academicians. The chairman and most of the members have very little or no 
experience of practical business” (ACCNT). Questioning the independence and autonomy of 
BSEC, a former governor of the central bank said: “Yes, it’s only in papers, but in practice, our 
regulators are pretty weak. We don’t have a strong regulator” (REG1) Another interviewee said: 
“There are flaws at the core of the system” (REG8). 
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Unfortunately, regulators are regulated by those who are to be regulated. Questioning the 
unwillingness of the government in enabling the regulators, a female CEO of an MNC contended: 
“Who is at the top of the Securities and Exchange Commission? … Nobody is working 
independently” (CEO4). Similarly, an independent director said: “The super-rich dominate the 
regulators. … So, the regulators do not like to disturb them” (ID1). Emphasising the essence of 
the political will of the government incapacitating the regulators, an interviewee added: 
“Everything depends on the willingness of the government. Had the Prime Minister wanted to see 
an effective BSEC, then she would put right people in the right place” (ACCNT). 
 
An independent director shared his experience, highlighting the incapacity and unwillingness of 
regulators to exercise their power. According to BB requirements, one cannot be on the board of 
more than one financial company (banks, NBFI, insurance) at a time. He said that he resigned from 
a financial company (non-bank) to join a bank, but several people were the sponsor directors and 
chairmen of more than one financial company, and the regulator did not enforce their power. As 
he said: “So, the environment is such that even if the regulator tried to do something; they were 
under pressure by the regime” (ID1). 
 
Female directors and SER 
The positive role of female directors 
About half of the interviewees opined that female directors exert strong commitment to 
humanitarian causes. For example, one interviewee said: “Female directors in our company 
propose to support the victims of natural calamities” (CSR Team4). Another interviewee said: 
 
For CSR and CSR reporting, their role is very strong compared to men. What I have observed in the board, 
say a cancer patient applied for the help of BDT 20 lakh for medical expense. We agreed that we have some 
other obligations and we will give BDT 5 lakh. Then suddenly a woman director interfered – no, you have 
to give sufficient money for his treatment to cure the disease, otherwise don’t give. (BC) 
 
Women possess certain distinct attributes and values, as an interviewee said: “Women are by 
nature more focused on corporate social responsibility. It’s the human instinct” (REG4). They have 
the experience of managing diversified responsibilities, namely running the family, looking after 
children and aged people. With such experience, they can help business and society. “Corporates 
are as good as families. So, if they can bring those values into the board, it can be socially 
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responsible” (REG1). Multitasking skills (Evans, 2010) and the abilities of women to manage 
things with scarce resources can enhance board efficiency, decision, and monitoring quality 
(Adams & Ferreira, 2009). Women are conscious and bring diversified perspectives. A female 
CEO said: “I think women are more conscious about all these issues (CSR). From our ICAB 
Women’s Forum, I will try to persuade BSEC to put at least one female in board leadership” (FD1). 
 
Underscoring the contribution of women towards the betterment of women employees, a regulator 
said: “If you think broader CSR issues, I have seen that woman directors are more caring of 
employee-related issues, particularly women employee-related issues, such as maternity leave, 
work environment, etc.” (REG3). In some cases, we have found that organisations owned by 
women employ more female employees. Female directors also try to persuade the board to do 
woman-friendly financing policies. A deputy CEO of a bank said: “Female directors always 
emphasise on investment in female entrepreneurs. They suggest us to follow the directions of 
Bangladesh Bank for financing women entrepreneurship” (CSR Team1). 
 
I believe that the situation would be different if strong women could come to the board with their capabilities. 
There are some women such as Rokia Afzal Rahman, Farzana Choudhury, who are promoting the real cause 
of the common people, women and children. (TA5) 
 
Almost all the interviewees agreed that women are more collaborative, compliant, committed, 
hardworking, focused on social and environmental benefits, less corrupt and risk-averse (Byrnes, 
Miller, & Schafer, 1999), compared to men. All these qualities naturally help women to contribute 
to both business and justice cases (Seierstad, 2016). Interviewees said: “Women don’t dare to do 
corruption” (TA2); “Women cannot be that much shameless or corrupt like the man” (ID5). 
Regarding the environment, “whereas men are more focused on profit, women are more tuned to 
environmental concerns” (ID1). A female CEO said: 
 
We, the women leaders, are more collaborative; we would like to discuss with others before concluding. … 
Women are very committed to their work, and they tend to be compliant and risk-averse. (CEO4) 
 
By contrast, a few interviewees contended that they could not undoubtedly say that women are 
less corrupt than men because “their participation is low, and women may not have the chance to 
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do corruption” (CSR Expert1). “We can say whether they are less corrupt or not only when there 
will be considerable participation of women” (REG8). 
 
The presence of female directors on the board can make a difference and “control the directors’ 
behaviour” (Pucheta-Martínez, Bel-Oms and Olcina-Sempere, 2018, p.181), by creating an open 
and relaxed atmosphere and influencing the perception of the male directors. The interviewees 
opined that the board would be more sensitive in making any decisions on woman issues in the 
presence of woman directors. “For the presence of women, I think the entire environment of the 
board will change, and the outcome will be different irrespective of the level of competence, 
because they may think of possible reactions of the woman (ACA5)”. 
 
Based on the aforesaid normative and cultural cognitive qualities, it is expected that the inclusion 
of women on the board should positively influence governance, decision quality, and SER. 
 
Some facts about the role of female directors for SER in Bangladesh 
We observed that women executives having knowledge and expertise in the area of accounting 
and sustainability contribute more towards SER than others. For example, one female independent 
director of an MNC, who is also a corporate CEO and FCA, plays an important role in promoting 
SER. She introduced sustainability reporting in one company and proposed it in another 
organisation: “I always look into the CSR issues, if it’s reported or not, maybe because of my 
background. … In Shashi Denims, I have introduced CSR reporting” (FD1). We have observed 
that women working with the development sector and having interactions with people from diverse 
backgrounds contribute more to CSR and SER. Sharing her experience of promoting SER, a 
female corporate CEO, who is also the president of a non-profit entity, said: 
 
Like yesterday, we had a meeting at XYZ Bangladesh. I proposed introducing sustainability reporting 
because we are a social development organisation. Of course, it will be a little expensive for us, but still, it 
will give more information to our community, donors and development partners about the way we work and 
our impact on the society. (FD1) 
 
We find that women having financial literacy, knowledge of business, work experience in a formal 
sector, contribute to SER more. These normative attributes are conducive for employee welfare, 
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safety and security, sustainability, together with economic performance. A female CEO of an 
MNC said: 
 
Since I run a business, my approach is to ask more of the business and the risk part of it. It’s not only CSR 
disclosure, but I also look at the sustainability, market share, safety and security, employee motivation, 
employee retention, things like that. When I am on the board, I always try to contribute; I want to emphasise 
on both the present and the future. (CEO4) 
 
Case study: Mixed boardroom experience of a female director 
We have tried to understand the boardroom experience of female directors regarding several 
factors, such as CSR, SER, motivations to be a director, participation in the decision-making 
process, difficulties faced. Some of the key responses of a female director of a state-owned 
commercial bank in Bangladesh have been presented in Appendix Table 6: “Conversations about 
SER and boardroom experience of a female director which depict the experience of a typical 
female director in Bangladesh”. 
 
Little or no role of female directors in SER  
In contrast to the aforesaid positive relationship, we have found that more than half of the 
interviewees said that SER does not differ for men or women, and the inclusion of women in the 
board does not necessarily mean an increased SED. The qualifications and willingness of a director 
are more important than gender. In response to the question “do you think women do better in 
terms of CSR and SER?”, a female head of CSR said: “Not exactly, it’s not male or female, it’s 
the mentality, because, as I see it, my male counterparts have a lot of female species (mentality) 
in their head; because if they didn’t, my SME portfolio would not be as big as it is now. Because 
they are doing excellent in ‘Pratyasha’ a product designed for women SMEs” (CSR Team2). A 
female CSR expert said, “I don’t see CSR as a man or woman’s job. If you are learned, a 
knowledgeable person, whether you are male or female, you will understand the philosophy of 
CSR” (CSR Expert2). Interviewees also said: 
 
The attitude of the board is more important than that of male and female. (ACA2) 
 
But in the end, I will not consider gender as an issue, especially in furnishing CSR reporting. (ID1) 
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About one-fourth of the interviewees said that there is no such relationship between women and 
SER, while another one-fourth is unsure of such a relationship. For example, a regulator said: “I 
am very much sceptical about the role of female directors in promoting CSR reporting; the majority 
of them are not” (REG7). Till now, the role of female directors has not been very visible, as an 
academic said: “If I am not wrong, you will not find a single female chairman in the country” 
(ACA6). The role of the female director is constrained and limited, as a deputy CEO said: “I 
haven’t seen any significant contribution of the female directors, not only in promoting CSR 
reporting but also in the core operations of the business” (CORP2). Sharing his experience, an 
interviewee said: “I don’t think there is any involvement of female directors or independent 
directors in promoting CSR reporting as I have seen” (CORP2). Underscoring the role of women 
in promoting social well-being, but not the reporting, a regulator said: “This (SER) is not related 
to women directors, I think, but gender-related social responsibility might be improved” (REG3). 
Similarly, a member of a CSR reporting team said: “Female directors have a ‘say’ (role) about 
where to spend the CSR fund, but about reporting I don’t think they have any say” (CSR Team4). 
 
However, a handful of interviewees were found to be cautious in generalising the relationship. For 
example, one of them said: “But general comments I must not make. In some cases, you will find 
some women who have established them as legendary for their business and social role, though 
the number is not big. Say, for example, Rokia Afzal, who is at a time a businessperson, a social 
worker and a former Cabinet member” (ACA6). Similarly, a female director contended against the 
generalisation, saying that “When you say housewife, it’s like they don’t do anything. I find it very 
objectionable” (TA1). 
 
Enabling factors – why some female directors can promote SER in Bangladesh? 
The interviewees strongly emphasised on certain qualities of women, such as independence, 
expertise, abilities, and willingness to understand corporate strategies (Huse and Solberg, 2006, 
p.113) and promote SER (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003) in Bangladesh. Most of the interviewees, 
including the females, opined that women directors having a formal education, vis-à-vis 
professional expertise and experience, are promoting CSR. Sharing his boardroom experience with 
female directors, a CEO of a financial company said: “I observed that the woman directors who 
have got professional expertise, leadership, corporate management knowledge and experience are 
contributing. But most of them are housewives who never manage more than two people. So, their 
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exposure is very limited. I am not saying they are good or bad; they simply lack the basic capability 
to contribute” (CEO3). Similarly, another female CEO said: “A professional lady and an educated 
lady are not the same. Maybe she is educated, but she does not know how to run a business. If they 
are professional, their contribution compared to men will be much better. But most often they just 
come, take fees and go; they don’t talk” (CEO4). A female director, who is also a lawyer, shared 
her boardroom experience, how she contributes to decision-making with her professional expertise 
in commercial law and business. She strongly claims that she is on the board because of her 
qualifications, not because she is a woman. 
 
My role is like any other directors, but if there are any legally specific matters, then they look for my views 
a bit more. Also, if there are commercially specific matters, they look to me because I have 35-year 
experience as a commercial lawyer. So, I understand quite a lot of commercial aspects as well. So, I contribute 
and intervene in all those issues. I don’t think I am on any board because I am a woman. (TA1 FD) 
 
More about the experience and expertise of a female director from her colleague is as follows: 
 
For example, our chairperson65, she is a very capable person, she is a very honest, straightforward and a very 
good administrator. We have been working with her for a long time. We were also in the Cabinet of the then 
interim caretaker government. She is very committed towards social and environmental issues (NGO/CSO1) 
 
Underscoring the importance of own qualifications, a member of the CSR team said: “It depends 
on the person. If she is a director because of her quality, she can contribute to quality decision 
making and affect CSR reporting as well” (REG9). Emphasising the personality of the female 
directors, a female CEO said: “I did not face any difficulty during my career; it depends on yourself” 
(FD2). Willingness to act is also very important as the president of a woman chamber said: “Their 
husbands have given them freedom, opportunity, cars and others, but many of them are not 
motivated. They are busy with fashion and lifestyle” (TA2). 
 
My observation also supports the above responses. I have found that women who are homemakers 
and become directors because of their family connections try to avoid being interviewed. Now, 
17% of the directors of DSE listed companies are women, but I have faced difficulties in getting 
access to them to be interviewed. I called a female director six times over the phone but, every 
 
65 Chairman of an NGO that works for transparency, accountability and anticorruption. 
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time, I found her son accepting the call saying that he would talk to her and let me know, but I 
could not reach her at all. I interviewed another woman director after 15 attempts. 
 
Hindering factors – why the majority-female directors can promote SER in Bangladesh 
Sociocultural context 
The interviewees opined that the relationship between female directors and SER is mediated by 
the sociocultural context in Bangladesh, such as the lack of awareness and understanding of CSR 
and SER, as an interviewee said: “Despite the positive link in literature, it is very difficult to 
generalise because women in western countries and women in Bangladesh are not the same” 
(ACA3). They said that Bangladesh is a male-dominated society where women are subservient, 
and men do not support women in their household work so that they can get involved with the 
business. The societal outlook does not permit women doing business. The culture is that business 
is for men, not for women. From the sociocultural perspective, women are treated as ‘baby 
producing machines’ as a female CEO said: “It’s a male-dominated society. People think that 
women are baby-producing machines, husbands think that ‘okay, this is my share; I allowed her 
to go and sit on the board’” (CEO1). Another interviewee said: “Truly our society is not that 
advanced that women are doing business independently or running the corporation, except a few. 
So, it is not the reflection of gender equity” (TA5). Moreover, there are various structural barriers. 
For example, banks require collateral and guarantee from a man when a woman wants to get a 
bank loan. The following responses offer a broader view of the sociocultural context that 
incapacitates female directors to play an independent role in business and in promoting SER in 
Bangladesh: “From their childhood, they got different education. They always think that what is 
said by the men is their responsibility to follow” (ACA6); “She says what he says” (CEO1); 
“Gender inequality is everywhere … definitely because of my physiological difference I 
understand I will face some kind of bias” (CSR Team2); “They are just filling up wishes of their 
male counterparts, not driven by their standings” (REG7); “How many men participate in the 
household work to allow women to work outside?” (TA1); “Our societal outlook, our society does 
not believe that women should come to the business” (ID5); “Of course, the culture and tradition 
is that business is for men, not for women” (CSR Expert2); “Also, less importance is given on 
women, and the capacity and contributions of women are undermined till today … Equal rights 
are in the paper, not in action” (REG8); “We have seen that our mother was taking care of the 
housework and our father is going out … being a female, I had to take the back seat and 
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compromise. … if my family wanted to rebuild, they could have, but then the system would not 
have let me do” (CSR Team2). There is limited opportunity for the woman to contribute, as an 
interviewee said: “Definitely women can also contribute if they are given the opportunity” 
(CORP1) 
 
Historically, women were mainly for housekeeping, and their rate of literacy was very low. Still, 
there are many barriers for women to work outside and do business. The government is trying to 
promote women emancipation and entrepreneurship, but the outcome is not up to the mark. People 
still feel insecure and, in most of the cases, parents do not want their daughters doing business 
because of the social structure, social outlook (honour society), insecurity, difficulties in mobility 
(transport system). Women prefer doing the job to doing business, as they have to take care of 
their family members and are relatively more risk-averse, whereas business requires taking risks, 
giving too much time and effort, being ubiquitous. However, it is also good to see that things are 
now gradually improving with access to education and information. The government policies are 
conducive for female education. Now almost 100% of the girls are going to schools, and they are 
doing better in education than boys. One female interviewee said that her husband does the 
household chores and takes care of their kids when she is at work. Now women are entering the 
police, military, government jobs – everywhere, which was unimaginable before. Similarly, the 
central bank has asked the banks to disburse a certain portion of their total financing to the woman 
entrepreneurs. Also, most interviewees think that religion is not a barrier for women to come to 
business anymore, but the culture is still. “Islam is a fantastic religion; Allah has given us freedom. 
I don’t see any restrictions from the religion” (CSR Team2). Likewise, another female said: “There 
are socio-cultural reasons. … But the level that you are talking about, listed company level or large 
corporate-level, I don’t think that’s (religion) very much of an issue anymore. It may have a few 
years ago” (TA1). 
 
Family control, male dominance and lack of corporate culture 
Some interviewees considered that to keep control and to comply with regulations, most of the 
sponsors bring their female family members into the board. A former governor of the central bank 
said: “Hardly any independent women directors you can see. If four members come from one 
family, two families can run the whole show, that’s not good” (REG1). Despite being listed with 
the stock exchange, companies lack corporate culture in Bangladesh – “… culture of corporate is 
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a question of the mindset that culture has not developed” (CSR Expert1). Excessive family control 
and absence of true corporate culture are not conducive for SER. Interviewees opined that female 
directors cannot play an independent role as they are not given the authority to speak. The husband 
uses his wife to act on his behalf, as a former deputy governor of the central bank said: “They are 
not so much independent excepting very few” (REG2). Likewise, a female CEO said: 
 
Frankly speaking, I hardly see any woman directors who are contributing that much. I can boldly say that in 
Bangladesh, the quality of the board women directors is not good because most of them are just like 
(showpiece) maybe they are not given the authority to speak, and she says whatever he says. So, they have 
to come out of the box and speak. (CEO1) 
 
The dominance of males is so acute that there are instances where the husband unofficially attends 
the board meeting, although, in official papers, the women are the directors on the board and sign 
documents. Also, decisions are made and controlled by the men in some cases, including CSR and 
SER. If the purpose of the inclusion of the female is only compliance, then they have no 
independent role as a woman. For example, a CEO said: “Although the women are on the board, 
sometimes the decisions are taken by the spouse outside the board” (CEO3). Another interviewee 
said: 
 
In some cases, the lady doesn’t appear in the board meeting, the husband used to come here unofficially, sit 
in the board, but the documents are signed by the wife. So, CSR activities are the same, no difference for the 
women on the board. (TA5) 
 
A former bureaucrat is an independent director of two companies. In one company (insurance), 
there are ten female directors out of 16 directors (62.5%), whereas in another company (cement 
manufacturing), there is only one female director out of nine directors (11.11%). In response to 
the question of how do you see the significant presence of women on the board of the insurance 
company, he replied: “They are all spouses of the sponsors who are also directors in other 
companies.” In response to the question about the role of female director in promoting SER, he 
said that “They just come and go, take fees and have some time. They cannot take a hard decision. 
Many of them don’t talk. Even sometimes their husbands physically attend the (board) meeting”. 
(ID2). In the same manner, the chairman of a CSR Award Committee said: “Not in our context, 
because normally female directors are there to retain family control. So, they don’t talk; they’re 
are just stooges and symbolic” (CSR Expert1). 
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Two interviewees said only about 10% of the female directors are active and contribute while 
others are not. A female CEO said: “Maybe, say, 10% of the female directors are active because 
most of the female directors are from the housewives. So, they don’t know how to contribute to 
the board” (CEO4). The President of a professional accountants’ body who is also an independent 
director of a listed company said: “I have hardly seen any female directors who have come to that 
level. I would say that I have seen about 10% of female directors who have exerted their role with 
their knowledge and experience like the male. … Not necessarily (to be CSR friendly)” (ACCNT). 
 
Many interviewees opined that with the increased literacy of girls, women participation has 
increased in different sectors, including corporate boards. It is expected that having a formal 
education, women would take the opportunity in positioning themselves in business (Pucheta-
Martínez, Bel-Oms, & Olcina-Sempere, 2018). A recent publication of DSE, ‘Women on Boards 
of Companies Listed on the Dhaka Stock Exchange’, shows that about 79% of the woman directors 
have at least a bachelor’s degree (41.4% bachelor’s and 37.5% are master’s degree holders). 
However, the corporate sectors in Bangladesh are yet to reap the benefits of the presence of women 
because most of the woman directors are directors not by their own choice, rather by choice of 
their male counterparts. Some interviewees opined that despite having formal education, expertise, 
experience and opportunity, women directors in most of the cases are not contributing towards 
CSR because of corrupt family control. The chairman of a CSR Award Committee said: “They are 
family members. They’re sitting with their parents; they are just there to retain control, corrupt 
control of their company, … If the motivation is such, it doesn’t matter whether they are educated 
or not” (CSR Expert1). However, a female CEO said that people should be cautious in generalising 
the role of female directors because “Sometimes, we tend to undermine just because they are 
family members. The second generation is smarter. … Someone should be aware of the business 
processes before she is inducted to the board” (CEO4). 
 
We need to work together 
A business is like a family. Therefore, people need to work together to achieve their goals. Four 
female interviewees emphasised on teamwork and working together. Referring to the Bangladeshi 
garments industry as a success story of both men and women, a CSR expert said: “If you look at 
the changes that happened in garments sector in Bangladesh, women made it happen, but the men 
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mobilised it. So, you have to work together; you cannot divide CSR by gender” (CSR Expert2). 
The president of a woman chamber said: “It is very important to have men and women together. 
Only women cannot do everything; we need men with us” (TA2). 
 
Other corporate factors and SER 
Quantitative studies show that the relationship of SER with a female director in Bangladeshi 
insurance companies is significantly positive and insignificantly positive in case of family firms 
(Ullah, Muttakin, & Khan, 2019); whereas such relationship is negative in the non-financial 
companies (Muttakin, Khan, & Subramaniam, 2015). We tried to explore why these variations 
exist through fieldwork. An insurance company which has 10 female directors out of 16 directors 
(62.5%), publishes a considerable amount of CSR disclosures and receives various awards (e.g. 
SAFA Award, ICAB Award) has also been studied. The CEO and head of an audit committee of 
that company said that contrary to the female directors being the majority, they do not have any 
visible role (see female director section). The underlying reasons for the SER of the company are, 
as the CEO said: “CSR is an ethical practice that comes from within, but CSR reporting requires 
certain skills and HR who are familiar with the reporting tools and techniques, such as GRI. A 
very good and responsible company may not have good reporting because of the lack of such 
skilled personnel. On the other hand, a company which has one or two reporting experts can have 
better reporting even if the company is not very responsible” (CEO4). The interviewees also 
opined that companies that belong to a group having people with sustainability reporting expertise 
have more SED than others. A Deputy CEO of a bank said: “I do not find any remarkable changes 
in their practice beyond reporting. We, the other commercial banks like EBL, the City Bank, we 
are also doing the same type of CSR activities, but they are reporting according to GRI, we are not. 
They want to show up, and as I know, one of them has a professional accountant who has expertise 
in this area” (CORP2). We have also observed that the corporate offices of the listed companies 
that belong to the same corporate group are located in the same buildings, their annual general 
meetings are held on the same day and in the same venue66, and the key accounting and reporting 
 
66 For example, (a) BEXIMCO Ltd., BEXIMCO Pharmaceuticals Ltd. and BEXIMCO Synthetic Ltd. Corporate Head 
Offices: 17 Dhanmondi R/A, Road No. 2, Dhaka 1205, Bangladesh; Date and Venue of AGMs: December 22, 2018 
in BEXMICO Industrial Park; (b) Square Pharmaceuticals Ltd. and Square Textiles Ltd. Corporate Head Offices: 
SQUARE Centre 48, Mohakhali C/A Dhaka 1212, Bangladesh; Date and Venue of AGMs: June 30, 2018 in Samson 
H Chowdhury Centre Dhaka Club Ltd. (c) Apex Foods Limited and Apex Spinning & Knitting Mills Limited 
Corporate Head Offices: Rupayan Golden Age (5th & 6th Floor), 99, Gulshan Ave, Dhaka 1212, Bangladesh; Date 
and venue of AGMs: December 12, 2019 in Spectra Convention Center Limited. 
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people of the companies are the same. Therefore, our fieldwork shows that the SER of listed 
companies in Bangladesh is mainly related to the key reporting personnel and the corporate group 
to which a company belongs to. 
 
Given the fragile national governance environment and passive cultural cognitive pressure from 
the society, corporate leadership and the mindset of top management play a key role in reporting 
CSR. Interviewees also opined that CSR and SER are not institutionalised in Bangladesh. CSR 
decisions depend on the person in charge, not on the systems. Therefore, “if the key person has the 
right motivation, you will find a very good structure of CSR and vice-versa” (ACA5). 
Underscoring the pivotal role of leadership and appropriate mindset, an interviewee who belongs 
to two boards and a chamber said: “Being socially responsible is not a question of corporate 
governance. In Bangladesh, it’s the question of the mindset of the people who own the company 
and to some extent, the mindset of the top management” (TA1). The head of CSR of a company 
that adopts UNGC, UNEP FI, and has been publishing stand-alone sustainability reports following 
GRI since 2012 said: 
 
The entire credit goes to our former CEOs – Mr Salam and Kalam and both of them are very forward-thinking 
CEOs. They worked in multinational banks. So, they know about global CSR reporting, and they have tried 
to incorporate those ideologies and standard practices here. (CSR Team2). 
 
Role of professional reporting personnel and top executives 
Despite the absence of any regulatory and cultural cognitive pressure for SED, some companies 
are pioneers in CSR reporting because of the knowledge, experience, expertise, and ambition of 
one or two top executives. A good number of the interviewees mentioned the name of a person 
who is a professional accountant and the first Certified Sustainability Reporting Assurer in 
Bangladesh. He formed a team and introduced the stand-alone CSR report in a company. Then he 
joined another company and introduced CSR reporting according to GRI G4 there also. Under his 
leadership, a sustainability reporting team was formed, and they attended training programs on 
how to prepare sustainability reports, and now they are all certified sustainability reporting 
specialist. Besides, he is also raising awareness of sustainability reporting by writing in the 
newspapers and conducting training sessions. 
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The outlook and understanding of the top executives are very important to start and continue SER. 
The head of CSR of a company (which is a member of UNGC and widely known for its stand-
alone CSR report) said that the new CEO of the company tried to discontinue its CSR reporting, 
arguing that it is an unproductive effort. But he could not discontinue it at the insistence of the 
head of CSR. Sharing her experience, she said: “CSR reporting is considered as a misuse of the 
fund, and it is the first to cut budget allocation and human resources arguing it has no visible 
outcome, it’s an unproductive department” (CSR Team2). 
 
The dominance of the chairman and key sponsors 
Corporate interviewees, including independent directors, CEOs, and female directors, said that 
CSR is decided by the Chairman, not by the man or the woman. For example, being asked if there 
are any differences between the roles of males and female in terms of CSR, one female director 
said: “It is generally decided by the chairman” (FD3). In response to the question whether woman 
directors advocate for the emancipation of woman employees, she said: “We do not have the power 
to decide, but when there is an issue, say, for example, promotion, we request the chairman to give 
priority to the women if there are any women candidates” (FD3). Sharing her frustration about 
boardroom experience, a female director said: “Many difficulties are there; saying that has no 
benefit. These have no solutions” (FD3). The CSR policy, spending, and reporting are decided by 
the chairman, as a senior executive of an MNC known for CSR said: “I would say CSR is driven 
by our chairman; under him, there is a team. So, whatever initiatives he takes, everyone 
irrespective of male or female supports” (CORP1). 
 
Legacy and corporate culture 
The legacy and corporate culture inherited from the predecessor MNCs are important determinants 
of SER. Currently, there are only two companies in Bangladesh that are simultaneously members 
of UNGC and issuing stand-alone sustainability reports following GRI. Notably, the same person 
is and was the CEO of the two companies. One of the companies was a project of the South Asia 
Enterprise Development Facility taken over by Bangladeshi sponsors. Another company (which is 
the first ISO certified company in Bangladesh and a member of UNGC) was a subsidiary of a large 
MNC. In 1992, the parent company sold it to the Bangladeshi CEO allowing him to pay from the 
earnings overtime given that he would take care of the interests of the employees and maintain the 
legacy (quality) of the parent company. An executive director of the company said: 
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The heritage and corporate culture of the original company have been retained. Mr Anisuzzaman did not pay 
the full amount at a time; he earned and paid, but they gave one condition that all the employees would be 
taken care of properly, and the standard will be maintained. FCI is the first company in Bangladesh that 
adopted ISO 9000: quality management and ISO 14000: environment. Our mission is to improve the quality 
of lives of people of Bangladesh and … advancing the possibilities, … We think it is our responsibility to 
share our prosperity with society and our stakeholders. (CORP1) 
 
Learning from MNCs 
Work experience and learning from MNCs help local executives in spreading SED among the 
companies in Bangladesh, as the head of CSR of a company said: 
 
So, as I see myself, I have worked with NGOs and MNCs, and whatever knowledge I have gained in terms 
of sustainable business and reporting is through working with them. I have tried to build the capacity of my 
team here. We are not an MNC, but we portray ourselves in such a way with our sustainability report people 
think we are an MNC. (CSR Team2) 
 
Enlightened self-interest and giving back to the society 
Given the institutional voids, some companies are trying to do something good both for them and 
the society at large, as one CSO interviewee said: “We should be a bit cautious in generalising 
corporates in Bangladesh in terms of CSR and CSR reporting because some companies are trying 
to fill the gap” (NGO/CSO4). In contrast to the weak national governance, they might report their 
CSR activities according to the international standard that may give them a lifeline to be looked at 
from a positive point of view. Interviewees said that companies do SER either as “a matter of 
responsibility they should have to the society – ‘social contract’ – or for the ‘enlightened self-
interest’ because they think the connection with the society through CSR will help their business 
in the long run” (CSR Expert1). Some good companies might feel responsible for their conscience 
that “they have taken so much from society, and they should give back to society” (REG1). The 
following shows that firms do CSR disclosure as a response to normative internal pressure. 
 
Although CSR reporting is voluntary, they do it either they realise that it is good for them in the long-term 
or they are connected with some global platforms where there is a demand or incentive for it. (NGO/CSO4) 
 
I believe that CSR is something that helps to attain my goals by addressing the goal of society through our 
products and services responsibly. (CEO1) 
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Vision To be a CSR leader 
In a market economy, companies want to gain public confidence with their market charisma. The 
interviewees opined that CSR champion companies publish CSR reports following GRI because 
they want to be CSR leaders. They are recognised and respected as CSR leaders because of their 
SER. Claiming that their views are counted and respected, the CEO of a financial company known 
for SER said: “Our regulators are aware of what we are doing. We talked to them and gave 
presentations about our CSR reporting on many occasions. When they (regulators) prepared 
guidelines, our people were in the committee … Our people were also in the committee for national 
CSR guideline. I am sure that we have a certain influence on them. We are small, but we are 
regarded as a very respected financial brand in the country” (CEO3). 
 
Personal branding 
Interviewees opined that besides the branding and competitive advantage of companies, some of 
the senior corporate executives do SER to brand themselves. For example, a corporate CEO who 
has been recognised as one of the top 10 SDG pioneers for woman economic security in 2016 said: 
“I feel proud when I go somewhere, and people say oh, we follow Sunshine; when people say oh 
Farhana apa, you are my idol, I follow your footsteps … getting an endorsement from the UN 
helps you to move ahead, people respect you. We have engaged ourselves with SDG report in 2016 
after I was recognised by Ban Ki-Moon” (CEO1). Another interviewee said: “They try to brand 
their company. But my experience is that the chief executives of some organisations also try to 
brand themselves” (TA5). Powerful directors and top management use CSR and SER as a tool for 
gaining power and legitimacy. Although CSR activities are done by the corporations, 
“Philanthropic activities (CSR) are practically decided and carried out by the people of the board 
or the top management. So, we can relate it with their self-reputation along with the corporation” 
(CSR Expert3). 
 
7.5  Discussion  
The study finds that the interactions between the global, country and firm-level governance create 
an overall governance environment that shapes SER practices in Bangladesh. Companies in 
Bangladesh adopt SER primarily as an expedient response to meet the expectations and appease the 
pressures from the international stakeholders. Findings show that global pressures are emanated 
from both ethical and unethical reasons. The pressures for ensuring labour rights (such as safety, 
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security and fair-pay of the workers), product quality, and accountability come from the importers 
because the consumers in developed countries are keen to know how these products are produced. 
Likewise, the donors and development partners put pressure for accountability because they are 
accountable to their citizens. Pointing to the unethical pressure for below cost price, interviewees 
question the morality of the international players that they do not always follow the ethical standard 
and are not driven by welfare motivations. They keep the goal post moving for business sense, 
rather than just for social or environmental causes. The international pressure groups such as trade 
unions and NGOs are often funded by protectionist lobbies in industrialised countries. Thus, part 
of the pressure comes from the genuine concern for the labourers who produce the goods, but part 
of the global pressure comes from the trade union lobbies who want to protect their jobs in those 
countries so that there is no cheap export from developing countries (Chang, 2011). Since export 
industries (garments) are globally visible, there is more discourse about them both globally and 
nationally. But there are many formal and informal sectors, not only in Bangladesh but also in other 
developing countries, having no labour standards at all, but the global players have little or no 
attention to those sectors. If they were driven by welfare motivation, they would pay attention to 
all the sectors irrespective of import or export.  
 
Companies that are dependent on the global market or are trying to expand their business outside 
the border67 face coercive pressures for adhering to the globally accepted standards and principles 
for labour rights, human rights, and environment (Belal and Owen, 2007, 2015; Islam and Deegan, 
2008). They must adopt global sustainability standards and communicate the same through SER. 
Thus, organisational conformance for SER is expedient and instrumental, irrespective of their 
choice (Lounsbury, 2008; Scott, 2001, 2002; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Adoption of global 
sustainability standards helps firms to showcase themselves decently and negotiate with 
international investors confidently (Rahaman, Lawrence, & Roper, 2004; Rahaman, 2000). 
Companies adopt global SER framework for preparing CSR report in an organised and structured 
manner to be competitive, satisfy and attract foreign buyers and lenders, be endorsed nationally and 
internationally, exceed the expectations of the regulators, and thereby establish them as a 
competitive brand and expand their business both at home and abroad. Prudent companies 
proactively adopt SER to communicate and convince the powerful international economic 
 
67 In terms of export, line of credit, listing with the international stock exchange, foreign direct investment. 
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stakeholders against the risk in the uncertain and complex global market aggravated by weak 
country governance and poor country-image.  
 
However, SER in Bangladesh is mainly symbolic rather than substantive (decoupling) evidence by 
the mismatches between the disclosure and the practices. Also, the views of the regulators, CSOs, 
corporate respondents, and even the views of top management and operational people about SER 
vary significantly. While the top management people say everything is perfect, the operational level 
employees say there are mismatches. For example, talking to female workers about maternity leave 
and baby care can help know the truth. All global practices can be implemented in Bangladesh 
because of its uniqueness in terms of limited land area and density of population. For example, 
‘rainwater harvesting’ is included in their green office guide, but it is difficult to harvest rainwater 
in Bangladesh due to lack of space. Thus, the reporting framework needs to be customised 
according to local needs and capacity. Most of the companies that are issuing CSR reports following 
GRI are from the financial industry (which is a relatively clean industry) in contrast to only a few 
from the manufacturing industries despite their significant adverse impact on the environment and 
society.  
 
The credibility of voluntary SER in Bangladesh can be questioned. SER in Bangladesh lacks 
stakeholder engagement as evidenced by the views of the corporate interviewees who mentioned 
their engagement with the powerful stakeholders (namely international buyers, lenders, regulators, 
advertising and designing agencies who are instrumental to their success and those who are 
involved with the preparation of the report), with little or no mention of the local customers, 
community and less powerful vulnerable and marginalised stakeholders (Brown, 2013; Derry, 
2012). Some corporate interviewees who do not report their CSR activities following to GRI opined 
that there is little or no difference between their CSR performance and the companies which issue 
stand-alone sustainability reports. The findings are consistent with the findings of Belal and Owen 
(2015), who document that an MNC operating in the tobacco industry in Bangladesh issued its first 
stand-alone social report, but had to discontinue that after a few years being confronted by the local 
stakeholders due to the lack of credibility. In most of the cases, the focus of SER is to be benefitted 
by convincing international buyers and lenders and getting recognitions, accolades, awards and 
media coverage rather than promoting social justice (Michelon, Rodrigue, & Trevisan, 2019). The 
publication of stand-alone CSR reports does not necessarily mean that the social and environmental 
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practices are ingrained at the strategic and operational levels, nor does it ensure transparency and 
accountability. Thus, in most of the cases, SER in Bangladesh is superficial compliance with 
external requirements because of the lack of stakeholder engagement and an absence of coercive, 
normative and cultural-cognitive pressures for SER from within the country. To be effective, the 
pressures for SER should have come from domestic constituencies.  
 
The overall country governance environment in Bangladesh is not supportive for voice and 
accountability, transparency and SER because of the guided democracy; politicisation and control 
over media, civil society organisations, trade unions, regulatory and judiciary systems; nexus 
between business, politicians and government, corruption and impunity; lack of understanding of 
and interest in SER on the part of both corporate and noncorporate stakeholders. The 
underdevelopment of institutions adversely affects the development of SER in Bangladesh, as an 
interviewee said: “We cannot expect an oasis of good governance and good CSR in an ocean of 
bad governance” (NGO/CSO4). The lawmakers are the lawbreakers. The unscrupulous nexus 
between business, politicians and government affects the demand for reforms and development of 
SER. Because of conflict of interest and power imbalance, this nexus also hinders the development 
of CSOs and trade unions that could put pressure for CSR and SER in Bangladesh. The weak 
governance and low level of SED in Bangladesh are worsened by the weak enforcement of laws 
(Siddiqui, 2010; Uddin & Choudhury, 2008). The law enforcing agencies of the country cannot 
discharge their bestowed duties independently because of the undue influence and unwillingness of 
the government. Instead of ensuring justice, some of the law-enforcing agencies and their members 
have become dependent on some companies by accepting undue benefits, including the undesirable 
use of the CSR fund. Bangladesh is one of the top corrupt countries in the world, where even the 
provision of public goods (such as health, education, public administration) involves pervasive 
corruption (Asadullah & Chakravorty, 2019; Knox, 2009). Almost all the interviewees 
unanimously agreed that corruption is everywhere in Bangladesh, particularly in the government 
offices. Unfortunately, the government offices incentivise unfair and immoral practices. Corruption 
and impunity create an environment where circumventing laws is easier than complying with them. 
Corruption is engulfing all good initiatives, including CSR and SER. The concept of voluntary 
disclosure was first introduced in the country by Bangladesh Securities and Exchange Commission 
(BSEC) with its corporate governance guideline in 2006, which required the listed companies to 
take some governance measures at the firm-level and disclose those in their annual report on a 
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comply or explain basis. In 2018, the BSEC attempted to introduce ESG reporting as a part of its 
corporate governance code but could not do so due to resistance from the powerful businesses.  
 
The print and electronic media influence SER with the coercive, normative and cultural-cognitive 
pressures. They are playing a critical role in creating awareness of sustainability and SER in 
Bangladesh by publishing good social and environmental practices and pointing to social and 
environmental wrongdoings. Despite the squeezing space for voice, accountability, and freedom of 
expression, some print and electronic media have been showing courage in unveiling the truth and 
promoting SER in Bangladesh. In a developing country like Bangladesh, the role of the press and 
media is more effective than regulations in overseeing governance and social and environmental 
issues. Because once any problems (e.g. environmental pollutions, grabbing the river land, 
violations of human rights) is highlighted by the media, it comes to the attention of the people, the 
government and the regulators. As a result, both the government and the businesses feel pressured 
to act. The press is more effective than the regulatory bodies, as they are too corrupt to take any 
actions unless there is any civic actions or media reports. Companies consider media reports as 
urgency and readily respond to them, especially to the negative news about them (Aerts & Cormier, 
2009). However, most of the print and electronic media have been politicised and captured by 
various business groups recently. Corporate-media partnership, media exposure and appreciation 
play an important role in catalysing SER in Bangladesh. Some media institutions also partner up 
with corporates in implementing CSR programmes. The print and electronic media play a 
significant role in overcoming the limitations of the traditional formal SER in Bangladesh, a country 
where the literacy rate is still low, and people are not interested in the published corporate reports. 
In addition to the mainstream traditional media, social media (e.g. Facebook, YouTube, Twitter, 
WhatsApp) play an important role in communicating corporate affairs, especially to the millennials.   
 
NGOs are playing a significant role in educating and making people aware of their rights and 
responsibilities, as well as impacting the society in terms of education, health, hygiene and nutrition, 
women empowerment, public innovation, low-cost solutions, poverty alleviation, agriculture, 
disaster management, adaptation and mitigation of climate risk, through their wide network across 
the country. Having a wide range of networks, NGOs can easily access to the grassroots and act as 
an intermediary between the government, corporates and social goals. Some of the NGOs have 
gained social acceptance for their long-standing trust-worthy contributions. Having unique 
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expertise, experience and access to the masses, NGOs can play an important role in implementing 
corporate social and environmental agenda and promote SER. Companies use the particulars and 
photographs of the activities collaboration with the NGOs in their CSR reports, annual reports, on 
their website as well as in the print, electronic, and social media. Partnering and collaborating with 
the established NGOs help companies in reaching the ultimate beneficiaries with their CSR 
programmes, reporting the same, and attaining tri-partite goals - the goals of businesses, NGOs, 
and society. Therefore, implementing CSR programmes through an NGO is more effective and 
beneficial for both the target groups and the companies because of the professional services, ease 
of access, cost savings, uninterrupted operations and branding. As opposed to the weak country 
governance, some of the notable environmental NGOs in Bangladesh, namely Bangladesh Poribesh 
Andolon, Poribesh Bachao Andolon, Bangladesh Environmental Lawyers Association have been 
playing remarkable roles in putting pressures on both the corporate and government to comply with 
the environmental laws and conserve the natural environment. For example, some of the 
environmental NGOs filed writ petitions in the higher court of the country when there were 
tanneries in Hazaribagh, and in some cases, they got verdicts in their favour. The government and 
businesses sometimes take some measures in response to the pressures exerted by the 
environmental NGOs. However, the findings indicate that the role of NGOs in promoting SER in 
Bangladesh is indirect rather than direct, “NGOs are doing very good in creating awareness about 
environmental and social impact. But with regards to reporting of CSR, possibly their interest is 
not that” (ACA6). Civil society organisations had a great role in promoting voluntary CSR type of 
activities. However, most of the CSOs in Bangladesh have been politicised and divided over time 
and they cannot play their expected role in ensuring transparency, accountability and social justice. 
Some of the influential politicians are envious of the name and fame of the members of the CSOs, 
as such, they do not let the CSOs express their views independently. The overall environment does 
not encourage CSOs to be involved actively.  
 
SER is not a priority in Bangladesh. Besides the absence of effective regulatory pressure, companies 
do not face any strong pressures for SER from society at large. Therefore, corporates try to merely 
comply with the mandatory requirements, and the level of the SED of Bangladeshi companies is 
low along with the rhetoric, descriptive and positive disclosures (Belal & Cooper, 2011; Sobhani, 
Amran, & Zainuddin, 2009; Imam, 2000). There are coercive pressures for donations, but not for 
SER. Like many other developing countries, the dominant form of CSR in Bangladesh is the 
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philanthropic donations (Ullah, 2013), which is a voluntary giving to charity. The larger portion of 
the donations in Bangladesh is made in response to the directives and coercive pressures from the 
government and the ruling party (Uddin, Siddiqui, & Islam, 2018). Firms are bound to respond to 
satisfy the call of the regime (Dyball, Fong Chua, & Poullaos, 2006; Weber, 1978). They have to 
donate whether they like it or not as interviewees said, “The sovereign wills, we act. That is the 
law” (CEO2); “They do not have the liberty to turn down that request. If they turn down, they will 
invite troubles for them; they will not be able to survive” (ID1). Many businessmen believe that 
political affiliation and support is a necessary condition for licensing, expansion and survival of 
business (Zaman, 2011; Uddin, Siddiqui and Islam, 2018, p. 417).  
 
There is a lack of national efforts and incentives for promoting SER in Bangladesh. Even the CSR 
Award Committee does not consider CSR reporting as a criterion for the award; instead, they 
consider the amount of tax payment as the necessary condition for the award. The NBR offers 
some tax credit for allowable expenditures on CSR, but there is no incentive for CSR reporting. 
The apex institute of the professional accountants in the country does not consider CSR reporting 
as a part of their jurisdictions and education. However, it is good to see that GRI has recently 
entered an MOU with the Institute of Cost and Management Accountants of Bangladesh and 
Dhaka Stock Exchange. Both stock exchanges of Bangladesh are members of sustainability stock 
exchanges initiative of the UN. But visible actions are yet to be taken place. The BSEC, Registrar 
of Joint Stock Companies and trade unions have no visible role in promoting SER in Bangladesh. 
SER is costly (Belal & Cooper, 2011), and there is a lack of incentives and pressures for SER. The 
lack of accountability and transparency in the national governmental system also affects SER at 
the firm-level. The culture and context in Bangladesh are not conducive for SER. About 90% of 
the people in Bangladesh are Muslims (BBS, 2015, p. 28), and giving donations (Zakat) in silence 
is an integral part of the religious belief. Therefore, the culture of donating in silence also affects 
SER in Bangladesh. There is also an absence of normative pressures for SER. For example, there 
is no national guideline to promote CSR or SER in Bangladesh. 
 
Regarding the firm-level governance, there are mixed relationships between board independence 
and SER in Bangladesh. Independent directors can play a positive role in promoting SER only when 
they are independent in appearance and fact, and are aware of SER. Findings suggest that board 
independence in Bangladesh is largely superficial, and inclusion of the so-called ‘independent 
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directors’ does not necessarily mean an increased SER. Results indicate that the independence of 
an independent director depends on (i) their mindset, knowledge, experience and expertise; and (ii) 
the mindset of the owner directors who select the independent directors and with whom the latter 
work. Unfortunately, independent directors are not or cannot be independent in most of the cases 
and the underlying reasons for such circumstances are related to three categories: (a) cultural-
cognitive barriers, lack of an independent mindset, personal connections with the owner directors, 
benefit dependency, and lack of incentives; (b) improper appointment process, family control and 
dominance of owner directors, poor governance and corporate culture; and (c) the lack of support 
from and independence of the regulators. The cultural-cognitive characteristics that obstruct 
independent directors in playing an independent role are the high power distance, high uncertainty 
avoidance, high masculinity, high collectivism and low indulgence (Hofstede, 1984, 2001). 
Bangladesh belongs to an ‘honour culture’ (Aslani et al., 2013, 2016), where people try to share 
less information and act tough, and those having more power and social status make better outcomes 
(Aslani et al., 2013). Findings support the suspicion about the effectiveness of the western corporate 
governance model in developing countries (Uddin & Choudhury, 2008; Singh & Zammit, 2006; 
Singh, 1997, 1999), and explain the reasons for the negative relationship between board 
independence and SER in developing countries (Alotaibi & Hussainey, 2016; Sundarasen, Je-Yen, 
& Rajangam, 2016; Barakat, Pérez, & Ariza, 2015; Kiliç, Kuzey, & Uyar, 2015; Giannarakis, 
2014b; Haji, 2013).  
 
In contrast to the orthodoxy that board gender diversity promotes governance and SER, the study 
finds mixed results. The following are the positive roles of women in promoting SER in Bangladesh.  
Woman directors are sensitive to the society than men (Burgess & Tharenou, 2002); respond 
immediately in case of humanitarian causes, charitable giving to the community, arts, and cultural 
activities (Nielsen & Huse, 2010; Ayuso & Argandoña, 2007; Williams, 2003; Wang & Coffey, 
1992); try to persuade the board to invest more in the woman entrepreneurship, employee welfare, 
especially for the woman employee-related issues (Kirsch, 2018), and conserve the environment. 
They are more collaborative, compliant and risk-averse, and their presence on the board influences 
the entire environment of the board irrespective of their level of competence, though the study has 
found very limited instances where woman directors are perceived to influence the motion of the 
boardroom (Pucheta-Martínez, Bel-Oms and Olcina-Sempere, 2018, p.181). Although there is 
some evidence of the direct role of woman directors in promoting CSR, their role in SER/CSR 
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reporting is indirect and limited. The findings suggest that women having financial literacy, 
knowledge of business, work experience in the formal sectors, knowledge and expertise in the area 
of sustainability and accounting contribute to SER more than others. Also, women are taken into 
the business to maintain family control, comply with the requirements of the regulators and meet 
the expectations of the international buyers as evidenced by interview responses and the 
concentration of 92% woman directors in only three sectors - of which more than 54% woman 
directors are in the financial sector followed by garments and textiles (24%) and pharmaceuticals 
and chemicals (13.9%), or tax management.  
 
However, in most of the cases, woman directors cannot play an independent role because of 
cultural-cognitive barriers, such as a male-dominated patriarchal society (Quisumbing, Kumar, & 
Behrman, 2018; WEF, 2017; Solotaroff & Pande, 2014; Kabeer, 2000; Amin & Pebley, 1994),  
honour culture (Aslani et al., 2013, 2016), family-dominated businesses, and lack of necessary 
expertise and experience of women in business (Uddin & Choudhury, 2008). Because of these 
cultural-cognitive characteristics, the presence of women on boards in Bangladesh seems to be 
symbolic and does not contribute towards promoting SER, as opposed to the views of the critical 
mass theory (Konrad, Kramer, & Erkut, 2008). The findings show that the male-dominance is so 
prevalent that in some cases the women are just ‘stooges or token directors’ since decisions are 
made by their husbands or other male family members, with the husband even attending the board 
meetings instead of his wife, leaving her to be a director on paper only, to keep family control 
through symbolic compliance with the regulations, as an interviewee said, “She says what he says” 
(CEO1).  
 
Unsurprisingly, such little or no role of women in promoting SER is expected and consistent with 
the socio-cultural context of Bangladesh, as discussed in chapter 2. In Bangladesh, women are 
deprived of the inheritance of land ownership, and they are often unable to hold or enforce property 
rights because of social norms and barriers to access to justice (Mair, Marti, & Ventresca, 2012). 
Husbands, who are the heads of families in Bangladesh still solely own 96% of household-land in 
rural areas (Quisumbing, Kumar, & Behrman, 2018). In the formal enterprises, Bangladesh still has 
the world’s smallest shares of female-majority ownership which is only 1.7%, compared to regional 
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and global averages of 9.6% and 14.5%, respectively68. In 2015, Bangladesh ranked 75 out of 77 
countries that encourage the development and growth of women-owned enterprises (Terjesen and 
Lloyd, 2015, p. 11). In addition to the formal structural problem, Bangladesh has a patriarchal 
society where women are prohibited from getting into business on their own because of the fear of 
losing honour (Aslani et al., 2013) and the threat of risk. The first resistance faced by the women 
comes from the family, because of the superiority of male family members and the head of the 
households, who in most of the cases do not want women to start and own a business although there 
has been an improvement in the woman participation in the household decision-making process. 
(Solotaroff & Pande, 2014; Kabeer, 2000; Amin & Pebley, 1994). With regards to the labour force 
participation, Bangladesh is ranked 124 out of 144 countries. The ratio of wage equality for similar 
work between female and male is 0.54 in 2017 (WEF, 2017). This can be explained as a social and 
cultural context in Bangladesh which is still a male-dominated society and women traditionally 
work as homemakers. Also, women and girls in Bangladesh are required to adhere to certain 
modesty norms (Camfield, Rashid, & Sultan, 2017) as the immodesty of a woman family member 
is considered a shame for the whole family (Aslani et al., 2013). 
 
In addition to the formal corporate governance mechanisms, the internal firm-level factors play an 
important role in determining SER in Bangladesh (Adams, 2002). Given the fragile country-level 
governance and the passive cultural-cognitive pressure from the society, corporate leadership and 
mindset of top management, enlightened self-interest, giving back to the society, legacy and 
corporate culture, learning from MNCs, personal branding, key accounting personnel, and the 
group to which a company belongs to play an important role in promoting SER. Findings show 
that as SER in Bangladesh is discretionary and the SER decision depends on the person in charge 
(in most of the cases the chairman) rather than the system. The early adoption of innovative ideas, 
such as SER comes from internal drivers (ethical obligations and moral values) (DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1983). If the board and top management think that they want to do good for the 
organisation, employees and other stakeholders, then CSR starts evolving. Therefore, the intention 
and willingness of the board and top management for doing good, being good and reporting good 
play a critical role in discharging their social and environmental responsibility and ensuring 
transparency and accountability through disclosure. Thus, SER in true sense is management driven. 
 
68 https://www.enterprisesurveys.org/en/data/exploreeconomies/2013/bangladesh#gender (accessed on 14 November 
2019) 
199 
 
The findings show that some companies realise that they have to address the labour rights, 
environment, community, product quality and the like to succeed and survive (Pachauri, 2006). 
They are voluntarily doing SER following global standards because of their internal motivations 
and moral obligations to act in a socially responsible manner (Dacin, Goodstein, & Scott, W, 2002; 
Scott, 2001). Finally, companies that belong to a group having people with sustainability reporting 
expertise have more SED than others. The study has also observed that the corporate offices of the 
listed companies that belong to the same corporate group are located in the same buildings, their 
annual general meetings are held on the same day and in the same venue, and the key accounting 
and reporting people of the companies are the same. Therefore, the fieldwork shows that the SER 
of listed companies in Bangladesh is mainly related to the key reporting personnel and the 
corporate group to which a company belongs to (Li & Belal, 2018). 
 
7.6  Summary  
This chapter examines how the global, country and firm-level governance influence SER in 
Bangladesh, as a case of developing countries, and why. The findings suggest that different levels 
of governance have different degrees of influence on SER, depending on the firms’ dependence 
on the stakeholders for their growth and survival. Firms having global linkage and dependence on 
the international stakeholders, were found adopting global sustainability standards and reporting 
their CSR activities to appease the coercive and normative pressures and expand their business 
both at home and abroad. The effectiveness of global governance depends on the effectiveness of 
the country institutional and governance arrangements (Chen & Bouvain, 2009). As the country 
governance in Bangladesh is weak, SER is not satisfactory despite the adoption of global 
governance standards for SER. The country governance is common for all the firms, irrespective 
of their scope of operation (within or outside the border) and dependence on the key stakeholders. 
Domestic companies that have little or no direct linkage with the rest of the world focus on the 
country-level requirements. However, companies that have visionary leadership and manpower 
equipped with sustainability reporting expertise and experience adopt global reporting standards 
and report their CSR practices despite the fragile country governance environment. SER is 
voluntary in Bangladesh. Therefore, when we think of the drivers of SER, for the export-dependent 
or internationally dependent firms, the main driver for SER is the global pressure along with the 
internal pressure for excellence within the firm. But when we look for the determinants of SER, 
which include both the drivers and barriers, the key determinant of SER is the country-level 
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governance. However, there is an overlap between the three levels of governance because many 
of the global governance initiatives are adopted in the country governance, and country governance 
affects firm-level governance. Moreover, the macrolevel cultural-cognitive factors of the country 
develop and shape the cognitive abilities of everyone, including the directors, management, 
regulators and the masses.   
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Chapter 8 
Conclusion 
 
The study examines the influence of global, country and firm-level governance on social and 
environmental reporting (SER) in the context of developing countries in general and investigates 
the underlying reasons for such influence in Bangladesh, as a case of developing countries. The 
study uses regression analysis techniques to have an overview of the relationship between the three 
levels of governance and SER in developing countries, and the interview method to unveil the 
reasons for such relationship by employing the multi-level institutional perspective of Scott (2002) 
and Whelan and Muthuri (2017). The findings of the quantitative analysis show that all three levels 
of governance have a significant positive relationship with SER in developing countries, where 
global governance has the strongest influence followed by the country-level governance and firm-
level governance. Also, the study finds a significant positive influence of all three levels of 
governance on social disclosure, a significant positive influence of the global and country-level 
governance while an insignificant positive influence of the firm-level governance on 
environmental disclosure. The insignificant positive influence of firm-level governance on 
environmental disclosure can be explained as a lack of motivation of firms and an absence of 
external pressure on them for environmental causes. The study also examines the relationships of 
twelve individual governance variables under three levels of governance with SER and finds the 
significant positive influence of UNGC, GRI, voice and accountability, political stability and 
absence of violence, regulatory quality, female directors on board, board size and the number of 
board meetings while the significant negative influence of governance effectiveness and the rule 
of law and an insignificant negative influence of control of corruption and board independence on 
SER. 
 
By conducting semi-structured interviews (with both corporate and non-corporate interviewees), 
the study investigates how the global, country and firm-level governance influence SER in 
Bangladesh and why. The findings of the fieldwork show that SER in Bangladesh is driven by the 
coercive as well as normative pressures from the global market, followed by the firm-level 
normative pressure as opposed to little or no cultural cognitive pressures for SER from the country 
level. Companies in Bangladesh do SER primarily as a desirable response to meet the expectations 
and appease the tensions from the influential international economic stakeholders. SER, mainly 
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the issuance of a stand-alone CSR report is considered instrumental in satisfying the foreign buyers 
and lenders, in being endorsed by national and international organisations, exceeding the 
expectations of the regulators, and thereby establishing and expanding businesses both at home 
and abroad. Findings suggest that global pressures are emanated from both ethical and unethical 
reasons. The international buyers put pressures on the Bangladeshi exporters for ensuring labour 
rights and product quality. Similarly, the donors and development partners put pressures for 
transparency and accountability because they are to be accountable to their citizens. However, 
though they very often ask for governance and ethical practice, the international players (such as 
trade unions, NGOs) are often funded by the protectionist lobbies in industrialised countries. Thus, 
they are not always motivated by just the social and environmental concerns or actual welfare, but 
by the sense of business, and they keep the goal post moving. Thus, part of the global pressure 
comes from a genuine concern for the labourers who produce the goods, but part of the pressure 
comes from the trade union lobbies who want to protect their jobs in those countries so that there 
is no cheap export from developing countries (Chang, 2011). There are more discourses about the 
export industries globally since they are globally visible. But there are many formal and informal 
sectors where violation of labour rights is common, but the global players have little or no attention 
to those sectors. Therefore, the motivation of global players is not always fair. 
 
The findings of the fieldwork suggest that SER in Bangladesh is mainly symbolic, rather than 
substantive due to the lack of coercive and cultural cognitive pressures from within the country. 
The overall country governance environment in Bangladesh is not supportive for voice and 
accountability, transparency and SER because of the guided democracy, politicisation and control 
over media, civil society organisations, and trade unions; fragile regulatory and judiciary 
institutions, nexus between business, politicians and government; corruption and impunity; lack 
of understanding of and interest in SER on the part of both corporate and noncorporate 
stakeholders. The underdevelopment of institutions adversely affects the development of SER in 
Bangladesh. The conflict of interest and power imbalance caused by the unscrupulous nexus 
between business, politicians and government hinders the development of civil society 
organisations and trade unions that could put pressure for CSR and SER, and thus affects the 
demand for reforms and development of SER in Bangladesh. The weak enforcement of laws is 
one of the critical reasons for weak governance and the low level of SER in Bangladesh (Siddiqui, 
2010; Uddin & Choudhury, 2008). Corruption is engulfing all the good initiatives, including SER. 
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Corruption and impunity create an environment where evading laws is easier than complying with 
them. The print and electronic media are playing a critical role in raising awareness of 
sustainability and SER in Bangladesh by publishing good social and environmental practices and 
pointing to the social and ecological wrongdoings. 
 
In a developing country like Bangladesh, the role of print and electronic media is more effective 
than regulations in overseeing governance, social and environmental issues. Because once the 
media highlight any problems, they come to the attention of the people, NGOs, government and 
regulators. The press is more effective than the regulatory bodies since the latter is too corrupt to 
take any actions unless there is any civic actions or media reports. Companies consider media 
report as urgency and readily respond to them, particularly the negative news about them (Aerts 
& Cormier, 2009). However, the print and electronic media are being politicised and captured by 
various business groups recently. Smart companies are shifting their focus to social media in 
contrast to the conventional annual corporate report to communicate their CSR activities 
considering the rate of literacy and the choice of the millennials. Findings suggest that SER is not 
a priority in Bangladesh - there are political pressures for donations, but not for SER; the CSR 
Award Committee considers tax payment as one of the criteria for giving the award, but not the 
SER; the National Board of Revenue offers tax credits for allowable CSR expenditures, but not 
there are no incentives for CSR reporting; the apex body of the professional accountants in the 
country does not consider CSR reporting as a part of their jurisdictions and education. The lack of 
accountability and transparency in the national governmental system also affects the accountability, 
transparency and SER at the firm-level. The overall governance environment in Bangladesh is not 
conducive for SER. Besides the weak coercive pressures, there is an absence of normative and 
cultural cognitive pressure for SER; for example, there are no national guidelines for CSR or SER 
in Bangladesh.  
 
The fieldwork finds mixed relationships between board independence and SER. Findings show 
that independent directors can play a decisive role in promoting SER only when they are 
independent both in appearance and in fact and are aware of the SER. However, findings suggest 
that board independence in Bangladesh is mostly superficial, and the inclusion of the so-called 
independent directors does not necessarily mean an increased SER. Consistent with the 
insignificant negative relationship between board independence and SER documented by the 
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quantitative analysis, the fieldwork shows that the independent directors have either little or no 
role in promoting SER in Bangladesh due to the lack independent mindset, knowledge, expertise 
and awareness of SER, which are aggravated by the benefit-dependency (co-option), family 
control and patriarchy.  
 
In contrast to the orthodoxy that board gender diversity promotes governance and SER, the 
fieldwork finds mixed results. Consistent with the results of quantitative analysis, findings of the 
fieldwork have shown that woman directors are more sensitive to taking immediate action to 
humanitarian causes, charitable giving to the community, arts, and cultural activities (Nielsen & 
Huse, 2010; Ayuso & Argandoña, 2007; Williams, 2003; Wang & Coffey, 1992); persuading the 
board to invest more in the woman entrepreneurship; ensuring employee welfare, especially the 
woman employee-related issues (Kirsch, 2018), and conserving the natural environment. Although 
there is some evidence of the direct role of woman directors in promoting CSR, their role in 
promoting SER/CSR reporting is rather indirect and limited. Findings show that women having 
financial literacy, business knowledge, work experience in the formal sectors, knowledge and 
expertise in the area of sustainability and accounting contribute to SER more than others. But in 
most of the cases, women are brought to the business to keep family control, comply with the 
regulatory requirements and meet the expectations of the international buyers as evidenced by the 
concentration of 92% woman directors in only three sectors - 54% are in the financial industry 
followed by garments and textiles (24%), and pharmaceuticals and chemicals (13.9%).  
 
In contrast to the findings of the quantitative analysis, the fieldwork shows that the female directors 
have very little or no role in catalysing SER in Bangladesh. Findings predominantly suggest that 
the inclusion of woman directors does not necessarily mean an increased SER, although there is 
some limited evidence of the role of women towards female-workers, humanitarian and 
environmental problems, that may have an indirect effect on SER in some cases. The empirical 
results indicate that in most of the cases, woman directors cannot play an independent role because 
of cultural cognitive barriers, such as a male-dominated patriarchal society, honour culture, family 
business, lack of necessary expertise and experience. In addition to formal corporate governance, 
the internal firm-level factors significantly affect the SER of companies. The corporate leadership 
and mindset of the top management, enlightened self-interest, giving back to the society, legacy 
and corporate culture, learning from the MNCs, personal branding, the key accounting personnel 
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and the group to which a company belongs to play a crucial role in promoting SER. Despite the 
enormous pressure from the global level, the SER in Bangladesh has yet to be institutionalised due 
to the lack of coercive, normative and cultural cognitive pressures from both the country and firm-
levels.  
 
The study offers the following implications for the policymakers, managers and academicians. 
• Different countries have different contexts, problems and capabilities requiring different 
approaches to address the social and environmental issues. Therefore, instead of adopting 
a one-size-fits-all global framework in their original form, a tailor-made doable reporting 
framework should be developed according to the local needs and capabilities.  
• A CSR guideline can be a learning tool and a benchmark for SER, help reduce the 
misunderstanding of SER, and promote better coordination among the stakeholders. 
Therefore, a national CSR guideline should be developed without any further delay. 
Though the concept of CSR and CSR reporting is originally voluntary, findings show that 
there are two contrasting views - companies do not do anything in Bangladesh unless they 
are bound to do it (mandatory), but even so, many companies do not follow the mandatory 
laws such as tax and environmental laws. Therefore, making SER mandatory will not work 
(voluntary). Overall, findings imply that Bangladesh should adopt a ‘carrot and stick’ 
approach in a combination of both voluntary and mandatory requirements to catalyse SER. 
As the implementation of a CSR policy/guideline requires support from many 
governmental institutions, a national coordination cell can be formed to coordinate and 
oversee the enactment, implementation and up-gradation of laws. 
• As there is a shortage of genuine independent directors - independent in both appearance 
and fact, a pool of independent directors with professionals having financial literacy and 
knowledge of corporate governance and reporting, especially SER, can be formed. A 
company can appoint a person as an independent director if and only if he or she belongs 
to the pool, and by doing so, the problems of co-option and benefit dependency can be 
minimised. Moreover, companies can be encouraged to appoint female directors from the 
professional and working people and organise training and workshops on CSR and SER 
for the board of directors. Bangladesh Securities and Exchange Commission (BSEC) has 
set the criteria of independent directors and required the publicly listed companies to have 
such directors. However, the BSEC itself does not have any independent directors to 
206 
 
oversee its activities. Findings indicate that the top executives of the BSEC are unlikely to 
play an independent role as they are appointed from the partisans based on absolute loyalty 
to the ruling party. Therefore, the BSEC should have some independent directors based on 
specific criteria. 
• In addition to financial reporting, accountants are inseparably involved with voluntary non-
financial reporting. Unfortunately, many of the professional accountants in Bangladesh do 
not consider SER as a tool for ensuring transparency, accountability and social justice. 
Hence, SER should be included in accounting education, particularly for professional 
accountants.   
• Considering the rate of literacy, choice of and access to information by the lion's share of 
the stakeholders who are mainly millennials, companies should offer alternative forms of 
discourses in the print, electronic and social media to communicate their social and 
environmental activities with the masses beside the traditional corporate reporting.  
• The findings suggest that SER in Bangladesh is mainly symbolic. As the level of SER is 
low, it is time to encourage companies to adopt and familiarise with the reporting 
frameworks. Once the number of reporting firms and the volume of disclosures reaches to 
a considerable level, then the question of authenticity may be raised.  
• The study offers some evidence of decoupling between SER and actual practice. Future 
studies can investigate more by capturing the views of the operational level employees and 
the target beneficiaries rather than managers to explore the realities.   
 
The study makes several methodological, practical and theoretical contributions. From the 
methodological point of view,  while most of the prior quantitative studies are limited to examining 
the relationship between corporate governance and SER, this study has brought in more 
complexity and comprehensiveness by extending the scope of the investigation to three levels of 
governance - global, country and firm-level governance, and segregating CSR disclosure into 
social disclosure and environmental disclosure. By using an extensive dataset of 45 developing 
countries from 2007-2016, developing an overall score for each level of governance, examining 
their relationships with SER, and exploring the underlying reasons for such numerical relationships, 
the study offers surprising perspectives (de Bakker et al., 2018) and responds to the calls of Roberts 
and Wallace (2015) and Richardson (2015) for advancing non-mainstream quantitative SEA 
research by providing convincing, alternative explanations for (non-) disclosure.   
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The study has made a couple of practical contributions by providing empirical evidence of nature 
of relationships between the global, country and firm-level governance and SER from the 
quantitative analysis, and the underlying reasons for such relationships from the fieldwork. The 
quantitative analysis documents that there are significant positive links between three levels of 
governance and SER in developing countries, where global governance has the highest influence 
on SER followed by the country-level governance and firm-level governance supporting the notion 
that “CSR developments are mainly driven by global developments, but shaped by context-specific 
factors” (Weyzig, 2006, p. 69). Findings show that in contrast to the global governance and country 
governance which have significant positive influences on environmental disclosure, the firm-level 
governance has an insignificant positive influence on environmental disclosure suggesting that 
firms in developing countries lack internal motivation and external pressure for environmental 
reporting.  
 
The fieldwork contributes to both governance and SER literature by offering evidence that only a 
handful of companies are publishing stand-alone sustainability reports, mainly due to the ‘business 
case’ and global coercive as well as normative pressures exerted by the dominant economic 
stakeholders. Additionally, there are many instances of decoupling in contrast to the token 
conformance (Duarte & Imbun, 2016; Momin, 2013; Slack, 2012; Owen, Swift, & Hunt, 2001). 
The fieldwork also offers evidence that the country’s cultural cognitive factors such as 'honour 
culture', ‘patriarchal society’, 'masculinity', 'uncertainty avoidance', collectivism', 'family firm', 
'business-politicians-government nexus', 'corruption and impunity’ adversely affect SER in 
Bangladesh. The absence of transparency and accountability in the state-level also affects 
transparency, accountability, and SER at the firm-level in Bangladesh. Among the country 
governance variables, the print and electronic media along with the NGOs are relatively more 
effective in ensuring transparency and accountability because once any irregularities are raised by 
the media or NGOs, it compels the law enforcing agencies and the judiciary to take some measures, 
at least to some extent. Companies readily respond to the media news, and some smart companies 
have shifted their focus from the traditional annual corporate reporting to the unconventional 
emerging social media reporting such as YouTube, Facebook. 
 
Regarding firm-level governance, the field study confirms that the inclusion of the independent 
directors does not necessarily mean an increased SER because the so-called independent directors 
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lack an independent mindset, knowledge and expertise. They cannot play an independent role 
because of benefit dependency (co-option), family control, cultural cognitive barriers such as 
patriarchy and honour culture. The study responds to the call of previous studies for further 
research by unveiling the underlying reasons and offering evidence for a significant negative 
relationship between board gender diversity and SER in Bangladesh (Muttakin, Khan, & 
Subramaniam, 2015) and an insignificant positive relationship in family firms in Bangladesh 
(Ullah, Muttakin, & Khan, 2019). The study also contributes to the governance literature that 
suspects and cautions about the effectiveness of the Western governance models in traditional 
settings (Siddiqui, 2010; Uddin & Choudhury, 2008; Singh & Zammit, 2006; Singh, 1997, 1999) 
by providing evidence of superficial corporate governance in developing countries. More 
importantly, this study offers evidence that the SER in Bangladesh is determined more by the 
internal organisational factors such as the mindset of top management, corporate legacy and 
culture, learning from the MNCs, personal branding and the group to which a company belongs to 
than the formal corporate governance.  
 
Finally, the study contributes to the institutional theory with evidence that SER is determined by 
the constellations of all three levels of governance (global, country and firm) and all three forms 
of pressures (coercive, normative and cultural cognitive), with varying degrees depending on the 
relative strength of the agents that create the pressures, and the exposure and dependence of the 
firms on the agents. Moreover, the study contributes to the institutional theory by providing the 
nuances that some companies realise their responsibility in sustaining society and try to fill the 
institutional voids by undertaking various CSR initiatives in developing countries, where the 
government services are ineffective, and report the same.  
 
The findings of the study are subject to several limitations. Although the quantitative analysis 
provides an overview of the relationships, it does not answer to the question of how the dynamics 
and interplay between the global, country and firm-level governance create an overall governance 
environment and affect SER in developing countries and why. The context of each country, even 
each company, can be different, causing differences in SER. Knowing the underlying reasons for 
such differences is critically important to promote SER in developing countries. Therefore, the field 
study attempts to overcome this limitation of the quantitative analysis. The quantitative study uses 
the third party provided social and environmental disclosure and governance databases. The data 
209 
 
for 2016 is less compared to that of other years. Moreover, data were dominated by the BRICS 
countries, especially China, which solely consists of about 49% firm-year observations, whereas 
some developing countries have only a few observations. The study examines the hypothesised 
relationships by excluding China, and the results are found robust. Although the interview method 
helps in answering how and why questions, interview responses can be biased because of the ability, 
willingness, potential risk of the interviewees, cultural, political or organisational factors and the 
problem of reflexivity (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe, & Lowe, 1991). Therefore, the results based on 
the interview responses should be interpreted and considered with the caution of potential biases 
and inaccuracies. Transcribing and translating the interviews and coding of the transcripts involve 
extensive work and require skilled hands. Out of 49 interviews, 43 were conducted in English and 
six were conducted in Bengali. As the author has fluency in both English and Bengali, he translated 
and transcribed the interview himself. Also, having the knowledge and experience of similar 
research (Miles, Huberman, & Saldana, 1994), the author could overcome the difficulties of this 
study. The fieldwork has been conducted in Bangladesh as one of the 45 developing countries 
included in the quantitative analysis, and as Muttakin, Khan and Subramaniam (2015) document 
that there are significant negative relationships of CSR reporting with both female directors of listed 
companies in Bangladesh and having the author’s access to the interviewees. Future studies can 
investigate how various governance variables in other developing countries influence SER and why. 
Although the study employs institutional perspectives to explain the relationship of SER with three 
levels of governance, the findings of the quantitative analysis are interpreted from the global, 
country and firm-level governance only due to the limitation of data while the findings of the 
fieldwork are interpreted both from the three levels of governance and three forms of pressures of 
the institutional theory. 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: List of social disclosure items 
A. Community Community Spending 
 Number of Awards Received 
B. Employee Employee Training Cost 
 Number of Employees – CSR 
 Employee Turnover % 
 % of Employees Unionized 
 % Women in Management 
 % Women in the Workforce 
 % of Minorities in Management 
 % of Minorities in Workforce 
 Workforce Accidents – Employees 
 Lost Time from Accidents 
 Fatalities – Contractors 
 Fatalities – Employees 
 Fatalities – Total 
 Health and Safety Policy 
 Equal Opportunity Policy 
 Human Rights Policy 
 Training Policy 
 Employee CSR Training 
 Fair Remuneration Policy 
 Employee Average Age 
 % Disabled in Workforce 
 Lost Time Incident Rate 
 Fatalities per 1000 employees 
 Fatalities – Third Party 
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Appendix Table 2: List of environmental disclosure items 
A. Audit/Verification Verification Type 
 Latest Period End Date CSR 
B. Certifications ISO 14001 Certified Sites 
 Number of Sites 
 % of Sites Certified 
C. Damages Number of Spills 
 Number of Environmental Fines 
 Environmental Fines (Amount) 
 Number of Spills  
D. Emission Indirect CO2 Emissions  
 Direct CO2 Emissions 
 Total CO2 Emissions  
 CO2 Intensity  
 Travel Emissions  
 Nitrogen Oxide Emissions 
 Sulphur Oxide Emissions 
 VOC Emissions 
 Carbon Monoxide Emissions 
 Methane Emissions  
 ODS Emissions  
 Particulate Emissions 
 Emissions Reduction Initiatives 
 GHG Scope 1 
 GHG Scope 2 
 GHG Scope 3 
 Sulphur Oxide Emissions 
 Greenhouse Gas Intensity per Sales 
 Greenhouse Gas Intensity per EBITDA 
 Greenhouse Gas Intensity per Energy Consumption 
 Greenhouse Gas Intensity per Employee 
 Greenhouse Gas Intensity per Retail Elec Sold 
 Travel Related Greenhouse Gas per Employee 
 Carbon Dioxide Intensity per EBITDA 
 Carbon Dioxide Intensity per Employee 
 Carbon Dioxide Intensity per Retail Elec Sold 
 Travel Related Carbon Dioxide per Employee 
 Total GHG Emissions  
 Total Greenhouse Gas / Carbon Dioxide Emissions 
 Total GHG CO2 Emissions Intensity per Sales 
E. Other Green Building Policy 
 Climate Change Policy 
 Environmental Quality Management Policy 
 Investments in Operational Sustainability 
 Environmental Accounting Cost 
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 Biodiversity Policy 
 ESG Disclosure Score 
 Environmental Disclosure Score 
 Climate Change Opportunities Discussed 
 Risks of Climate Change Discussed 
F. Product New Products – Climate Change 
G. Resource Consumption Total Energy Consumption (MWh) 
 Renewable Energy Use (MWh) 
 Total Water Use 
 % Water Recycled 
 Discharges to Water 
 Paper Consumption  
 Fuel Used (Th Litres) 
 Raw Materials Used 
 % Recycled Materials 
 Energy Efficiency Policy 
 Sustainable Packaging 
 Electricity Used 
 Water per Unit of Production 
 Energy Intensity per Sales 
 Energy Intensity per EBITDA 
 Energy Intensity per Employee 
 Energy Intensity per MBOE Produced 
 Water Intensity per Sales 
 Water Intensity per EBITDA 
 Water Intensity per Energy Consumption 
 Water Intensity per Employee 
 Paper Consumption per Employee 
 Total Power Generated 
 Waste Sent to Landfills 
 Fuel Used – Crude Oil/Diesel 
 Fuel Used – Coal/Lignite 
 Fuel Used – Natural Gas 
H. Supply Chain Environmental Supply Chain Management 
 Total Recordable Incident Rate 
I. Waste Management Hazardous Waste 
 Total Waste  
 Waste Recycled 
 Paper Recycled  
 Waste Reduction Policy 
 Total Water Discharged 
 Water Discharge Percent 
 Waste Generated per Sales 
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Appendix 3: Description of variables 
Main governance variables 
Expected  
sign 
Variable 
(abbreviation) 
Variables 
(full name) 
Description Source  
+ GLOBAL_ 
GOVSCORE 
Global 
governance 
score 
Average of two global governance variables: 
GRI and UNGC 
Bloomberg 
ESG database  
+ COUNTRY_ 
GOVSCORE 
Country-level 
governance 
score 
Average of six country-level governance 
variables: VA, PV, GE, RQ, RL and CC  
Worldwide 
governance 
indicators of 
the World 
Bank  
+ FIRM_ 
GOVSCORE 
Firm-level 
Governance 
score 
Average of four firm-level governance 
variables: board independence, female on the 
board, the board size, number of board 
meetings 
Bloomberg 
ESG database  
Global governance variables 
 
+ 
UNGC United 
Nation 
Global 
Compact 
UNGC dummy variable; equals 1 if the firm 
is a signatory of UNGC, otherwise 0 
 
Bloomberg 
ESG database  
 
+ 
GRI Global 
Reporting 
Initiatives  
GRI is a dummy variable; equals 1 if the firm 
is compliant with GRI requirement, otherwise 
0 
Bloomberg 
ESG database  
Country-level governance variables 
+ VA Voice and 
accountability  
Perceptions of the extent to which a country’s 
citizens can participate in selecting their 
government, as well as freedom of expression, 
freedom of association, and free media. 
Worldwide 
governance 
indicators of 
the World 
Bank  
+ PV Political 
stability and 
absence of 
violence 
Perceptions of the likelihood that the 
government will be destabilized or 
overthrown by unconstitutional or violent 
means, including politically motivated 
violence and terrorism. 
Worldwide 
governance 
indicators of 
the World 
Bank  
- GE Governance 
effectiveness  
Perceptions of the quality of public services, 
the quality of the civil service, and the degree 
of its independence from political pressures, 
the quality of policy formulation and 
implementation, and the credibility of the 
government’s commitment to such policies. 
Worldwide 
governance 
indicators of 
the World 
Bank  
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+ RQ Regulatory 
quality  
Perceptions of the ability of the government to 
formulate and implement sound policies and 
regulations that permit and promote private 
sector development. 
Worldwide 
governance 
indicators of 
the World 
Bank  
- RL Rule of law Perceptions of the extent to which agents have 
confidence in and abide by the rules of 
society, and in particular the quality of 
contract enforcement, property rights, the 
police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood 
of crime and violence. 
Worldwide 
governance 
indicators of 
the World 
Bank  
+ CC Control of 
corruption  
The extent to which public power is exercised 
for private gain, including both petty and 
grand forms of corruption, as well as the 
‘capture’ of the state by elites and private 
interests. 
Worldwide 
governance 
indicators of 
the World 
Bank  
Firm-level governance variables 
+ BIND Board 
independence  
The proportion of independent board 
members  
Bloomberg 
ESG database  
+ FEMD Female 
director on 
board  
The proportion of female board members Bloomberg 
ESG database  
+ BSIZE Board size Number of board members  Bloomberg 
ESG database  
+ BMTG Board 
meeting  
Number of board meetings  Bloomberg 
ESG database  
Control Variables 
+ ROA 
 
Return on 
assets 
The ratio of earnings before interest and 
taxes, and total assets 
Bloomberg 
ESG database  
+ FSIZE Firm size Natural logarithm of total assets Bloomberg 
ESG database  
+ MTB Market to 
book value 
Market value of a stock to book value of 
stock 
Bloomberg 
ESG database  
- LEV Leverage  The ratio of the book value of total debt and 
total assets 
Bloomberg 
ESG database  
+ GDP Gross 
domestic 
product  
Natural logarithm of the gross domestic 
product (GDP) per capita, at the current price 
World Bank 
website  
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Appendix 4: Profiles and details of the interviewees 
Sl # Position and Organisation Background and 
affiliations 
Gender Dates Length: 
Minutes 
Code* 
Corporate Interviewees   
1.  CEO of a listed company 
(insurance) which is a 
member of UNGC 
UN SDG pioneer for 
women economic 
security 
Female 24/04/2019 70 CEO1 
2.  CEO of a listed company 
(bank) which is a member 
of UNGC, issued CSR 
report following GRI G4 
and known for CSR 
reporting awards 
Worked in MNCs; 
known for sustainability 
and reporting  
Male 14/05/2019 48 CEO2 
3.  CEO of a listed company 
(finance) which is a member 
of UNGC, issued CSR 
reports following GRI G4 
and known for CSR 
reporting awards 
FCMA Male 07/05/2019 60 CEO3 
4.  CEO of an MNC Independent director of 
two other MNCs; 
member of an NGO 
Female 06/05/2019 80 CEO4 
5.  CEO of a listed company 
(insurance) known for 
reporting awards 
- Female 25/04/2019 70 CEO5 
6.  Deputy managing director 
of a listed company (bank) 
which is a member of 
UNGC, issued CSR report 
following GRI G4 and 
known for CSR reporting 
awards 
Certified Sustainability 
Reporting Assurer; 
FCMA, 
Head of Sustainability 
Reporting Team 
Male 05/03/2019 40 CSR 
Team1 
7.  Head of CSR of a listed 
company (finance) which is 
a member of UNGC, issued 
CSR reports following GRI 
G4 and known for CSR 
reporting awards 
Worked at MNCs and 
NGOs earlier 
Female 01/04/2019 120 CSR 
Team1 
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8.  Vice president and member 
of CSR Reporting Team of 
a company (bank) which is 
a member of UNGC, issued 
CSR reports following GRI 
G4 and known for CSR 
reporting awards 
Certified Sustainability 
Reporting Specialist 
Male 10/03/2019 62 CSR 
Team1 
9.  Member of CSR Reporting 
Team of a listed company 
(bank) which is a member 
of UNGC, issued CSR 
report following GRI G4 
and known for CSR 
reporting awards 
Certified Sustainability 
Reporting Specialist 
Male 10/03/2019 51 CSR 
Team1 
10.  Chairman of a state-owned 
financial institution,  
chairman of the executive 
committee of the largest 
private bank, vice president 
of an accounting body 
FCA, FCMA, PhD and 
Professor of Accounting, 
former director of banks 
and stock exchange  
Male 10/03/2019 45 BC 
11.  Independent director  Chair of the audit 
committee, FCMA, 
Professor of Finance 
Male 30/03/2019 124 ID1 
12.  Independent director of two 
listed companies  
Former bureaucrat; 
audit committee chair 
 
Male 08/05/2019 30 ID2  
13.  Independent director of a 
listed company 
Former CEO of a private 
commercial bank 
Male 24/02/2019 43 ID3 
14.  Independent director and 
chair of the Audit 
Committee of a listed 
company 
Professor of Accounting, 
FCMA 
Male 25/03/2019 47 ID4 
15.  Independent director A listed company, 
Professor of Banking 
and Finance  
Male 07/04/2019 71 ID5 
16.  CEO of a telecom company 
and independent director of 
some companies, including 
MNCs 
FCA, chair of an NGO 
for underprivileged 
children, member of 
CSOs advocating 
Female 25/03/2019 55 FD1  
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transparency and control 
of corruption and policy 
based on multi-
stakeholder engagement,  
member of Advisory 
Board of UNICEF, 
former president of an 
accountants’ body 
17.  Director of a state-owned 
bank  
CEO of an investment 
company 
Female 19/03/2019 32 FD2 
18.  Director of a state-owned 
bank 
CEO of a private 
company 
Female 18/04/2019 33 FD3  
19.  President of a multilateral 
trade association and 
independent director  
Director of a few 
companies;  
lawyer 
Female 02/05/2019 68 TA1  
20.  President of a Women Trade 
Association 
Director of a stock 
exchange and several 
companies, 
former Vice President of 
FBCCI, known for 
woman entrepreneurship 
Female 27/04/2019 70 TA2 
21.  President of a bilateral trade 
association 
The country 
representative of a 
foreign external trade 
relations organisation 
Male 13/05/2019 51 TA3  
22.  General Secretary of a 
bilateral trade association 
CEO (consultant) of a 
consulting company 
Male 12/05/2019 70 TA4 
23.  The executive director of a 
Bangladeshi MNC which is 
a member of UNGC and 
adopted ISO 9000 for the 
first time in Bangladesh, 
Member of UNGC 
FCA 
 
Male 20/03/2019 48 CORP1 
24.  Deputy managing director 
of a bank 
- Male 28/02/2019 30 CORP1 
25.  Vice president of a bank Regularly writes in the 
newspaper on 
contemporary issues 
Male 28/03/2019 80 CORP3 
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26.  Vice president of a trade 
association 
CEO of a company  Male 17/02/2019 46 TA5 
Noncorporate Interviewees    
27.  Chair of CSR Award 
Committee 
Former Cabinet member 
(minister) of the 
Caretaker Government, 
Director of Central 
Bank, chair of the panel 
of Economist for 
different Five-Year Plan 
and Perspective Plan 
Male 06/05/2019 60 CSR 
Expert1 
28.  CEO, CSR expert and 
consultant for reporting  
Local network of a UN 
initiative  
 
Female 20/03/2019 65 CSR 
Expert2 
29.  Academic, 
CSR expert 
Professor, expert, and a 
post-doctoral fellowship 
in CSR  
Male 11/03/2019 30 CSR 
Expert3 
30.  President of an accounting 
body  
Current and former 
independent director of a 
few companies, 
including MNCs, 
FCA; worked as a 
statutory auditor and at 
MNCs 
Male 18/04/2019 65 ACCNT  
31.  Former governor of the 
Central Bank 
 
Known for CSR 
expertise and initiatives; 
researcher and 
development activist 
Male 28/04/2019 48 REG1 
32.  The former deputy governor 
of the Central Bank 
Social activist, writer 
and critic 
Male 14/03/2019 31 REG2 
33.  Commissioner, Securities 
and Exchange Commission 
FCMA, 
Professor of Accounting 
Male 14/03/2019 124 REG3 
34.  CEO of the stock exchange Former CEO of a bank Male 25/03/2019 30 REG4 
35.  CFO of a stock exchange FCA, 
worked in MNCs at 
home and abroad 
Male 18/03/2019 62 REG5 
36.  General Manager of the 
Central Bank 
Known for CSR 
expertise 
Male 25/03/2019 54 REG6 
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37.  Director of Securities and 
Exchange Commission 
Expertise in governance Male 04/03/2019 42 REG7 
38.  Deputy general manager 
(DGM) of a stock exchange 
- Female 31/03/2019 67 REG8 
39.  Deputy Director of the 
Central Bank 
Expertise in CSR and 
green banking 
Male 18/03/2019 47 REG9 
40.  Member of CSO advocating 
transparency and control of 
corruption  
A former adviser to the 
Caretaker Government 
(minister), Secretary of 
Government of 
Bangladesh, independent 
director, chairperson of a 
CSO, worked at World 
Bank and ADB 
Male 18/02/2019 
 
51 NGO/C
SO1 
41.  Vice President of a USA-
based international NGO for 
poverty and hunger; 
founder secretary of a CSO 
(think-tank) for good 
governance 
Political analyst, local 
government and election 
expert; 
development worker 
Male 09/04/2019 68 NGO/C
SO2 
42.  Former Secretary of 
Government of Bangladesh 
Bureaucrat and 
governance researcher  
Male 11/04/2019 107 NGO/C
SO3 
43.  Senior Executive of a CSO 
(think-tank) for policy based 
on multi-stakeholder 
engagement 
PhD in structural 
impediments to 
Bangladesh’s economic 
growth, expert of 
Development Policy, 
international trade and 
globalisation 
Male 07/04/2019 70 NGO/C
SO4 
44.  Academic Professor of Accounting Male 13/02/2019 30 ACA1 
45.  Academic  PhD in CSR reporting in 
banks in Bangladesh  
Male 11/02/2019 45 ACA2 
46.  Academic PhD in foreign direct 
investment, 
Research corporate 
governance and family 
business 
Male 18/03/2019 59 ACA3 
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47.  Academic, governance 
Expert 
FCMA, Professor of 
Accounting, PhD in CSR 
and Governance  
Male 08/04/2019 56 ACA4 
48.  Academic Professor Male 24/02/2019 41 ACA5 
49.  Academic Professor of Accounting Male 24/03/2019 42 ACA6 
The total duration of the interview 2838 minutes 
The average duration of the interview (2838 minutes/49) 58 minutes  
*CEO stands for Chief Executive Office; CSR Team stands for a member of CSR team; BC stands for Chairman 
of the Board; ID stands for Independent Director; FD stands for Female Director; TA stands for Trade 
Association; CORP stands for Corporate Interviewee; CSR Expert stands for CSR Expert; ACCNT stands for 
Professional Accountant; REG stands for Regulator; NGO/CSO stands for Non-governmental 
Organisation/Civil Society Organisation, and ACA stands for Academician. 
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Appendix 5: Case study: Mixed experience of a successful independent director in 
Bangladesh 
 
This case study shows how effective is the inclusion of independent directors in enhancing 
corporate governance and corporate social and environmental reporting. This illustrates the 
diverse ‘rise and fall’ experiences of one of the top-performing independent directors who was 
selected through an appropriate process (similar to a peer review). Initially, he was disliked by 
the sponsor directors for his insistence for compliance and was asked to resign. He struggled 
with all of his capabilities and finally could convince the board that his role is for the 
betterment of the company, not for his benefit. He has shared some of the dynamics and 
idiosyncratic status quo. His views indicate that it is very difficult for a typical independent 
director (ID) to play an independent role. 
 
The responses of the case ID have been outlined in direct speech, in the following order: 
motivation to be an ID, how he was appointed, difficulties faced, how he overcame the 
difficulties and survived, support from some of the directors, making positive contributions 
and getting accepted, other independent directors, how different he is from the typical ID, 
absence of enforcement by BSEC and Bangladesh Bank, and concluding remarks. 
 
Motivation to be an independent director 
I have chosen to be an independent director of a bank because there is a bigger role to play in 
a bank. Because Bangladesh Bank empowered independent directors by requiring them to have 
the financial literacy to be made the chairman of the audit committee. The audit committee 
chairman has been given power in many areas. now they give the annual confidential report 
(ACR) of the head of the audit. So, under this rule, the owners are bound to do it whether they 
like it or not. When I was offered this position, I thought this is an opportunity to serve the 
nation by creating some good examples. So, I enjoy it because I feel I own this bank and 
accordingly feel if I can do better for this bank. 
 
How he was appointed 
In earlier cases, the chairman used to pick up whoever he liked. It was simply an invitation 
made to known people. But in my case, the earlier chairman sought some advice from someone 
(expert/peer) who quoted some names and I was one of the chosen. Fortunately, I have been 
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made the chairman of the audit committee because I have a professional degree. Being a fellow 
of the Institute of Cost and Management Accountants in addition to my doctorate in Applied 
Economics, an MBA major in Finance and a Professor in Finance, I qualified according to the 
regulation that has been mentioned there. 
 
Difficulties faced 
I wouldn’t like to share that bitter experience. But I will say how I came across that problem. 
For whatever reason, they rejected me, they didn’t want to listen. I argued and tried to convince 
them, but still, they didn’t like me. Because they have a perennial idea that what they believe, 
it has to be. At the beginning of my tenure, they said: “you can resign”. You see the kind of 
force they applied. 
 
How did you overcome the difficulties and survive? 
I said, “if I resign, I will quote this kind of behaviour to BSEC and Bangladesh Bank and then 
your chairmanship will be in trouble.” With that threat, they kept away from that. But over 
time, they have seen that whatever I had said earlier was happening. Therefore, they started 
believing – “what he is saying is correct”. Later on, I found that many of them on the board 
were complacent with my job, with my performance, and I managed to get their mindset to be 
changed. Before they wouldn’t like to listen to what I was saying; they said: “who is doing 
that kind of thing?” Now they are listening; at least I improved their absorption capacity of 
listening. Now if they take 70 – 80%, that is my achievement. So, I had to change their mind. 
Over time, whatever the objections I made, I said that “this will impact your performance in 
future”. In the following two years, the same things that I warned about happened. Then they 
started believing that “this fellow knows things”. Now they want to listen. I have improved 
their perception. I improved their knowledge. Now they listen and they find that whatever I 
am saying is good for the company. Even now, they don’t listen to 10 – 20% of my advice. 
But I have proved myself, and that’s the way I have overcome the challenges. 
 
Support from some of the directors 
I got support from some directors who said: “he has no personal interest. He has no benefits 
whether his suggestions are implemented or not.” That kind of support made the others think. 
It wasn’t me saying that, it w the other directors who felt early, who have changed their minds 
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and convinced others. There are more dynamics which are really different from bank to bank, 
from industry to industry. 
 
Making positive contributions and getting accepted 
After being inducted as an independent director and chairman audit committee, within one and 
a half years, there was one incident which didn’t show good governance of the bank. But since 
I had more understanding of the laws and regulations of the BSEC and Bangladesh Bank, I 
forcefully told them “you are violating the law” and the board chairman and others apologised 
for the behaviour they had with me earlier. And with that struggle, I am surviving and 
continuing the second term. At this moment, I have been accepted by them as a freelance 
consultant. They have found that I am working for the institution. It took two years to convince 
them that I am for the institution, not for any individuals. 
 
What about other independent directors 
In some cases, they (other independent directors) may not be able to continue for the second 
term until and unless they can convince the sponsor directors, as I have convinced them. 
Elsewhere, they are not continuing for the second term. First thing, I know what I am saying; 
this is my firm conviction that I am saying what is the reality; I am saying what is going to 
implicate the firm. 
 
How different are you from the typical independent directors?  
I am damn sure. They (previous and current Managing Directors) used to say that I fall in 5% 
of the total independent directors of the listed companies in the country, who are doing this 
kind of things. So, it is only 5% whose works are similar to mine. So, you can consider “surely 
it is different. You can survive the rest of the period and the next period you will be gone.” 
But what am saying I have achieved? The environment was not favourable to me at that time. 
But I turned it into a favourable One. That means I considered myself as an agent for change. 
This may not be possible for many of the directors. So, you cannot expect that they will be 
able to succeed in changing the environment.  
 
Absence of enforcement by BSEC and Bangladesh Bank 
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Again, regarding the rule of law and the situation of the country, the sponsors are the super-
rich. They are politicians or have connections with politicians. They dominate the regulators. 
The regulators do not like to disturb them. According to the regulation of Bangladesh Bank, a 
person cannot be a board member in more than one bank, non-bank financial institute, and the 
insurance company. To join a bank, I resigned from the non-bank financial company. I 
complied with the regulations. I know some sponsor directors were on the board of a bank and 
NBFI or insurance company simultaneously. But the regulator did not enforce the regulation. 
The environment is such that even if the regulator tried to do something; they were under 
pressure by the regime. 
 
Concluding remarks 
So far, I consider myself successful. If I had not been liked by them, they would have not 
reappointed me for the second term. 
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Appendix 6: SER in Bangladesh: Boardroom experience of a female director 
Interviewer: What is your role in promoting CSRD? 
Female director (FD): Basically, the reporting of CSR is done by the management; 
Interviewer: What about CSR? 
FD: It is generally decided by the chairman. However, in case of any emergency or 
natural calamity, we usually discuss helping the victims. 
Interviewer: Could you please share such an experience if you can remember any? 
FD: For example, when there was a severe flood in Sylhet, I proposed that we should 
give loans to the farmers and we should do it right now. And I am thankful to all the 
members of the board because they all supported it. 
Interviewer: Have you observed any difference between the role of men and women for 
CSR and SED? 
FD: Basically, CSR is not a regular agenda of the board and I don’t find any difference 
between men and women. Frankly speaking, it’s ‘chairman and the management’. 
Interviewer: It is said that having women in the top management or boardroom may be 
encouraging and beneficial for other women. How do you see it from your boardroom 
experience? 
FD: You see, we do not have the power to decide, but when there is an issue, say, for 
example, promotion, we request the chairman to give priority to the women if there are 
any women candidates. 
Interviewer: How do you see corruption and its influence on CSR disclosure? 
FD: I have an objection to corruption. Say, for example, someone has embezzled money 
and I think that person should not have the job anymore. He should not be excused, 
because he has breached trust. But I have found that people say he refunded the money; 
he apologised, etc. I don’t support this policy. If the same thing happened in my own 
company, I would never tolerate it because he has broken my trust. So, he cannot be with 
me anymore. But it is said that it is not possible to sack someone easily; government job 
doesn’t go easily. So, I do not like this. 
Interviewer: Have you protested in such a situation (corruption)? 
FD: You see, it is not an individual director’s matter. A board consists of about 20 
people. So, the decision is made by the majority. My choice or opinion may not be 
reflected in the board decisions. 
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Interviewer: Are there any other female directors on the board? 
FD: Yes, another two women are there. 
Interviewer: Do you get support from the other two female directors? 
FD: It’s not a man or woman; someone’s opinion depends on the types of the agenda. 
Interviewer: You are a director of a government bank and the CEO of your own 
company. How do you see your role in these two companies? 
FD: The two organizations are totally different. This business has been developed by me 
and I have been running it for the last 37 years. I think my voice, my freedom and respect 
are much more in my company than that in others. 
Interviewer: Do you have a chance to talk there? 
FD: There is a chance to talk, but how much your opinions are counted, that is a different 
thing (important). I feel the most interest in my own business. I am happy with the 
success of my own business. 
Interviewer: Could you please tell me how do you see CSR? 
FD: Look, if a company does not do its main activities properly, what will you do with 
CSR? There are many anomalies. 
Interviewer: Please tell me more. 
FD: Sorry, I don’t want to talk about those. 
Interviewer: Do you face any difficulties as a member of the board? 
FD: Many difficulties are there. Saying that has no benefit. These have no solutions. 
 
 
